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“Secularism Narratives and Arab American Fiction” focuses on contemporary fiction’s 
challenge to the liberal political construction of minority religious practices and community life 
as incompatible with modernity, progress, and secularism. U.S. secularism is not simply the 
absence of religion from the public sphere, but is underwritten by a particularly U.S. Protestant 
conception of religion that has historically shaped assumptions about what it means to be both 
religious and secular in the United States. Looking to Mohja Kahf, Rabih Alameddine, Ninar 
Esber, Mouir Fatmi, and Hasan Elahi, I explore immigrant narratives that work outside 
religious/secular binaries; rather than operating unequivocally within the terms of religious 
categorizations, contemporary writers often recast those terms and respond to the secularism 
narrative by scrambling the terms of the religious/secular binary through lived, embodied 
religious experience. These works dispute the dominant United States narrative of secularism 
and its claim to be universal and progressive; rather, they reveal how prohibitory secularism 
enforces an exclusionary citizenry through racialized immigration policies, Islamaphobic 
political rhetoric and popular culture, and the promotion of specific economic forms and 
ideologies worldwide. I argue that secularism is entangled with global ideologies of human 
rights, but also with the particularly United States legal discourses of privacy and property. 
Moreover, by elucidating the relationship between generic forms and the secular conventions 
that inform them, I uncover how these texts work to restructure and resist secular narratives of 
modernization and, by doing so, create the potential for more inclusive secularisms.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Secularism and Muslim and Arab American Fiction 
 
A dream between us 
fogging what we want to see . . .  
A prison, but then everywhere else is a prison . . .  
Who ain’t a slave, asks Ishmael. 
The worse form of government except for all the others, etc . . . 
To wipe the glass window with a muddy rag, 
enclosing us within the house upon the Malibu hills. 
What girds one’s bearing against attention? 
What will send the nerves to their first apprehensions? 
A picture now. 
A tremble. 
A night full of furor. 
 -Khalid Mattawa, “Toqueville” (46) 
 
Khalid Mattawa’s 2010 collection of poetry, Toqueville, begins with the question: “Will 
answers be found/ like seeds/ planted among rows of song?” (2) Mattawa commences his book 
by questioning the ethical role of the poet as aesthetic witness to atrocity and translator of 
history. The title poem of the volume roams widely from the horrific violence in Sierra Leone, to 
Vietnamese sweatshops, to child pornography, to CIA operatives explaining their trade craft.  
Fellow poet Phillip Metres calls the 26 page poem a “tour-de-force globalist polyphonic collage” 
in which the poet “recreates the poet’s role as global Tocqueville” and “linger[s] on the dark 
abyss of global connectedness, of its profound alienation, without any Friedmanesque elation” 
(Metres).  The poet of “Toqueville” no longer has the privilege of distance that Toqueville, the 
famous foreign observer of the United States, once had; instead, the poet is implicated in the 
United States’ domestic and foreign policy, in its empire and in the crush of globalization.  This 
implication crops up repeatedly in the poem, in a multitude of different voices: “And I realized I 
was one of them,” and “You’ve got to admit that we’re all white people now,” and finally a voice 
asks, “Who is talking now?  Which ‘we’ are you inserting yourself into now?” (41, 43, 44).  
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What is the place, the poem asks, of story-telling, of witness and of lyric, in the midst of all this 
horror?  A Sierra Leone man who was forced to kill his own child says, “I am one of the stories 
now, one of the signs” (40).  The question, “which ‘we’ are you inserting yourself into now” 
accuses the poet of appropriating stories and voices through the act of writing, just as the poem 
transforms the Sierra Leone man into an allegory for human depravity.  “How do you belong 
when you just observe?” asks one voice, and another replies, “You make observation your 
home” (38). 
I begin with Mattawa’s poetry because he asks what it means to use art – including 
literary forms that emerge from the hegemonic culture - to address questions of globalization and 
empire, and explores the consequences of making “observation your home.”  Every section of 
the poem, while extending outward globally to touch on a myriad of themes, eventually circles 
back to the politics and promises of the United States. The very forms of the poems in the book, 
from the lyric of the first poem and the collage of “Toqueville” to the “Power Point” series, 
partake of the Western cultural tradition, as well as the narration of progressive civilization, that 
the poem critiques.  My dissertation, “Secularism Narratives and Arab American Fiction,” 
attends to questions of the relationship between aesthetics and empire from the vantage point of 
one of the key Western narratives that Mattawa’s volume implicitly critiques: the progressive 
story of secularism that works in tandem with the miscarried promises of freedom, democracy, 
and free enterprise that Mattawa addresses.  The authors and artists I consider also employ 
Western literary forms, and through the process of writing, performing, and producing art, 
transform them, and consequently, create transformative conceptions of secularism. 
The liberal democratic sphere has long been defined as the endpoint of the forward march 
of modernity – a progressive journey always advancing towards more perfect manifestations of 
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modern civilization and the values it produces.  As Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pelligrini write in 
their introduction to Secularisms:  
Specifically, secularism is central to the Enlightenment narrative in which reason 
progressively frees itself from the bonds of religion and in so doing liberates humanity.  
This narrative poses religion as a regressive force in the world, one that in its dogmatism 
is not amenable to change, dialogue, or nonviolent conflict resolution.  This 
Enlightenment narrative separates secularism from religion and through this separation 
claims that secularism, like reason, is universal (in contrast to the particularities of 
religion).  However, this narrative also places secularism in a particular historical 
tradition, one that is located in Europe and grows out of Christianity (2). 
It is thus taken as an article of faith that secularism is central to modernity, that it enables 
progress towards universalism, and that it represents development or emancipation.  The 
secularization narrative works by creating a dichotomy between rationality and irrationality, 
progress and traditionalism.  Recent scholarship on the secularization thesis challenges the 
received view that secularism indicates a neutral, non-historical, non-political, abstract 
principle.1  Whatever the secular might mean – and there are many competing definitions – it is 
not merely the absence of religion.  Rather, secularism and religion are mutually constitutive: 
secularism makes claims about the meaning of religion and what constitutes proper religious 
subjectivity in the modern world.   
                                                          
1For an example of the shift in scholarship on secularism, see Charles Taylor’s groundbreaking work, A Secular Age 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. Print).  For examples of critical responses to 
Taylor’s work, see Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pelligrini’s edited volume: Secularisms. Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008. Print.  Additionally, see Michael Warner’s, Jonathan VanAntwerpen’s, and Craig J. Calhoun’s edited 
volume: Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010. Print. 
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But what exactly constitutes proper religious subjectivity in the modern, secular world?  
The general concept of secularism at play in Western societies defines religion as a set of 
propositions in which an individual subject believes or acquiesces.  This emphasis on individual 
belief is rooted in Protestant ideologies of faith and practice that developed in tandem with the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation.2  Therefore, as Talal Asad writes, “Where faith had once 
been a virtue, it now acquired an epistemological sense.  Faith became a way of knowing 
supernatural objects, paralleled to the knowledge of nature (the real world) that reason and 
observation provided” (38-39).  For Charles Taylor, this shift opens the horizon of possible 
beliefs, as “the process of disenchantment involves a change in sensibility; one is open to 
different things,” and “we tend to think of our differences from our remote forebears in terms of 
different beliefs, whereas there is something much more puzzling involved here” (“Western 
Secularity”, 40).  According to Taylor, the differences between our ancestors as well as those not 
participating in the “secular age” is more than a difference of belief, it is a difference of 
experience.  It may even be a difference in ontology that entails distinctive ways of being in the 
world, although Taylor certainly does not suggest this conclusion.  Nonetheless, within secular 
societies, faith is considered a way of knowing and not experiencing, and religion is ascribing to 
a set of (sometimes) codified beliefs that are recognizable as only one set amongst many possible 
beliefs, all of which stem from the individual subject.   
                                                          
2 Western secularism’s emergence from and dependence upon a specific strain of Protestant thought has been 
established by numerous scholars.  For example, Jakobsen and Pelligrini state: “Recognizing the co-origination of 
secularism and market-reformed Protestantism unmasks the national and religious particularities that have come to 
pass as a universal secular.  This secularism was linked at its origins to a particular religion and a particular location, 
and it was maintained through a particular set of practices” (Secularisms, 3).  Furthermore, as Tracy Fessenden 
argues: “Evacuating religious authority from its institutional locations, the Reformation generated its presence 
‘everywhere,’ not least in secular guise – an outcome, it further bears reminding, given as ‘truth’ or ‘freedom’ in the 
measure that the Reformation frames its program as liberation from the errors and superstitions of Rome.  In this 
sense Protestantism’s emancipation from Catholicism both provides the blueprint for, and sets the limits of, 
secularism’s emancipation from ‘religion’ itself” (Culture and Redemption, 4). 
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Religious subjects thus seem easy to define.  Religious identity, particularly with regard 
to certain sects of Judaism and Christianity, and certain Islamic practices, is often publically 
visible, for example in the dress of the Hassidim or the Amish.  Religious identity can be marked 
by one’s name, bodily markings, habits, or religiously coded attire.  The corporeal or affective 
dimensions of secularity, however, are seen as unmarked.  Implicit to the concept of secular self-
understanding is that it is disembodied; it has its roots in philosophical rationalism, not in the 
body, in an approach to life, not the shaping of life itself.  Scholars have begun to question these 
assumptions and assign corporeal disciplines to secularism.  For example, Nilüfer Göle points to 
secular material culture and bodily habitus, and looks at the ways in which public, secular spaces 
like the French classroom condition bodies, in this case the enforcement of French state 
ideologies through coerced dress, namely the banning of headscarves (248).  In many ways these 
disciplines complement the Protestant ethos that informs them, as with compulsory 
heterosexuality and the gendering of public and private spheres. But could it be the experience of 
secular society, not one’s individual beliefs, that in fact creates secular subjects?  If this is the 
case, than no matter one’s personal beliefs, living in a secular society means being habituated (or 
coerced) into secular subjectivity.    
 Göle writes, “Secularism is about state politics, lawmaking, and constitutional principles, 
but foremost it permeates and establishes the rhythm of the phenomenology of everyday life 
practices” (254).  Furthermore, “The powers of the secular can be traced in its capacity to 
develop a set of disciplinary practices, both corporeal and spatial, that are inseparable from the 
formations of the secular self” (254).  My dissertation underscores the material conditions of 
Charles Taylor’s immanent frame; these phenomenological conditions shape the forms that 
freedom, community, religion and the individual can take.  According to Göle, the changing 
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conditions of belief that Taylor outlines are firmly rooted in bodily practice and 
conceptualizations of space, and, I would add, the narrative frameworks that produce and 
reproduce these disciplinary practices.  Thus the study of secularism has been taken up by 
scholars as a lens to examine how religious values are naturalized as secular and civic values 
through cultural production, as well as how secularism is embodied in, as Göle writes, “people’s 
agencies and imaginaries” (254).    
There are of course many ways that literature is tied to matters of religion.  Scholars such 
as Tracy Fessenden have explained that link by describing how canonical U.S. literature 
naturalizes Christian values as secular, while containing, suppressing, or excluding other forms 
of religious expression.3  And others like John McClure have understood contemporary literature 
as an expression of postsecular philosophies.4  These critics thereby understand literature in 
terms of its relationship to the religious and secular values encoded in its language.  My work 
expands upon these frameworks by asking how literature enables us to imagine alternative 
secularisms through literary forms.   
“Secularism Narratives and Arab American Fiction” enters the debate by examining 
artistic endeavors that provide counter narratives to the seemingly endless and irresolvable 
process of secularization.   I analyze two novels by Arab American authors, in addition to a 
range of digital, visual, and performance art, that grapple with the shortcomings of secular forms 
of freedom.  United States secularism is underwritten by a Protestant ethos in which religion is 
consigned to the private sphere, and religious subjectivities that do not adhere to this model are 
considered anti-modern.  As a result, the ways in which secularism and religion frame 
                                                          
3 See: Fessenden, Tracy. Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2007. Print. 
4 See: McClure, John A. Partial Faiths: Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Pynchon and Morrison. Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2007. Print. 
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contemporary debates in the United States creates an impasse between acceptable forms of 
religiosity and those that are dangerous to the body politic. The works I look at employ formal 
devices to undo the religion-secular binary and open up new configurations for debate.  They 
critique what I term prohibitory secularism - a form of secularism that does not just limit 
religious expression in the public sphere, but defines what religious expression can be - therefore 
excluding minority religious communities from full political and cultural participation.  I 
demarcate prohibitory secularism rather than using the more general secularism, because these 
artistic projects are responding to the particular political project of United States secularism.  
While my project aims to develop a healthy critique of certain assumptions contained in 
dominant, prohibitory accounts of the secular, I don’t argue that we should discard that concept 
in its entirety.  Rather, I look to literature to envision how it may be enlarged and reconstellated.   
Mohja Kahf and Rabih Alameddine, as Arab American authors who write in English and 
who engage with Islam in their work, give diverse outlooks on Muslim American experiences of 
secularity in the United States.  Nouri Gana writes about the experience of “writing while 
Muslim, writing while Arab,” in which “the immigration lawmaking trajectory ….under laid as it 
is by the geopolitics of suspicion and the all-out war on terror, produces the conditions of 
possibility of racing Islam and Islamplyfying race while politicizing Muslims and Arabs alike – 
conferring on them, by virtue of their religious and cultural affiliations or differentials, a 
capacious political significance where the stakes are high” (1577).  By situating Muslim and 
Arab American literature within larger conversations about secularism and exceptionalism, I 
hope to present new perspectives on the place of Muslim and Arab American literature in the 
politics of the nation state.   
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Literature that critiques secular narratives and/or includes positive portrayals of Islam in 
the U.S. underscores the relationship between U.S. nationalism and its Protestant foundations.  It 
demonstrates how the influence of this relationship extends beyond Muslims to a range of 
communities, laws, cultural practices, and domestic and foreign policies, as well as how it 
continues to inform contemporary thinking.  Islam has become a touchstone for thinking and 
writing about secularism in many fields, particularly post 9/11 – including anthropology, 
ethnography, political science, sociology, and activism – which demonstrates the longstanding 
linkage between secularism and Orientalism in the global and U.S. contexts, but also entails a 
flattening out of difference.  Kahf and Alameddine’s texts, and the art of Ninar Esber, Mounir 
Fatmi, and Hasan Elahi, controvert contemporary politics that connect debates about secularism 
and modernity solely to incommensurability with Islam; rather, they point to broader networks 
between empire, globalization, and secularization by drawing on a variety of literary influences 
and tying together myriad histories of exclusion.  Analyzing these works with regard to secular 
narratives reveals how contemporary secular rhetoric draws upon a supposed inherent 
contradiction with Islam.  Yet it also reveals how secular rhetoric draws upon a long standing 
discourse rooted in Protestantism, and thus work on secularism and U.S. literature can and 
should extend outward to include scholarship on other kinds of religious and minority 
communities, keeping in mind the way in which contemporary arguments about religious 
freedom in the U.S. are framed in terms of a cultural clash with Islam.   
Finally, these texts and art are examples of ways in which “writing while Muslim, writing 
while Arab” in the U.S. can mean partaking in established literary traditions such as the 
immigrant bildungsroman, AIDS narratives, and diaries, and building upon them; “creating 
while Muslim, creating while Arab” can mean challenging preconceived notions of what it is to 
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be an “American” writer or a “religious” or “secular” artist.  Arab American literature is by no 
means a new phenomenon, yet in the last few decades there has been a concerted effort by 
scholars and writers to critically address Arab American literature as a category.  Part of that 
process has involved delineating the boundaries of the category and forming the canon, including 
gathering works by diverse authors into anthologies.5  These anthologies play an essential role in 
making Arab American literature visible and accessible to a wider reading public, as well as 
doing the work of legitimizing Arab American literature as part of the U.S. literary tradition.  
Indeed, recent scholarship on Arab American writing addresses familiar themes of immigration, 
exile, feminism, and post-colonialism, but also debate the parameters of the designation “Arab 
American”.6  Other scholars, such as Wail Hassan, Nouri Gana, and Layla Maleh, chose to make 
wider connections between Arab American writers, Arab Anglophone writers from different 
national contexts, and writers in diaspora. 7  My dissertation builds upon both of these scholarly 
strains.  I designate Kahf and Alameddine as taking part in and transforming the U.S. literary 
tradition; at the same time, I claim that both use transnational literary forms, are part of diasporic 
writing communities, and engage with secular narratives that are distinctly U.S., but have global 
reach.  The art of Esber, Fatmi, and Elahi connects with the work of Kahf and Alameddine 
                                                          
5 For examples of contemporary anthologies, see: Orfalea, Gregory, and Sharif Elmusa. Grape Leaves: A Century of 
Arab American Poetry. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988. Print. Kadi, Joanna. Food for Our 
Grandmothers: Writings by Arab-American and Arab-Canadian Feminists. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1994. 
Print.  Akash, Munīr, and Khaled Mattawa. Post-gibran Anthology of New Arab American Writing. West Bethesda, 
Md: Kitab, 1999. Print.  Kaldas, Pauline, and Khaled Mattawa. Dinarzad's Children: An Anthology of Contemporary 
Arab American Fiction. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2004. Print. Atefat-Peckham, Susan, and Lisa 
Suhair Majaj.  Talking Through the Door: An Anthology of Contemporary Middle Eastern American Writing.  
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2014. 2014. 
6 For an example see: Salaita, Steven. Modern Arab American Fiction: A Reader's Guide. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse 
University Press, 2011. Print.  And: Salaita, Steven. Arab American Literary Fictions, Cultures, and Politics. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print. 
7 Hassan, Waïl S. Immigrant Narratives: Orientalism and Cultural Translation in Arab American and Arab British 
Literature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print. Maleh, Layla. Arab Voices in Diaspora: Critical 
Perspectives on Anglophone Arab Literature. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009. Print. Gana, Nouri. The Edinburgh 
Companion to the Arab Novel in English: The Politics of Anglo Arab and Arab American Literature and Culture. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013. Internet resource. 
10 
 
because it engages with transnational literary forms, transforming them through performance, 
visual art, and social media.  However, analyzing their art also further demonstrates the global 
reach of the U.S. secular paradigm and underscores connections between Arab American writers 
and writers and artists in diaspora and the new aesthetic traditions and potential secularisms they 
are creating. 
Many scholars who write about the relationship between secularism and literature have 
begun using the term postsecular as a categorical term to designate the works they write about. 
Manav Ratti describes the postsecular as a paradox “to find a non-secular secularism, a non-
religious religion” (xx).  Ratti asks “how can the need for faith, awe, wonder, and transcendence 
find expression and significance without the political and ideological constraints of nationalism, 
secularism, and religion?” (xx).  He writes about “postsecular affirmative values” such as “love, 
friendship, community, art, literature, music, nature, the migrant’s eye-view, hybridity, and 
‘newness,” and his interest in how “writers write through religion by invoking its great signifiers 
and great ethics, and then translate and secularize them within the contingency – and urgency – 
of material and historical circumstance” (xxiii).  Postsecularism thus relates to literary form “as a 
marker of impossibility and possibility in capturing that which might be resistant to 
representation – such as a kind of ‘postsecular belief’ for which there might not be an easy 
creative or critical vocabulary mediating between the secular and the religious” (18).  In turn, 
John McClure writes that “certain features are constant across the field of postsecular texts.  The 
partial conversions of postsecular fiction do not deliver those who experience them from 
worldliness into well-ordered systems of religious belief.  Instead, they tend to strand those who 
experience them in the ideologically mixed and confusing middle zones of the conventional 
conversion narrative” (4).  This fiction’s “most characteristic strategies and claims,” he writes, 
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“are its plots of partial conversion, its project of ontological disruption, its efforts to reassert and 
to weaken religious conceptions of reality, and its attempts to imagine a new, religiously 
inflected, form of progressive politics” (4).  What McClure’s and Manav’s definitions of 
postsecular literature have in common is that the novels they write about critique secularism and 
institutional religion, promote progressive politics, do not advocate a return to the religious, and 
have a modicum of respect for faith, so long as it does not represent institutionalized belief 
systems.  These examples of postsecular literature only validate religion that is flexible and 
suitably progressive; they detail a liberal subject formation that is not too far afield from the 
secular thesis, only modified by an approach to religious multiplicity that is akin to 
multiculturalism.  They include all of the religious signifiers with none of the religiosity. 
The turn towards the postsecular as an analytic must indicate more than the critique of 
secular narratives of progression if it is to offer up new political and cultural possibilities.  It 
must look to artistic production that attempts to salvage secularism as an inclusive model for a 
multiplicity of practices to co-exist, not in diluted forms, and not apolitically.  One of the primary 
reasons I do not invoke the term postsecular with regard to the works in my dissertation is that 
these works do not necessarily take religion’s great signifiers and ethics and “translate” or 
“secularize” them.  For example, while the protagonist of Mohja Kahf’s The Girl in the 
Tangerine Scarf does experience an ontological disruption due to the circumstances of her life, 
she never abandons the orthodoxy of her Muslim faith.  Rather than translate or secularize 
Muslim signifiers and ethics, she validates them.  Although she imagines religiously inflected 
forms of progressive politics, they are based on theological interpretations of Islamic history and 
theology.  The women’s rights she asserts, for instance, abortion and wife initiated divorce, are 
always there within the history of the faith.  Likewise, although it is unclear if the protagonist of 
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Rabih Alameddine’s Koolaids: The Art of War considers himself a practicing Muslim, what is 
apparent is that many of his characters have unwavering faith, and that the book’s critique of 
institutional religion does not mean its inevitable dismantling. Mounir Fatmi, one of the artists 
whose work I analyze in my third chapter, uses sacred forms that enable the audience to imagine 
the transformation of secularism as a dialogic process that includes Muslims globally.  Instead of 
translating or secularizing sacred forms, Fatmi decontexualizes them in order to create new 
meanings.  The works included in my dissertation exhibit the need to restructure secularism from 
a political project and a cultural narrative that excludes Muslims and non-Westerners into an 
inclusive secularism that allows for religious and cultural particularities to co-exist.8   
All of these texts can be read together productively, despite and even because of their 
generic differences, as all use artistic forms to reflect a sense of human limitation and historical 
causation.  These texts are not calling for some kind of re-enchantment, or suggesting a 
weakened hybridity, or postsecularism, but are actually reformulating secularism to include 
themselves and their communities.  In contrast to prohibitory secularism, I define inclusive 
secularism as a form of secularism that has the space for communities to creatively solve the 
problems caused by prohibitory secularism.  As Ratti writes: 
                                                          
8Although unbiased inclusivity would appear to be the original goal of United States’ political secularism, its 
foundational ethics prevents that from actually being the case.  Thus the value (and implementation) of 
nondiscriminatory religious freedom is squandered because the way in which that freedom is conceptualized cannot 
incorporate difference. As Tracy Fessenden writes, “Far from being a neutral matrix, then, the secular sphere as 
constituted in American politics, culture, and jurisprudence has long been more permeable to some religious 
interventions than to others.  The co-implication of secularism and Reformed Christianity has meant, for example, 
that Christian religious polemic could remain compatible with America’s vaunted history of religious liberty and 
toleration by being cast in strictly secular terms.  Thus at various points in American history, Muslims, Catholics, or 
Mormons could be construed as enemies of republican institutions, Jews as a racial or economic threat, and Native 
American ritual practice as an affront to environmental or drug policy, all without apparent violence to cherished 
notions of religious freedom” (Culture and Redemption, 4).  The question is whether or not the potential value of 
religious freedom can be recuperated through secularism itself (and its reformation) or if new political and cultural 
models are needed.    
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….what fascinates me is that on one hand there are powerful modes of living together in 
spite of the divides of religion and nation: indigenous, personal modes that can be marked 
by fellowship, community, open-mindedness, and an acceptance and embracing of others.  
On the other hand, political systems, concepts, and forms of organization – such as state 
concepts like multiculturalism and secularism – fall short of recognizing and organizing 
“the people.” What can we make of this difference between individual practices of good 
will toward others and state-sanctioned, political ideas about how we should relate to one 
another? (xviii) 
I ask how literature can offer up not only critiques, but alternatives, to “political ideas about how 
we should relate to one another,” and if the community and individual values Ratti finds so 
inspiring can in fact influence political structures. So, for example, while Kahf illuminates the 
limits of secularism, she also sees its potential, and her novel ultimately envisions the secular 
context as a place in which to foster the umma - the global, transnational community to which 
every Muslim belongs.  I suggest that aspects of these texts, for example, forms of religious 
community like the umma as represented by Kahf, could become starting points for discussions 
on how to rethink secularism from a Muslim American perspective. 
As Vincent Pecora writes, what is significant is “that the static and totalizing concept of 
secularism – connoting an already achieved and reliably reproducible intellectual standpoint – be 
supplanted with a dynamic understanding of secularization, that is, with a process that has 
remained, at least up to the present, in some ambiguous relationship with religious tradition, 
neither translation and transformation, or radical overturning or forgetting” (208). A considerable 
question is whether a political ideology like secularism (no matter how dynamic an 
understanding we have of it) that is so marred by its own history can or should be maintained in 
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a different form.  I do not attempt to answer this question, rather I argue that the authors and 
artists I analyze are not imagining a world “post” secularism – they have not created entirely new 
political systems – but are working within the realm of United States secularism’s ideals of 
religious freedom, as troubled as that particular ideology may be.  The inclusively imagined 
secularism of The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf, for example, emerges from the ideals of U.S. 
secularism; it depends upon the secular promise of religious freedom to imagine alternative 
enactments of that freedom.  Secularism can only be thought of as in relationship with its 
religious foundations, and also with the various religions it encounters, absorbs, or excludes.  
Postsecularism does not adequately express the concerns of Muslim American writers who are 
not reimaging their religion, but are reimaging how they can practice it within the specificity of 
the United States secular context.   
In a similar vein, these authors and artists are working with forms that emerge from the 
Western literary tradition, for instance, Kahf’s use of the bildungsroman. In her analysis of 
Jamaica Kincaid’s Lucy, Maria Helena Lima writes, “I cannot help but continue to wonder what 
dangers lie in the form itself, given its central historical role in determining our notions of human 
identity. Since humanism’s unstated goal ...was to constitute a “center of humanity”... what is the 
Bildungsroman genre, recognizably one of the main carriers of humanist ideology, indeed 
helping to reproduce?” (859). I argue that Kahf, much like Lima eventually argues about 
Kincaid, transforms the genre.  Similarly, Alameddine reworks genres with his convergence of 
Western postmodern forms with classical Arabic poetic forms.  Therefore, I argue, the forms 
these authors and artists use – namely the bildungsroman, the postmodern novel, specific 
performance and visual art forms, and digital art –are tied to secularism as an aesthetic ideology, 
and furthermore, the transformation of Western literary forms by these authors and artists can 
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contribute expressive perspectives to the larger post-colonial project of refashioning secularism 
to be more inclusive. 
Related to the issue of racing Islam and “Islamplyfing” race in the United States is the 
issue of classifying Muslim (whether Arab American or otherwise) American literature, and the 
equally problematic factors of generic conventions and marketing niches.  Shalal-Esa writes that 
Kahf “would prefer to see [her] book categorized with other coming-of-age stories, not just Arab 
or Muslim-American fiction” (Shalal-Esa).  At the same time, Kahf believes in the pedagogical 
and literary potentialities of the category “Muslim American literature,” as she writes: 
Is there such a thing as Muslim American literature (MAL)? I argue that there is: It 
begins with the Muslims of the Black Arts Movement (1965–75). The Autobiography of 
Malcolm X is one of its iconic texts; it includes American Sufi writing, secular ethnic 
novels, writing by immigrant and second-generation Muslims, and religious American 
Muslim literature. Many of the works I would put into this category can and do also get 
read in other categories, such as African American, Arab American, and South Asian 
literature, “Third World” women’s writing, diasporic Muslim literature in English, and so 
forth. While the place of these works in other categories cannot be denied, something is 
gained in reading them together as part of an American Muslim cultural landscape. Like 
Jewish American literature by the 1930s, Muslim American literature is in a formative 
stage. It will be interesting to see how it develops (and who will be its Philip Roth!) 
(“Teaching Diasporic Literature: Muslim American Literature as an Emerging Field,” 
163). 
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In Kahf’s view, Muslim American literature is a homespun creation tied to, but by no means 
limited by, the genres of immigrant and diasporic writing.9  She allows for the possibility of an 
organic Muslim American fiction with room for a multitude of cultural influences which is not 
solely defined by the religious persuasion of its authors or the religiosity of their writing.10  Her 
essay has a hopeful tone, one that discourages an authenticity litmus test or the use of ethnic 
literature as a marketing niche.   
However, by using the term “secular ethnic novels” she makes a distinction between 
works that are inherently “religious” and “secular”, but in the brief essay the distinction remains 
unexplored.  Her secular/religious dichotomy is further complicated by her comparison of 
Muslim literature’s development with Jewish American literature (a contentious term in its own 
right) as she is in danger of making the designation “Muslim” solely an ethnic or cultural value 
that can be measured.  Yet the comparison stands, as fraught as both terms may be, because both 
carry significant social and political weight.  In the United States “Muslim” has never been a 
label with exclusively religious meanings.  In his article on immigration and citizenship law and 
post-9/11 policies, Moustafa Bayoumi argues that the United States government’s policies “turns 
Islam into a racial category” (275).  But despite the racialization of Islam, or perhaps to spite it, 
Muslim Americans from a variety of backgrounds are insisting on the plurality of meanings for 
Muslims in public, political, and cultural spheres.  As Sarah Eltantawi writes: “For American 
                                                          
9 Kahf includes four tentative categorizations: Prophets of Dissent, Multi-Ethnic Multitudes, New American 
Transcendentalists, and New Pilgrims. (Kahf, “Teaching Diasporic Literature”, 167). 
10 However, being Muslim is a factor: “My criteria for Muslim American literature are a flexible combination of 
three factors: Muslim authorship. Including this factor, however vague or tenuous, prevents widening the scope to 
the point of meaninglessness, rather than simply including any work about Muslims by an author with no 
biographical connection to the slightest sliver of Muslim identity (such as Robert Ferrigno with his recent dystopian 
novel about a fanatical Muslim takeover of America). It is a cultural, not religious, notion of Muslim that is relevant. 
A “lapsed Muslim” author, as one poet on my roster called himself, is still a Muslim author for my purposes. I am 
not interested in levels of commitment or practice, but in literary Muslimness.”  (Kahf, “Teaching Diasporic 
Literature”, 167). 
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Muslims, these times are exciting ones in which the boundaries of what it means to be a Muslim 
– in terms of identity, specific forms of practice or non-practice, sectarian affiliation or non-
affiliation, and attitudes about major social issues, including gender roles – is expanding before 
our eyes” (156).  She goes on to say, “We live in a time where an unbeliever of Muslim heritage 
feels the need to call herself or himself a Muslim, in the way Sartre said, ‘In the face of anti-
Semitism, I am a Jew” (156).  Acknowledging or creating a genre of Muslim literature, as Kahf 
uses the term, can be one way of answering Eltantawi’s call to combat anti-Muslim sentiment 
through identification and visibility.  However, as Kahf’s careful criteria demonstrate, avoiding 
the pitfalls of identity politics when defining or designing new literary canons can be tricky, as 
can negotiating marketing strategies that paint an individual author as representative of an entire 
religion, culture, or community.   
I am not going to debate the relationship between ethnic United States literatures (or even 
the possible meanings of ethnic here) and the emerging category of Muslim American literature, 
although I think it is a fruitful topic ripe with teaching and scholarly potential.  In terms of 
Kahf’s writing I am more interested in how she uses the terms Muslim and ethnic with respect to 
her own literature and what her novel shares with more traditional secular narratives as well as 
the long history of the ethnic bildungsroman in the United States.  There is a moment in Randa 
Jarrar’s short story “Lost in Freakin’ Yonkers” that speaks directly to the linkage I am outlining.  
The young, female protagonist narrates, “I walk three miles to the college’s library, look up 
‘Arab’ and ‘American’ and ‘Women’ and ‘Fiction’ on the computer, find nothing, then go into 
the girls’ room and weep into cheap toilet paper, wondering what I am supposed to be doing 
now.  Defeated, I read Beloved” (52).  In writing this moment in the bathroom stall, Jarrar 
captures both the absence of Arab American women voices from the public sphere as well as the 
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powerful influence of the African American women writers that precede and inspire her.  In his 
introduction to the volume that contains Jarrar’s story, Mattawa writes, “Keeping their silence 
for a long time, Arab American storytellers have learned a great deal from their African 
American, Asian American, and Latina sisters, the American Shahrazads who have sustained the 
integrity of their communities through their stories, letting the outside world into their world and 
providing a sense of community for their kin” (Dinarzad’s Children, xiv).  Mattawa’s lineage – 
from African American, Asian American, and Latina/o storytellers to Arab American ones – 
charts a slightly different trajectory than Kahf’s Muslim American one.  Yet both locate Muslim 
and Arab American literature firmly within the United States literary tradition in terms of 
influence and kinship, and the relationship between Muslim and Arab American literature, 
secularism, and other ethnic American literatures is an important area for scholarship.11 
Writing post 9/11, Mattawa likens Arab American writing to coming out: “The stories in 
this anthology are in a sense a double coming out” (xiii). He writes about how the “silence could 
not be kept for long,” as “even before the September 11 events brought the American public’s 
attention to the existence of an Arab American community, Arab American writers had presented 
their stories to the public” (xiii).  He goes on to talk about the historical events that were “turning 
points not only for the community but also for the larger American public’s awareness of this 
community’s existence,” as “Arab Americans could not try to engage the world and remain 
anonymous” and “Even those who wished to remain in the shadows were sought out” (xiii).  
Shadows, anonymity, silence, and public awareness – the language of coming out and the public 
                                                          
11 For example, as debates about secularism have taken off since 9/11, it would be productive to look at communities 
that have borne the brunt of 9/11 stigmatization concurrently; namely, Arab and Muslim Americans and Latina/os, 
all of whom are under increased scrutiny post 9/11.  Additionally, while neither Mattawa nor Kahf mention 
American Indians, I believe that American Indian literature could also be a generative junction for scholarship.  
Particular points of connection might be land and community ethics, for example the way in which secularism 
structures the ways in which we can actually live and relate to one another in community, and how secularism 
structures our relationship to our very environment.  
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sphere are potent reminders of the shame and stigmatization Muslim and Arab Americans endure 
in the United States, one shared by GLBT communities and shaped by secular notions of public 
and private.  Alameddine accentuates the correlation between Muslim and Arabs in the United 
States and gay men in particular, which points to another literary and cultural indebtedness that I 
explore in my chapter on Koolaids. The metaphor of coming out for Arab American writers post 
9/11 and its allusion to GLBT coming out allows us to think about how secularism structures 
what is private (sexuality, religion) while policing it publically.  Alameddine’s work, as it deals 
with the AIDS epidemic as well as Arab immigrants in the United States, also invites us to 
consider how secularism calls for the regulation of certain kinds of bodies (undocumented, or 
even unhealthy).  In my conclusion, I analyze a digital art piece by Hasan Elahi, who 
manipulates notions of public and private in his work; his piece draws attention to the 
relationship between assimilation and privacy, and demonstrates how difference must not only 
be interiorized (another connection between immigrant and GLBT identities) but is now 
commoditized and monitored through the internet.  Alameddine, Elahi, and Kahf all point to the 
role of secularism as a technology of assimilation in terms of immigration, but also, in various 
ways in each case, in terms of sexuality, religion, and consumerism. 
In conclusion, my dissertation contests the universalizing ambitions inherent to many 
definitions of secularism, which take for granted that varied secularisms share the same goals.  
Instead, through the works I analyze, I make an argument for the particularity of the United 
States context, in which regulatory secularism and religious rhetoric co-mingle in the political 
and cultural spheres.  Secular values in the United States are conceptualized such that religious 
rhetoric fits seamlessly into the national dialogue; United States secularism is unique for the 
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specific ways in which certain religious rhetoric determines the political conversation, which is 
part and parcel of how secularism defines appropriate religious practice. 
In my first and second chapters, I contend that Western feminist and GLBT rights 
discourses often use secularism narratives to endorse neo-colonial ideologies, thus limiting 
permissible ethnic, gendered, and sexual embodiments. Chapter one examines Mohja Kahf’s 
American coming of age novel, The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf. Although the bildungsroman 
conventionally plots an individual’s modernization in line with the nation, Kahf uses the formal 
strategies of the bildungsroman to contest the moral superiority of secular feminism and to assert 
an Islamic feminism that works in tandem with United States identity. The novel points to the 
ways in which the bildungsroman as an immigration assimilation genre has traditionally been 
part of the technology of secularism. She situates her protagonist’s ultimate independence from 
the family fold, patriarchal Islam, and mainstream United States society in explicitly gendered 
and religious acts of claiming control over her body.  Ultimately, I argue that the text offers up 
an imaginative reworking of secularism through the protagonist’s vision of the umma, which she 
sees as unlimited, transnational, and experiential.   
Building upon my analysis of feminist rights and secularism, my second chapter argues 
that Western GLBT international rights discourses posit modern sexual identity formation as part 
of the secularization process, and as impossible outside of secular political and cultural 
conditions. I argue that Alameddine uses the figure of the refugee in combination with 
postmodern literary forms and the traditional Arabic form of the mu’arada to critique how both 
secularism and religion work as structures of affect that naturalize certain identities and regulate 
others. I look to the relationship between secular discourses, GLBT rights, and gendered and 
racialized representation of Muslims – both imposed and self-asserted – in the United States, to 
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address the question about what kinds of agencies, and indeed what kinds of bodies, are 
considered to bear universal significance. Finally, I draw together my previous arguments about 
narrative and identity to consider how Koolaids can be read as endorsing the potential in both 
secular and religious moral thought to create more inclusive secularism(s). The novel 
demonstrates how Muslim and Arab American experiences of secularity can transform and 
challenge our understanding of the American secularism, both in terms of its limitations and its 
possibilities. Koolaids calls for a reexamination of the canonical works of secularism, including 
the works it cites and reveres, in order to deconstruct the naturalization of Protestant values and 
practices as American. Furthermore, through the use of an Arabic literary form and Muslim 
allegory in a decidedly American novel, Koolaids expands and deepens our conception of what 
kinds of forms and voices constitute American literature.  
In my third chapter I expand my scope beyond the borders of the United States to 
consider how contemporary artists are confronting nation-based secularisms and notions of 
public and private spheres.  Yet the works in this piece are responding to and in conversation 
with the post 9/11 United States secular context.  I take up the question of interpretive practices 
by analyzing the work of two artists, Ninar Esber and Mounir Fatmi, and examine theories of 
secular affect and secular reading practices in order to think about the ways these artists 
challenge our conceptions of public and private spheres.  I begin by discussing how museum 
cultures and academic discourses define art, arguing that these definitions perpetuate a model of 
stewardship and make claims for universal ideas about culture, religion and humanity that eclipse 
cultural and religious difference.  I contend that Western, secular definitions of art intersect with 
modern interpretive practices.  They “secularize” art, but also link artists and their works to 
religion in ways that essentialize artists’ subject matter and the publics they address, and also 
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glosses over artistic political critiques.  I then analyze works by Esber and Fatmi that adapt 
literary forms, including sacred texts, arguing that these works challenge modern, secular 
interpretive practices through form.  Finally, in my conclusion I extend the question of the 
secular public sphere to emerging debates about surveillance and privacy.  I consider Hasan 
Elahi’s online project Tracking Transcience: The Orwell Project which raises questions about 
the public address of art, but also comments on governmental and commercial monitoring that 
are accepted features of contemporary social life.      
My dissertation is a call to think about “religious” and “secular” as intersecting political 
and cultural formations, not simply in terms of the politics that attach to secular systems and 
religious institutions, or the literary and artistic production that both shapes and is shaped by 
these formations, but also in the constitution of religion and secular as analytic categories with 
deep roots in United States culture and history. While I set out to critique the secularism thesis 
and its exclusive claims on civilization and progress, I am wary of the wholesale dismissal of 
secularism as a viable political and cultural configuration. I question the notion that secularism is 
necessary for the resolution of religious conflict and the only means for peaceful co-existence. 
Yet I recognize secularism as a salient feature of United States identity that is embodied in 
everyday practices and influences how Americans imagine themselves as belonging to and acting 
within both local and global contexts. The novels and art that I explore reject the paradigm of 
prohibitory secularism that seeks to spread its economic and political ideologies globally while 
restricting its membership locally.  They challenge the contemporary notion of postsecular 
literature, which takes a weakened, hybridized, liberal spirituality as its starting point. At the 
same time, these texts locate the promise of freedom in a more inclusively imagined secularism 
by refashioning the meaning and context of disciplinary practices and the public sphere. 
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Secularism is part and parcel of the story we tell about the United States’ evolution into a 
modern, democratic nation, and I propose that these novels write themselves into the historical 
plot while envisioning a different destination.   Because the secularization process and its 
incumbent values are produced through narrative, it makes sense to rework those stories through 
fiction, giving expression to forms of secularism that are not yet tangible, but may be possible.  I 
propose that reading these texts together reveals how their approaches, generic and otherwise, to 
these issues differ, but also shows how they are linked by a broader project to find potential in 
secularism by recasting it as inclusive.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 Gender, Islam and U.S. Secularism in Mohja Kahf’s The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf 
“Liar,” is how Khadra Shamy addresses the highway sign telling her “The People of 
Indiana Welcome You” (1). Thus begins Mohja Kahf’s 2006 novel, The Girl in the Tangerine  
Scarf, a coming of age story in which a young girl immigrates from Syria with her family to the 
U.S. The sentiment of inhospitality is echoed later in the book, when Khadra's mosque and 
community center are vandalized: “Toilet paper was everywhere. Markings in white spray paint 
were blazoned across the windowpanes of the clubhouse....FUCK YOU, RAGHEADS.  
DIE. They were signed: KKK 100% USA” (82). The U.S.’s hostility towards Muslims arises 
again and again in the novel, as when Khadra contemplates the unsolved murder of her friend  
Zuhura; “Maybe we don't belong here,” she thinks to herself, as she stands at Zuhura’s graveside  
(97). Khadra is constantly grappling with the paradox of religious freedom in the U.S.: a secular 
society that claims to protect its pluralistic religious communities, while at the same time 
constraining those communities by strictly defining what constitutes appropriate religious 
practice within a secular society. Essentially a narrative about growing into one’s religious 
beliefs, the text counters the myth of the U.S. as melting pot and challenges the framework of 
secular freedom and its promise of rights for religious minorities.  The novel’s distinctiveness 
lies in its plot development and form; Khadra’s eventual life choices upend the anticipated 
movement of the U.S. immigrant coming of age story. 
The novel is deeply engaged with issues of religious formation as well as informed 
dissent, and a kind of faithful self-formation. In this chapter, I examine Kahf’s adaptation of the 
bildungsroman and analyze her novel in terms of its location within the field of contemporary 
writing about Muslim women in the U.S. The immigrant bildungsroman in which the protagonist 
learns to “make it” in America has a long history in U.S. literature, and the genre plays a 
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significant role in producing familiarity with secularism for contemporary Western audiences.  I 
ask whether Kahf rewrites these old themes as new valorizations of the gutsy Muslim heroine 
who defies religion and tradition to embrace secular modernity. I argue that Kahf is using a 
major literary form that has been used historically to enact secularism and assimilation and 
undoes the form itself in order to critique secular discourses. I then consider how the text 
engages two types of U.S. political secularisms as outlined by feminist theologian Kathleen 
Sands – strong form exceptionalism and weak-form exceptionalism – and draw out the 
connection between these political forms and secular feminism. Finally, I argue that the text 
illuminates the limits of secularism, but also highlights its potential to be inclusive, as the novel 
ultimately envisions the secular context as a place in which to foster the umma - the global, 
transnational community to which every Muslim belongs.  
 The progressive narrative of secularization has been used repeatedly to police Muslim 
women; thus, there is a sense of urgency in Kahf's writing, as she looks to the myriad ways the 
secularization narrative shapes the practice of Islam in the U.S. The idea that Islamic practice  
and belief are incompatible with being American (“100% USA”), or with secularism in general, 
comes from both outside and within Khadra's family and religious community, and a large part 
of that inconsistency is connected to gender and women's rights. Muslim women are often 
portrayed in U.S. media in one of two ways: women who modernize and assimilate, and often 
publicly critique patriarchal Islam; or as observant women with no agency, rights, or loyalty to 
the nation. The U.S. media (and often academia) turn to the former as examples of the triumph of 
Western humanism and the latter as images of the backwardness of Islamic “traditionalism.”  
 Narratives that take up the subject of gender and Islam have become popular in the post  
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9/11 U.S. as an audience eager for information about Islam has developed. Much of this 
literature, however, falls into prescribed and familiar representations of Samuel Huntington’s 
ideological “clash of civilizations” and of an oppressive, backwards Islam. Muslim women 
become objects of discursive enquiry, trapped by patriarchal Islam but longing for the autonomy 
offered by Western, secular feminism. These paternalistic and politicized tropes are not limited 
to books about Muslim women, but are prevalent in “insider” memoirs and exposés such as  
Irshad Manji’s The Trouble with Islam or Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Infidel.12  Dora Ahmad writes that 
these late twentieth century texts “cannily appropriate central tenets of twentieth-century 
feminism and civil rights: the personal as political; the importance of speaking for oneself” and 
thus “these heroines are made over to look like us precisely so that we can take for granted what 
we are rescuing them into” (109). And, presumably, what we are rescuing them out of: 
patriarchal Islam and the oppressive cultural practices of their countries of origin. This gives the 
reading audience critical distance from the narrative; they can identify with the desire for 
individual freedom, yet remain safely distanced from similar issues that confront women in the  
U.S. While critiquing the narratives themselves, Ahmad sees a larger context which assumes that 
liberal secular humanism is the ultimate goal, and that “Underneath an inconvenient and 
irritating layer of culture – a culture separated from the messy imbrications that characterize 
contemporary world politics – lies a free liberal subject waiting to emerge into unproblematic 
selfhood” (109). The narratives she describes have a great deal in common with the novel of 
formation or bildungsroman in which the protagonist experiences conflict between self-
determination and the demands of the larger society. The comparison works precisely because 
                                                          
12 For an insightful critique of Manji’s and Hirsi Ali’s work, see: Lalami, Laila. "Books & the Arts - the Caged 
Virgin: an Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam." The Nation. 282.24 (2006): 23. Print. 
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underneath the aggravating cultural differences Ahmad describes is the sense that these are 
universal stories of development.  
 How does Kahf’s novel, particularly because it evokes a narrative tradition that revolves 
around the self-cultivation and eventual socialization of its protagonists, avoid the trap of the 
“oppressed Muslim woman” and the assumption that superficial multiculturalism can reveal a 
common experience of selfhood? In part, because of the reading practices Ahmad implicates, it 
cannot. The image of the oppressed Muslim woman is so dominant in the U.S. media that 
essentially any text about Muslim women is read with this trope as its backdrop. The realities of 
an U.S. reading public hungry to identify itself with a feisty female protagonist bent on self-
determination, as well as publishing houses intent on marketing texts by exploiting the image of 
the veil, complicates the reception and experience of novels such as Kahf’s.13  Kahf, however, 
does not only seek to normalize Muslims to a non-Muslim audience, she also addresses the 
realities and concerns of many American Muslims through her characters’ struggles with 
practice, belief, and acculturation. She does so though a literary form fraught with connections to 
the development of the modern nation state and the liberal secular subject. Nevertheless, it is also 
a form that represents a sense of order in a world in crisis in which communities are changing. 
The form itself serves as a response to the exploitation of the memoir and novels of formation 
that cast Muslim women as pitiable victims who can (with help and backbone) grow into their 
                                                          
13“Veiling” often has a negative connotation in the media and is used generically to refer to a wide variety of 
practices – from the head scarf to the covering of the face and wearing of gloves - yet because of the predominance 
of the term in my sources it is the term I use here.  For a more thorough discussion of the veil, see: Alvi, Sajida S, 
Homa Hoodfar, and Sheila McDonough. The Muslim Veil in North America: Issues and Debates. Toronto, ON: 
Women's Press, 2003. Print. 
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own women insofar as Kahf reconfigures the plot and protagonist to depart from well-worn 
stereotypes of Muslim women. 14   
The rhetorical thrust inherent to the form of the bildungsroman shapes the narrative. The 
form dictates a linear conception of development in which a white, male, Western, bourgeois 
subject performs a coherent self-made possible through a universal conception of selfhood and 
rights. This linear progression to enlightenment parallels and incorporates the secularism 
narrative. The bildungsroman has traditionally plotted an individual’s modernization, as Franco  
Moretti reminds us, “when we remember that the Bildungsroman – the symbolic form that more 
than any other has portrayed and promoted modern socialization – is also the most contradictory 
of modern symbolic forms, we realize that in our world socialization itself consists first of all in 
the interiorization of contradiction” (10). In The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf the inevitable 
interiorization of contradiction renders reconciliation between the protagonist and mainstream 
society eternally incomplete. However, the interaction between mainstream and marginal society 
is not alone at the center of the narrative; rather, it is joined by the interaction between marginal 
and mainstream Islams. And the seemingly insurmountable conflict between Islam and the 
individual, a trope played out in the numerous accounts Ahmad critiques, is revealed to be an 
artificial divide. The protagonist’s assertion of female Muslim individuality and agency serves as 
a counterweight to mainstream U.S. views of Muslims, as well as to the kinds of Islam that 
                                                          
14 Kahf is not unique in using the form of the bildungsroman to write a feminist critique, indeed the “female 
bildungsroman” has a long and storied tradition.  For a more comprehensive theoretical treatment and a history of 
criticism of the female bildungsroman, see: Lazarro-Weis, Carol.  “The Female Bildungsroman: Calling it into 
Question.”  NWSA Journal 2.1 (Winter 1990): 16-34.  Print. Morgon, Ellen.  “Humanbecomming: Form & Focus in 
the Neo-Feminist Novel.”  Images of Women in Fiction: Feminist Perspectives.  Ed. Susan Koppelman Cornillon.  
Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University, 1972.  Print. White, Barbara.  Growing up Female: Adolescent 
Girlhood in American Fiction.  Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985.  Print. 
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Khadra finds spiritually restrictive, offering a counter-narrative to both U.S. and inter-Muslim 
discourses.  
 The bildungsroman does more than map the individual’s journey; rather, the individual 
comes to represent the universal subject in relationship with a particular mode of governance.  
That relationship is decidedly secular, wherein abstract secularism is the backdrop for the 
citizen-subject’s relationship to wider society and/or the state. The form seems ideal for asserting 
the rights of the marginalized into the national fold, as Joseph Slaughter argues: “The genre 
provides the normative literary technology by which social outsiders narrate affirmative claims 
for inclusion in the franchise of the nation-state, the story form of incorporation through which 
the historically marginalized individual is capacitated as a citizen-subject’” (1402).15  However, 
the form is capable of critiquing the very status quo to which the protagonist appeals, “as the 
canonical genre of human rights incorporation, the Bildungsroman has the dual capacity to 
articulate claims of inclusion in the rights regime and to criticize those norms and their 
inegalitarian implementation” (Slaughter, 1411). Indeed, even as Kahf’s narrative questions the  
animating myth about what it means to be an American, and the democratic rights and individual 
freedoms promised by that myth, her characters assert their place in the American story and lay 
claim to the rights denied them by racist, sexist, anti-Islam, and anti-immigrant ideologies.  
                                                          
15 Slaughter’s insight will sound familiar to readers of scholarship on African-American and Latina/o 
bildungsroman, as well as the female novel of formation. Indeed, Kahf’s novel follows in the wake of these re-
workings of the genre, including the process of racial awakening, as Claudine Raynaud describes it: “Coming of age 
– reaching the age of ‘maturity’ or ‘discretion’ – is variously a process, a moment, or a scene akin to the structural 
‘scenes of instruction’ inherent in African American narratives.’” (106). Tobias Boes writes, “Given the explosion 
of Bildungsroman writing in post-colonial and minority literatures of the late twentieth century, other critics have 
begun to reconceptualize the modernist era as a period of transition from metropolitan, nationalist discourses to post-
colonial and post-imperial ones” (240). In addition to African American, Latina/o, and feminist bildungsroman, 
post-colonial and multi-ethnic bildungsroman, particularly works that reflect upon nationalist discourses, are also 
sites of production exchange for considering The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf. 
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The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf uses the formal strategies of the bildungsroman to 
challenge the claims to moral superiority of secular feminism and its definition of women’s 
rights by situating Khadra’s ultimate independence from her family fold, patriarchal Islam, and 
mainstream U.S. society in explicitly gendered acts of claiming control over her body; namely, 
through an abortion, the offer of a wife-initiated divorce from her husband, and her eventual 
choice to retain her veil. The narrative does not present these acts as requiring a Western, secular 
horizon to ensure their possibility and success. Instead, Khadra narrates an historical  
Islam in which women venture into the world to make their own way by emphasizing the roles of 
women throughout Islamic history and the voices of the women who surround her. Yet the text 
does follow narrative patterns of a progressive movement toward political, religious, and 
personal enlightenment. In addition, Khadra, as an Muslim American, is shown to be deeply 
connected to the U.S. milieu, and her own journey to autonomy would not be possible without 
her cultural context. The process of enlightenment, and indeed it is a process in the novel, is 
cultivated through Khadra’s specific experience within the U.S., but it is ultimately posed as 
universally possible given the right conditions. In her case, Islam provides the means of 
resistance and transformation for Khadra. At first, Khadra believes in the Enlightenment mantra 
that Western philosophy invented individual freedom, but later comes to realize that many of the 
ideals she dismisses as Western and innately imperialist – including natural rights, women’s 
rights, and even the desire for a direct personal relationship with the Divine – exist in historically 
and culturally divergent forms in Islam.  
 Khadra's own view of religion changes as she grows up and encounters different religious 
practices and passes through various stages in her religious development. Born in  
8 
 
Syria, but raised in Indiana with her two brothers, Eyad and Jihad, Khadra’s entire life centers on 
her religious commitments. Her father, Wajdy, is the chapter coordinator for the Dawah Center, a 
Muslim non-profit outreach center. Khadra’s day-to-day life is rooted in religious education and 
work and is deeply informed by her experience of community. As with any child raised in a 
profoundly religious home, she is initiated into the rituals, prayers, practices and beliefs of her 
community as interpreted by her parents. At the core of the text is an unwavering reverence 
towards devotion and faith, although Khadra’s devotion often causes internal and external 
conflict and leads her to question how one can live religiously in a secular state. But the text is 
working with multiple understandings of what it means to be secular and religious within various 
national, familial, and cultural contexts, and Khadra’s own understanding of Islam functions in 
relationship with these various modes.  
 Above all, the text critiques two forms of political secularism that have been explained as 
peculiar to the U.S. legal and political systems: strong-form and weak-form exceptionalism. 
Within the U.S., exceptionalist secularism depends upon the notion of secularism as an abstract, 
universally recognizable category distinguished by the absence of religion. The secular in this 
case is merely what is not religion, and secularization is the historical withdrawal of religion 
from the public sphere, rather than a narrative underpinned by a European, Protestant, and 
Enlightenment ethos. As Kathleen Sands writes, in exceptionalism, religion is “construed as a 
unique category; clearly bound off from the rest of culture and populated with individual 
religions that are somehow coherently connected to each other” (310). Religion, in this 
formation, is therefore understood in the same vein as the secular: as a universally recognizable 
category in which all religions share some common conditions. Yet, despite its disavowal of any 
ideological origins, Sands states that exceptionalism is deeply influenced by Protestant notions of 
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faith, “for example, the idea that religion is more about interior faith than public works, that 
religion begins in the heart or the conscience of the individual rather than in the life of the 
community, that religion cannot be coerced without ceasing to be religious” (311). Sands’ 
definition of U.S. exceptionalism works against the dominant definition of the secular as 
unshaped by religion. Rather, a particular Protestant understanding of religion is naturalized as 
universal in U.S. culture through centuries of political and culture discourse.  
 At the core of the U.S. exceptionalist view of religion is the division between private 
belief and public affect, a disjuncture which Khadra experiences as contradictory to the teachings 
of her family and community. Khadra questions the understanding of faith that Sands describes 
as inherent to exceptionalism, as throughout the novel, she resists the distinction drawn by the 
mainstream U.S. between Islam as her interior faith and Islam as her public and communal 
practice. Khadra’s viewpoint is in direct contrast to the forms of exceptionalism she encounters 
as a citizen of the U.S. Her experience of political and cultural exclusion reflects Sands’ 
definition of exceptionalism, particularly “strong-form” exceptionalism, as limiting religiously 
informed participation in the political sphere. Strong-form exceptionalism stresses the limitation 
of religion in public life and the separation of church and state in order to protect religion from 
the state, but also vice versa. Sands argues that religious freedoms therefore apply to the 
“religious individual, not the religious community,” thus “when separatist exceptionalists 
identify a viewpoint as religious, it warrants the exclusion of that viewpoint from law, policy, 
and even public conversation (311). In the U.S., in the form of public conversation, Islam 
becomes Political Islam. Any activism on behalf of Muslim causes or social justice for Muslims 
becomes suspect. During college, when Khadra begins to deeply question her obligations as a 
Muslim American, her father Wajdy tells her, “Faith requires political, social, and economic 
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actualization . . . Others may see it as politicizing religion, but we see Islamic activism simply as 
service. Service of humanity, to please God” (235). For Wajdy and Khadra, Islam is not a private 
affair – prayers to be said five times a day in private before returning to the secular public 
sphere– but the defining feature of being in the world, and, significantly, acting in the world.  
 Wajdy believes that Islam demands political, social, and economic action on behalf of  
Muslims as a group, not in order to politicize Islam but to fulfill a communal obligation that 
transcends the private sphere and the individual, thus challenging an U.S. culture that focuses on 
individual rights. The freedom of individual Muslims to worship as they please privately does 
not necessarily extend to religious communities living as they see fit. As Sands writes, when the 
“laws or policies of the state directly contradict the religious commitments of individuals, free 
exercise is vigorously defended,” but it is “defended more as a right to individual expression 
from public norms than a right to exert influence in creating and changing those norms” (311). 
When Khadra expresses an interest in Sufism during a college course on Islam, her Uncle Kuldip 
argues that Westerners like to focus on radical Muslims because Westerners value individual 
expression that departs from the norm, in this case dominant Sunni Islam, but only to distract 
from the need for social justice for a global Muslim collective. As Uncle Kuldip points out, 
“Westerners like to focus on the heretics and deviants in Islam;” they are concerned with the 
religious individual because they “cannot stomach the activist Islam that seeks to redress 
injustices committed against Muslim lands” (233). Thus while the idea of one individual 
challenging dominant Islamic beliefs is reassuring to Westerners, the idea that Islam could create 
or change Western dominant, normative culture causes social panic.  
 Uncle Kuldip limits his social realm to other Muslims, but for Wajdy, faith coincides 
with the political sphere beyond commitment to other Muslims, as it also means responsible 
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engagement with the polity of the land: “In a kuffar land, it meant developing ways to help 
Muslims live by shariah while being good citizens” (235). After becoming an U.S. citizen, 
Wajdy says that because of the “Islamic qualities” of “law and order, cleanliness, democracy, 
freedom to work and honestly seek the provision of the Lord . . . freedom to practice religion . . .  
America is like Islam without the Muslims” (144). He can, in a sense, be read as endorsing a 
kind of “weak-form” exceptionalism. Sands defines weak-form exceptionalism as, like strong-
form, regarding religion as a unique category, however, “religious freedom is thought to accrue 
not only to individuals but to religious communities. To label something as religious, then, does 
not warrant its exclusion for public life; on the contrary, religion warrants special voice, and 
perhaps special authority, in the public sphere” (312). Weak-form exceptionalism thus 
recognizes religious communities as part and parcel of the civic landscape in ways that strong-
form exceptionalism does not. For Wajdy, as a U.S. Muslim citizen, part of his Islamic duty is to 
help his religious community members be good civic members as well, just as weak-form 
exceptionalism dictates. Sands’ criticism of weak-form exceptionalism is that it does not monitor 
religious expression in the public sphere without prejudice; rather, it favors the expression of the 
majority who then use this form to insist on policies that reflects the majority’s morality. Thus a 
civic voice like Wajdy’s cannot be heard in the political realm because majority held religious 
views not only dominate the conversation but determine its parameters.  
 The novel underscores the ways in which both strong and weak forms of exceptionalism 
exclude U.S. Muslims. It condemns the mistreatment of Muslims globally and historically, as 
evidenced in the constant chatter of the characters about various political situations around the 
globe, from the oppression of the Cham in Cambodia to the Iranian revolution. The majority of  
Muslim characters bemoan their absence from the public, political conversation as Muslims.  
12 
 
Zuhura, for example, is an outspoken Kenyan American university student and activist involved 
with the Campus Muslim Council. When Zuhura is murdered, her community believes “it was 
religious bigotry” related to her “vocal espousal of Muslim causes on campus, it was political”  
(95). But the local papers attribute her unsolved murder to racism or anti-immigrant crime. The  
Indianapolis Freeman calls Zuhura “a young black woman”, while The Indianapolis Star 
“pretended like race wasn’t there at all, calling Zuhura a ‘foreign woman’ and ‘an IU 
international student’” (95). Repeatedly in the novel, Muslim identity in the public sphere is 
either elided completely or collapsed into racial, ethnic, or national identities.  
 Surprisingly, given that Zuhura is stripped and raped, and her hijab shredded, gender is 
ignored by the media reports, and it is not mentioned by any of the main characters as playing a 
part in the crime. The text does, however, gesture to secular feminism’s ignorance of the plight 
of Muslim American women in terms of anything but oppression by Muslim men, as The  
Indianapolis News article “treated it like just some random crime, giving it one tiny paragraph in 
the back pages. The front-page news was about a march. A photo that showed a group of white 
women yelling, ‘Take Back the Night!’” (95). The shredded hijab, juxtaposed with white women 
marching in a Take Back the Night event, creates a striking image of the kinds of women secular 
feminism is uncomfortable protecting. Gender is ignored until, of course, the media gets word of 
Zuhura’s fiancé being a prime suspect, then the headlines read: “Murder Possible Honor  
Killing – Middle Eastern Connection” with a “sidebar on the ‘oppression of women in Islam’”  
(97). Zuhura’s father is an Anglo American from Nebraska and her mother is from Kenya, but 
the headline insists upon the commonplace conflation of the Middle East and Islam and the 
portrayal of Islam as an inherently violent, misogynist religion. The relationship between  
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Zuhura’s activist life, untimely death, and intra-community expectations for women is only 
raised implicitly by the text. This is reflected in the whispers about the freedoms her parents 
allowed her and in young Khadra’s subsequent adoption of a stringent interpretation of Islam.  
  As she enters adolescence, Khadra begins what she later calls her “black scarf” phase 
during which she wanted to spread “pure, revolutionary Islam in the world” (150). Kahf 
describes the “black scarf” phase with gentle derision and an indulgence for the misguided 
passions of teenagers, but with an eye to the dangers of prejudice, misogyny, and isolationism 
inherent in unexamined fundamentalist ideologies. By ascribing the phase to Khadra’s 
philosophical explorations in adolescence and having her later shed those beliefs as she matures, 
Kahf emphasizes the juvenile and uncritical nature of such beliefs. Young Khadra dismisses her 
parents’ “moderate Islamic revival movement” and her brother’s “yearning-for-traditional-Islam 
phase,” as well as his subsequent “Islamic modernism phase,” and her own later “neo-classical 
Islam phase” (153). She later ascribes the donning of pakols by her college peers to a similar 
kind of growing pain: “Some CMC boys in their first flush of Islamic movement geopolitical 
awareness had taken to wearing the rolled Afghan caps. Sort of the guy equivalent to the black-
scarf thing” (202). In one sense, this mocking of different interpretations of Islam as “phases” 
can be read as only leaving room for Khadra’s final interpretation of Islam at the end of the 
novel. Yet as these “phases” come through the voice of the teenaged Khadra, the door is left 
open for her later struggles and consequent transformation – one that allows for a multitude of 
lived experiences and Islam(s), even the ones she critiques in adulthood.  
 But while in the throes of her black scarf phase, it is the secular U.S. against which  
Khadra rails, along with the Muslims who adjust their own practice to fit neatly into the secular 
public sphere. A reoccurring motif in the novel is the pressure and threat of assimilation. For  
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Khadra, “assimilated Muslims” are irresolute creatures who have “failed to preserve their 
identity,” are emptied of cultural content, and unmoored from their heritage (184). Adolescent 
Khadra’s critique of assimilation responds to exceptionalism in two contradictory ways. First, 
religious identity for Khadra has little to do with personal faith and everything to do with one's 
national or ethnic origins, which she links to religious authenticity. When a group of friends she 
encounters while on Haj insist on her “Americanness,” she retorts: “I’m Arab. I told you. I’m 
Arab. Just like you” (178). They are shocked when this “American” girl refuses to take off her 
hijab and join their drug use, and she is shocked that Muslim Arabs would indulge in anything so 
“un-Islamic.” In her adolescent naiveté, Khadra associates an essentialist Arab heritage with 
Muslim legitimacy. Consequently while Khadra unconsciously rejects the notion that faith is 
merely an interior, private affair, thus countering the exceptionalist definition of appropriate 
religious spheres, she also rejects the idea that private faith informs the shape of public practice 
for individuals and groups. She repeatedly touts the “Islamic Lifestyle” and she even criticizes a 
couple making Haj, saying, “why weren’t they practicing Islam? Which she could tell they 
weren’t, by the way they dressed” (160). At this point in Khadra’s development, the “Islamic 
Lifestyle” dictates a particular mode of behavior that must be adhered to globally and without 
variation, without regard to cultural context, tradition, or personal beliefs. Exceptionalism 
defines religion in one very specific way, and although Khadra’s definition is different, her 
definition is just as exclusive.  
 Ultimately, for Khadra, assimilated Muslims are those who relegate religion to the private 
sphere as a personal belief system. However, Khadra associates assimilation with weakening or 
absence of religion in the very mode of exceptionalist discourse, thus creating her own 
prohibitive religious framework. U.S. culture, then, is the absence of religious culture, as the 
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secular is the unmarked category through which the religious is defined. Eventually, both her 
association of ethnic origin, public practice, and authenticity, and her belief that “secular” U.S. 
culture is incompatible with “true” Islam are challenged as the novel progresses, thus debunking 
exceptionalism’s premise of separate public and private spheres, while complicating her own 
views on the interiority and exteriority of faith.  
 “America,” for Khadra's mother Ebtehaj, corresponds to the secular sphere that deadens 
or expels religion, and although the entire family becomes citizens, this is the definition of 
“America” to which Ebtehaj clings. When Khadra and her brother, Eyad arrive home late one 
evening, their panicked mother screams at them, “We are not Americans!” (67). Khadra explains 
who the Americans are:  
 The Americans were the white people who surrounded them, a crashing sea of unbelief in  
 which the Dawah Center bobbed, a brave boat. (There were black people who were  
 Americans, but that was different.) You had your nice Americans and your nasty  
 Americans. And then there was the majority of Americans; the best that could be said  
 about them was that they were ignorant (67).  
She then goes through a litany of what Americans do: cuss, smoke, drink, do drugs, fornicate, 
commit adultery, have broken families, divorce, and abandon their children and elderly. They 
“led shallow, wasteful, materialistic lives” and “Americans believed the individual was more 
important than the family, and money was more important than anything” (68). She internalizes 
the stereotype of the individualistic American, and, although she revisits the significance of 
individualism in religious life in adulthood, Khadra never fully examines or sheds her view of 
the “typical American.”  
 In the novel the U.S. is racialized as white and Islam as non-white. The racialization of  
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Islam in the U.S. plays out in the novel in multiple instances of prejudice Khadra endures and 
witnesses, and also in her own assumptions about what it means to be Muslim and what it means 
to be American. The “black people who were Americans” are “different,” and although Khadra 
includes non-Muslim African American culture under the umbrella of her larger definition of  
American culture, she also recognizes a long history of slavery and racial prejudice that 
marginalizes African-Americans. Whiteness, the West, and non-Muslim are inextricably 
intertwined in Khadra’s childhood imagination. She is later shocked to meet white Albanian  
Americans on Haj – she has known white American converts in her youth, but had never 
considered white European Muslims a possibility. Khadra’s viewpoint reflects both her own 
upbringing and the racialization of Islam by the U.S. media and government in the 1970s, 80s, 
and 90s. The text, however, is careful not to associate Islam only with Arabs. In the first thirty 
pages readers are introduced to Muslims that are Cham, Sudanese, Syrian, African-American, 
and Kenyan, as well as white American converts. The text’s insistence upon the racial and ethnic 
diversity of Islam is almost farcically overdone. Even so, Kahf critiques the racism within  
Muslim communities, particularly Arab prejudice against Africans and African-Americans. She 
also questions their quiet distrust of the motives of Anglo American converts as well as their 
doubts about the ability of converts to live the “Islamic Lifestyle” without adopting the customs 
of Arabic-speaking cultures. The doggedness with which the text presents the amalgamation of 
ethnicities and Islamic cultures that the American milieu produces serves to emphasize the later 
importance of the umma, a concept to which I will return.  
 Nonetheless, as a child and teenager, Khadra's definition of Americans is as monolithic 
and limited as many of her non-Muslim neighbors' understanding of what it means to be  
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Muslim. America, in Khadra’s view, could never mix with Islam. She shows her inability to 
envision an American Islam through her description of the experience of the earliest Arab 
American immigrants who came over and formed communities beginning in the 1870s: “But 
slowly, over generations, they had mixed American things in with real Islam” (184). “Real  
Islam” is something Khadra believes is tangible, and “American things” are a corrupting 
influence. Her mother reinforces this belief, saying, “Our biggest fear was always losing you …  
Losing our children to America. Having you not keep Islam one hundred percent” (384). As 
though the very landscape of the U.S. is inhospitable to Islam, Khadra’s mother imagines  
America as a rapacious monolith eager to absorb her children. And Islam is construed as a 
concept as quantifiable as secularism; as though something is either Islam or not, just as in 
dominant liberal political thought society and government must be entirely secular or they are 
not secular at all.  
 When Khadra’s African American childhood friend Hanifa begins to display “unIslamic” 
behavior, she attributes it to Hanifa's African American heritage. Khadra goes to Hanifa’s house 
to confront her about her absence from school and finds her “stretched out on the sectional sofa,” 
wearing shorts, and “listening to music. UnIslamic music” (129). “Well,” Khadra reasons, “she 
was related to non-Muslims, wasn't she? She was related to this music, to Lionel Ritchie, to some 
old non-Muslim grandmother in Alabama. She could just up and leave this life she had where 
Khadra was her friend, where you abided by the Total Islamic Lifestyle, and go off somewhere 
else. Be some other person. Leave Khadra in the lurch” (129). She yells at Hanifa,  
“You're going astray, you know. Soon you'll be just like any American. You're going to hell, you 
know” (129).  
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 Khadra’s experience with her childhood friend casts light on the intra-community 
prejudices limiting the umma in the U.S. It also underscores the racist legacy of the U.S. that 
their common religious identity struggles to overcome. Hanifa’s authenticity is questionable to  
Khadra because Hanifa is related in some deeper way – ineffable to a child – to U.S. history 
itself. While Khadra imagines herself and her family as able to resist acculturation and to exist 
outside of U.S. cultural norms, she imagines Hanifa as somehow born from and forever fettered 
to the U.S. and its racial categories. Hanifa’s history –her Americanness – is decidedly un- 
Islamic. The text acknowledges that many Muslim American spaces privilege Muslims from 
immigrant families, particularly from Arabic-speaking nations, as more authentically Muslim. 
Racialized divisions exist within immigrant Muslim communities themselves, exemplified by 
Eyad’s parents discouraging him from marrying a Sudanese woman. His parents give a litany of 
reasons: because his wife must be a native Arabic speaker (she was), because she was older than 
him (but not enough to matter), but ultimately because she was “black as coal” (139). Later in 
the novel, when Khadra finds out that Hanifa was pregnant as a teenager, she regrets that her 
quick judgment led to the end of their friendship, when clearly Hanifa was a young woman in 
need of understanding and the kind of compassion Khadra comes to associate with Islam. But for 
the young Khadra, Islam is an inheritance as much as a faith. Her perspective is one that the 
exclusionist secularization narrative rejects because faith must be a conscious choice, but that  
Khadra maintains, although her views become more elastic as she experiences different 
embodiments of Islam in her life.  
 Of all the characters in the novel, Khadra’s college friend Joy most accurately represents 
the transformation of second and third generation Muslims to secular exceptionalism, which  
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Khadra initially critiques as assimilation. Joy is a third generation Syrian American, and “Joy’s 
family album was part of the American landscape in a way that Khadra did not think it was 
possible for her family ever to be” (184). Joy, with her mixed Syrian Christian and Muslim 
family, mystifies Khadra, who has never encountered such a mixture of faiths, cultures, and 
practices. Khadra and her brother had “never seen Arab folk like this: women called Rose who 
mangled Arabic with an American accent and played Arabic music on American guitars, and 
men who looked like Hoosier farmers in denim overalls” (191). Eyad is suspicious of the 
family’s authenticity as Muslims and Syrians: “The Muslims who lived in that northern Indiana 
town were the assimilated kind, second- and third-generation Americans descended from turn-of-
the-century Arab immigrants. They failed to preserve their identity – they’d caved” (184).  
Khadra finds Joy’s family familiar because of their shared Syrian heritage, but also threatening 
because this familiarity is jumbled with Indiana culture. Again, Khadra and Eyad link Islam to a 
purified cultural and ethnic inheritance that authenticates and preserves it – a heritage absent 
from America and by extension excluding African Americans like Hanifa or third-generation 
immigrants like Joy. Islamic identity that is tainted by U.S. culture is drained of legitimacy. At 
this point in the narrative, Khadra and Eyad are unable to distinguish the linkages they are 
making between ethnic, cultural, or national identity, and Islam itself. Therefore they are unable 
to reconcile their reductionist definition of Islam with the lives of their friends Hanifa and Joy, or 
even with their own American identities.  
 Khadra objects to joining her friend Joy at a study session in a “Sushi Bar”, and she 
berates her friend for entering because she misunderstands what the word “bar” connotes in the 
restaurant's name: “It seemed to Khadra that her friend was just an assimilated Muslim, plain and 
simple” (185). Assimilating, for Khadra, is the height of cultural and religious betrayal. She 
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accuses Joy of being a “McMuslim” saying: “It means you believe by default in the typical 
American lifestyle of self-indulgence, waste, and global oppression” (186). Even at this point in 
the novel, Khadra’s self-satisfying separatism begins to unravel, when she meets Joy’s Syrian  
Christian grandmother Litfy, and asks herself “What other homes of similar sweetness and joy 
had they passed by all these years, insisting as they did on their separateness and specialness, 
then?” (189). As an “assimilated Muslim”, Joy also comes to represent one version of feminist 
secularism in the narrative. She is in some ways a cardboard character, without depth or nuance, 
against whom Khadra can measure her own purity, but Joy also pushes Khadra to question the 
normative status of women in Islam within her own community.  
 It is because of the evolving nature of her friendships with women such as Joy, and also 
because of the frustration she feels at having her efforts constantly dismissed by male members 
of the Muslim Student Association, that Khadra pushes more forcefully against the structures of 
the patriarchal Islam of her family and community. Just a few years earlier she had been escorted 
home by two matawwa policemen during Haj when she attempted to pray in a mosque (women 
are not permitted to pray in mosques in Saudi Arabia). During college Khadra gets married, and 
as she settles into married life she begins to find her community overly restrictive, particularly 
because her new husband Juma demands that she change her lifestyle and uses Islam to justify 
himself. When she becomes pregnant soon after their marriage, she feels stifled by his treatment 
of her and resents the life he and her family have laid out for her, as embodied in her pregnancy: 
“It was a growth, invading her body, reaching out its tentacles, even up her throat. It was a 
possibility, one she could not entertain. It would lock her into a life, a very specific kind of life 
with Juma, that she was no longer certain she wanted. She knelt on the tiles with a wet rag 
mopping up the vomit. Seven times, once with Ajax powder” (247). Her reaction to the 
21 
 
pregnancy echoes the one her mother has after the discovery of Zuhura’s violated body, when a 
terrified and grieving Ebtehaj conflates Khadra’s body with Zuhura’s. She insists that Khadra is 
filthy and must bathe, trying desperately to wash off the contaminating violence of U.S. culture.  
Only now the impurity is the violation of Khadra’s will, which she connects to God’s will:  
“Where was it, this will of hers, this misshapen self . . . You have to have a self to even start on a 
journey to God. To cultivate your nafs whom God invites to enter the Garden at the end of Surat 
al-Fajr . . . her self was a meager thing, scuttling behind a toilet, what she hadn’t given over of it 
to Mama, to Juma” (248). Rather than envisioning the virgin body or the pregnant woman as 
sacred in and of itself as her mother does, Khadra sees cultivation of the self through God as the 
highest virtue. She feels she must clean away this invasion of her will by other people’s plans for 
her life, symbolized by her loss of control through pregnancy. And by linking her will directly to 
God’s will, she claims its sacredness above and beyond the mere expectations of her community 
and family.  
 After she has an abortion – horrifying her family, community, and husband, although 
completely within the realm of Islamic law - she offers Juma a khulu’. He refuses this wife-
initiated divorce out of pride, and thus Khadra declares of herself that the “Dawah Center poster 
girl had fallen” (251). Marriage is not the dénouement of the novel; rather divorce is the 
beginning of Khadra’s independence. Even if Juma rejects the offer of khulu’, the very fact of its 
offer and her willingness to mark herself publicly in this way emphasizes her assertion of 
sovereignty over her own body and destiny. Although abortion within the first one hundred and 
twenty days of conception is permitted by shariah, her family is angry and censorious, and the 
only person who will accompany her to the clinic is Joy who is “horrified by abortion” (249).  
22 
 
The woman who had met constantly with Khadra’s moral disapproval proves to be a staunch 
ally. In the car on the way home from the clinic Khadra initiates a conversation about the life 
cycle of the bug. She asks Joy, “‘Do you know what entomologists call the body of the bug in its 
different stages of life . . . an instar. . . . Know what they call the adult instar- the mature bug?”  
(250). Joy demurs but Khadra continues, “An ‘imagine.’ Yeah. Like, you and I are the 
‘imagines’ of the human species” (250). Her newfound self-dominion is explicitly tied to her 
decision to have an abortion.  
 Abortion is not merely portrayed as her right as an U.S. citizen (one her doctor and 
school clinic refused to acknowledge) and as a Muslim woman, but abortion for Khadra is a 
spiritually embodied act. It allows her to be “an imagine” and to continue to imagine a future for 
herself. She is able to recover her meager self from its scuttling behind the toilet and transform 
her body into the next stage of life. Her brother Eyad tells her that God will punish her by not 
allowing her to have children later when she wants them, but Joy tells her “God is not such an 
asshole” and then adds “alhamduliliah” (250).  Joy’s “alhamduliliah,” meaning “praise be to 
God,” alleviates the ostensibly flippant tone of her advice to Khadra, and emphasizes the genuine 
reverence in her words.  God, she is telling Khadra, can be trusted, but may look very different 
than the God you were raised to venerate.  It is in this moment of familial rejection and cultural 
free-fall that Khadra’s security in her beliefs begins to dissipate.  
 It is during her period of rediscovery, or recovery, of self and will that Khadra begins to 
seriously reflect upon the constructed religious identities imposed upon her both by the larger  
U.S. society and from within her own community. In turn, she negotiates various secular feminist 
ideologies in order to counter the image of Muslim women as victims of an oppressive religion 
and as participants in a monolithic culture. Her world expands, and she begins to encounter a 
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series of friendly antagonists who offer up arguments that flatly represent secularism (her Iraqi 
boyfriend Chrif), feminism (her Pakistani friend Seemi), and religious universalism (as 
embodied by a series of teachers and poets). Building upon Khadra’s unexamined experiences of 
sexism in her past, Kahf uses these encounters to explore the relationship between women, 
religion, and the public sphere, and much of that relationship turns on her portrayal of veiling. 
The birth, so to speak, of Khadra as an emancipated individual is not represented as a universal 
experience, but is located in the highly gendered acts of abortion, the offer of a wife-initiated, 
heterosexual divorce, and veiling. Within Kahf’s novel, veiling and unveiling become narrative 
strategies; not as in the tired metaphorical sense of lifting the veil on hidden ways of life, but as a 
way to explore the cultural and religious choices Muslim American women make against a 
naturalized secular background that insists on pressing a monolithic identity upon them.  
 The question of the veil has been discussed exhaustively in the media and by Muslim 
activists and scholars. Homa Hoodfar underscores the changing meaning of veiling in various 
historical and cultural contexts. In Western culture, the meaning of the veil has remained “static 
and unchanging”, while in Muslim cultures the “veil’s function and social significance have 
varied tremendously, particularly during times of rapid social change” (421). While the veil has 
been “a mechanism in the service of patriarchy, a means of regulating and controlling women’s 
lives, women have used the same social instrument to free themselves from the bonds of 
patriarchy” (Hoodfar, 421). After all, Hoodfar writes, “Muslim women, like all other women, are 
social actors, employing, reforming, and changing existing social institutions, often creatively, to 
their own ends” (421).  
 Nevertheless, in the Western imagination, the image of the veil is inextricably linked to  
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Islam itself, and one finds women peeking out from under veils on book covers about Islam and 
magazine and newspaper articles about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the War on 
Terror.16  
It is not my intention to comprehensively revisit political debates over the veil. However, 
conversations about Islam and gender in the West often center on references to the veil, and thus 
many authors who write about women and Islam in the U.S. find themselves confronted with 
questions about veiling, by the non-Muslim public. Some authors such as Kahf choose to explore 
individual beliefs about the meaning of the veil, inter-community pressures to veil, and the 
political implications of veiling in the U.S., or the desire to remain under the radar by not veiling.  
 The West’s obsession with veiling practices and the use of secular feminist rhetoric to 
condemn everything from the building of mosques to the citizenship/naturalization of women 
who wear the burqa produces an ugly binary in which Islamic feminism has no place and one 
kind of secular feminism is used to support racist and anti-immigrant ideologies that often further 
radicalize fundamentalist populations and ultimately fail to protect women. Minoo Moallem 
writes of the disconnect between universal secularism and gendered religious identity through 
her own experiences of being viewed as a representative “Muslim woman”: “The failure of 
secularism to protect me either in the media or on the campus brings to mind the importance of 
‘civilizational and counter-civilizational thinking’ that constantly mobilizes and dichotomizes 
                                                          
16 Andrea Shalal-Esa addresses the politics of publishing that pigeonhole Muslim and Arab American writers 
through the editing, publishing, and even design processes.  She relates a story of Kahf’s disapproval of her 
publishing company’s decision to post a cover design on its website that “showed her Muslim-American character in 
a midriff and cut off her eyes, exactly the sort of exoticized Orientalist cover that Kahf has sought to avoid by 
writing a clause about cover control into her contract” (Shalal-Esa).  The “publishing house hemmed and hawed” 
but it “eventually commissioned another cover, albeit one that still focused on a single woman with a hijab – one 
that omits the sense of community Kahf had wanted” (Shalal-Esa).   Even when publishing a novel that combats 
Islamaphobia and Orientalizing representations of Muslim women, Kahf must contend with market forces that boost 
the bottom line by trading on images of veiled women. 
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both secular and religious universalistic and fundamentalist impulses” (54). These impulses are 
“sometimes spatial (West/Islam), sometimes temporal (modern/archaic), and sometimes moral  
(evil/good), and they have become hegemonic since the Enlightenment” (Moallem, 54). And as  
Hoodfar and Moallem point out, dichotomous thinking is not the purview of the West, as both 
authors underscore that fundamentalist Islamic movements often use identical (but inverted) 
binaries of West/Islam and evil/good. Colonial subjugation and economic and demographic 
dislocations have made what was once a conservative cultural idea into a popular religious ideal.  
 Tracy Fessenden makes the essential link between forms of colonialism and neo-
imperialism, and the discourse of human, and more explicitly, women's rights. She contends that 
secularism, with its masked Protestant foundation, is portrayed as the inevitable outcome of 
human history and the march toward modernity and civilization. When myth and mysticism are 
replaced by rational thought (even rational Christian thought), the only outcome can be the 
advancement of human dignity and freedoms. The association of secularism and freedom 
“confers a special moral standing on those who share both secularism and its particular 
Protestant genealogy, fueling imperial projects from nineteenth century colonial to contemporary 
international interventions” (Fessenden, 139). Fessenden argues that the evidence for this 
“special moral standing is frequently given in appeals to the treatment of women: the presumed 
freedom of women in secularized contexts and the presumed oppression of women in religious 
contexts is regularly invoked . . . to underwrite a hierarchy of progress that places supposedly 
backward religions at one end of the civilizing scale and democratic freedoms at the other” 
(139). Debates about the unique ethical status conferred upon secularism are often played out on 
women’s bodies. Kahf comments on this process by peppering her novel with references to 
contemporaneous domestic and foreign policies. She calls into question the U.S.’s “special moral 
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standing” on issues of human rights, and by extension its claim to superiority with regard to 
women’s rights.  
 The rhetoric of rights is used globally to justify military occupation, anti-Muslim policies, 
and the exclusion of certain types of Muslim women (generally hijab wearing in some form or 
another) from the rights of citizenship in the West. The Bush administration’s connection of the 
invasion of Afghanistan to the pursuit of women’s rights, the vitriolic opposition to the building 
of a Muslim community/cultural center near the site of 9/11, and the vehemently anti-Islam 
rhetoric coming out of Europe in the last several years all contrast Western enlightenment, vis-á- 
vis secularism, with Muslim backwardness, in which women must look to the West to enforce 
their natural and universal rights. These kinds of progress narratives mask their inherent racism 
by touting secularism’s rationality and universalism. By attaching feminism to the progress 
narrative, feminists who insist that women’s rights can only be achieved through secular means 
and in the secular sphere reproduce the exclusionary rhetoric of imperialism. It is not as though 
gendered bodily disciplines disappear, but they are either whitewashed, unexamined, or 
correspond to the “goals” of secularism. Observant Muslim women who wear hijab, however, 
cannot be whitewashed or absorbed in the progress narrative. They are visibly marked as Muslim 
because of their head coverings, and hijab in general is read as an identity, or even as a symbol 
of anti-Americanism.  
 In The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf, Khadra’s friend Seemi repeats the same rhetoric of 
secular progress when she claims that religions try “to control women’s bodies” whereas 
secularism delivers women from patriarchal control. Seemi emigrated to the U.S. from Pakistan 
and calls herself an agnostic (361). She serves as a stock character used to draw out the 
contradictions within Khadra’s own ethical systems. The two women constantly debate, as when 
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they fight over attending a protest in support of Salman Rushdie. While Khadra purports to be 
against the fatwa on his life, she finds his work distasteful and seems to support limitations on 
free expression as she is “sick of Western publishers getting away with anything they want to put 
out about Muslims” and “I’m kind of glad someone’s standing up to them” (332). It is an 
uncomfortable moment in the text for any reader who thinks that Khadra is proceeding nicely on 
the way to becoming a modern feminist. For example, she defends conservative Islam to Seemi, 
who declares that these are exactly the type of Muslims that would prevent Seemi and her Hindu 
boyfriend Veejay from being together. But Khadra insists that she is not defending their views, 
only their right to have them. She decides that she is “humanizing” fundamentalist Muslims by 
defending their right to have a voice and to believe and live as they see fit, but she condemns 
Rushdie and his publishers for the same. The last part of the novel draws out these kinds of 
inconsistencies in Khadra’s moral logic. She humanizes the seemingly unredeemable 
fundamentalists and refuses to believe that the only freedoms worth having are defined by and 
distributed by the West. At the same time, she draws on her experiences in the U.S. and as a 
member of the Islamic American community in order to create her own not entirely coherent 
belief system. And that system, in part, is embodied by her relationship to hijab.  
 Kahf balances the claims of secular feminism with Khadra’s own Islamic feminism.  
Rather than casting Islam as antifeminist or feminism as inherently anti-Islam, Kahf questions 
whether assimilation is the price of emancipation, and whether emancipation is homogenous or 
can allow for difference. She gives voice to intra-community resistance against patriarchal Islam, 
but also makes room for perspectives on gender that destabilize some of the foundational tenets 
of secular feminism. With regard to hijab, a recurrent motif for the women in the novel,  
Aunt Khadija says, “Imagine being made to stand naked in front of a whole bunch of people . . .  
28 
 
That's how it was for black women back in slavery times. Up on the auction block. Covering is a 
strong thing” (25). Aunt Khadija strips away the notion that uncovering is always, universally 
liberating, revealing deeply held cultural assumptions about the gendered meaning of clothing 
and display in public spaces. Furthermore, the text argues against the notion that hijab is not  
“American” by including African American characters such as Aunt Khadija who wear hijab and 
who narrate the long historical relationship between Islam and African Americans. Also included 
are characters whose family histories represent a Muslim presence that dates back to the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Hijab, or Islam for that matter, is only an import insofar 
as Christianity, or Judaism, or secularism, are imports –all of which developed distinctly  
American meanings. To discount the Americanness of Islamic practice in the U.S., the text 
suggests, is to pose Muslims as eternal outsiders to American culture and to write Muslims out of 
the American narrative.  
 Veiling, always a contentious issue, isn’t stripped of its complexity; rather, Kahf offers it 
up as an intricate and dense issue, as deeply rooted in cultural attitudes and historical tradition as 
in religious feeling. In the beginning of the novel, Khadra joyfully recounts the choosing of 
fabrics for her first hijab, and her father’s handiwork in creating them for her. Wearing hijab is 
intimately tied to nostalgia, her father’s love, and passage from childhood into adulthood.  
Veiling is a “sign of the heritage” but it is also an affect and an embodiment, as when she unveils 
she realizes “her body would not forget its caress” (312). She removes her scarf for the first time 
when visiting her Téta in Syria, while picking cherries in the Ghuta orchard. She pauses in the 
setting sun “in a position like the first stand of prayer” and compares the experience to “kashf, 
the unveiling of light” (309). As a child veiling represents maturity and family connection, but in 
adulthood unveiling becomes prayer: “She opened her eyes, and she knew deep in the place of  
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yaqin that this was all right, a blessing on her shoulders. Alhamdu, alhamdulilah. The sunlight on 
her head was a gift from God. Gratitude filled her. Sami allahu liman hamadah. Here was an 
exposure, her soul an unmarked sheet shadowing into distinct shapes under the fluid” (309).  In 
the context of exposure, the unmarked sheet evokes the mechanics of photography.  Yet it also 
conjures imagery of the unmarked virgin – Khadra’s soul, if not her body – or even the scandal 
of unmarked conjugal sheets that were supposed to be stained with virginal blood.  The light on 
her bare head suggests the process of taking a photo: exposing the film to light, and creating a 
latent image that later emerges as it is enlarged, submerged in developing agents, and hung to 
dry.      
It is significant that the Al Ghuta orchid is where Naziq al-Abid famously hid after taking 
up arms in the Syrian Revolt against the Mandate, linking Khadra to a renowned female activist, 
and again emphasizing the legacy of women activists in Islam. 17 The cherry orchard also 
suggests a literary heritage: Anton Chekhov’s The Cherry Orchard immediately comes to mind, 
as does the moment in Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, when “Janie saw 
her life like a great tree in leaf with the things suffered, things enjoyed, things done and undone.  
Dawn and doom was in the branches” (12).  As The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf often refers to 
African American history, as well as the experiences of African American Muslims with 
immigrant Muslim communities, it makes sense that the cherry trees that surround Khadra in 
Syria would evoke the novel’s literary ties to a distinctly African American text, and to the 
knotty symbolism of Janie’s pear tree.  All of these literary, cultural, and historical elicitations 
combine in one singular gesture of exposure by Kharda; yet exposure, like photography, is about 
                                                          
17 Naziq al-Abid was a “Syrian pioneer for independence and women's rights. She began writing in 
the Damascus press under a male pseudonym. She criticized the Ottoman Empire and wrote on various topics 
related to women such as suffrage, divorce rights, and civil marriage. In 1919, she founded the first women NGO 
in Syria called Noor al-Fayha (The Light of Damascus)” (“Naziq al-Abid”).  
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process.  Just as Janie circles back repeatedly to the allegorical pear tree, Khadra returns to the 
motif of revelation in order to make sense of her own “dawn and doom.” Khadra goes on to 
speak of the “development of the soul in its darkroom” that is preceded by exposure to the light 
(309).  She is captured through the act of exposure, but she only develops through her return to 
the darkness.  Unveiling here does not signify ultimate freedom or casting off tradition, and the 
veil itself does not denote only the modesty or piety of the wearer; rather, both are the actions of 
embodied faith.  
 Khadra’s unveiling is set in Syria instead of the U.S., with her beloved Téta and her 
friends in an isolated orchard, rather than in a politically marked public space. Thus the moment 
avoids the association of unveiling with political freedom. Instead, the moment embodies  
Khadra’s spiritual return to Islam after being rejected by her family and community due to her 
divorce and abortion. It is this rejection that causes her to question her previously solid 
understanding of what it means to be Muslim, and she bares herself to God, not to a public eager 
to witness it. Unveiling does not indicate comfortable assimilation in accord with mainstream 
U.S. ideas about veiling. In the airplane on her return flight to the U.S. Khadra drapes her head in 
tangerine silk. The silk “moved and slipped about her face and touched her cheek, like the hand 
of a lover” (313). Khadra does not describe the act of veiling as donning an oppressive garment, 
but like feeling the intimate touch of a familiar lover. Khadra’s veil works variously as a shield, 
an identity marker, an incarnation of faith that connects her to family and community, and even a 
burden, and it can never be contained by one definition.  
 While her unveiling is a spiritual act, her veiling becomes a political one. Veiling cannot  
escape political connotations in a culture in which Muslim women are read as professing religion 
in the public sphere through dress that has been racialized and politicized by the body politic. 
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After all, is religion really a matter of individual choice if Islam itself becomes an ethnic 
category or is racialized, and if it cannot be relegated to the private sphere? Is it the public nature 
of the hijab or minarets that seemingly makes them so incompatible with secularism?  
Samaa Abdurraqib links visible markers such as the hijab to readable allegiances when worn in 
the context of the U.S.: “The veil thus becomes the visual repository for the Muslim identity that 
is being preserved, and veiling shifts from being construed as somewhat normal behavior into an 
action that proclaims identity and (sometimes) allegiances” (54). Indeed, upon re-entering the 
U.S., Khadra “wanted them to know at Customs, at the reentry checkpoint, she wanted them to 
know at O’Hare, that she was coming in under one of the many signs of the heritage” (313). 
Khadra’s act of veiling serves to identify her allegiances, but at the same time, for Khadra it is an 
act that is essential for the U.S. context and has the deeply American connotation of religious 
freedom. Nonetheless, because no political act for Khadra is empty of spiritual content, “she 
wanted her heart to remember, in the dappled ruffle and rustle of veiling and unveiling, How 
precious is the heritage! A treasure fire cannot eat” (313). Veiling is not emptied of its spiritual 
and cultural meaning for Khadra because it is politicized; rather, by embracing the spiritual as a 
political act, she has fully absorbed the earlier lessons of her father who encouraged her to live 
her religion in every sphere of her life.  
 The text’s overt defense of women who choose to veil appropriates secular feminist 
rhetoric to its own end – the operative word being choice and a woman’s right to sovereignty 
over her body. The choice to veil has different implications in the U.S. than in many European 
countries, or when compared to the less heavily weighted symbolic act of veiling in 
predominantly Islamic countries where the practice is commonplace. Yet I would argue that 
Kahf is determined to write veiling into U.S. history rather than denote it as a refusal to 
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assimilate. Veiling is not an anti-secular act; in fact, it embraces the version of secularism the 
text eventually endorses, a secularism that endorses a multitude of religious embodiments in the 
public sphere.  
 Khadra comes to value the ways in which growing up American has fashioned her 
individual spirituality as well as her understanding of religious community. Khadra's struggle, as 
she matures, is between the value of individualism which she absorbed from U.S. culture and the 
pull of her family’s and community's expectations. The narrative seems the most strained when  
Khadra attempts to balance the individual freedoms she values (for example, her decision to have 
an abortion after she is married and divorce her husband, although these are also linked to her 
spirituality they are partially possible because of her situation in the U.S., as well as her choice to 
move temporarily to Syria and live alone in Philadelphia) with the obligations of the community 
life she also clearly values. She concludes not only that America is able to coexist with Islam but 
also that her faith is indelibly shaped by her constant negotiations of the secular spaces of 
American life. She does not blindly accept the secularism narrative that excludes Islam from its 
modernity and her from its history, and admits to liking those Muslims who “stood up to  
America”:  
 Like the people in the south of Lebanon, or the Palestinians who said ‘fuck you’ to  
 America and Israel even though they were getting stomped on . . . Saying, hunh – we  
 don’t care how you do things over there, we do things our own way. You ain’t the  
 Masters of the Universe. You can’t come and make us. Wanna piece of this? You had  
 to love them for trying, because it was so obviously a losing battle, after perestroika and  
 glasnost and, God help us, the impending McDonaldization of the globe (349-350).  
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Her inventory moves quickly from a list of oppressed peoples, to snatches of defiant language – 
“Wanna a piece of this?” –to policy language like perestroika.  She links the reform movements 
that preceded the dissolution of the USSR to globalization, as represented by the international 
expansion of McDonald’s with its standardized products and its promotion of bloated 
consumerism.  Yet she realizes as she returns from her trip to Syria, “at last that it was in the 
American crucible where her character had been forged, for good or ill....She was on her shariah 
to America. Toto, we're not in Damascus anymore, Khadra whispered, as the wheels hit the 
ground. Homeland America, bismillah” (313).  
The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf raises questions about the incompatibility of being truly  
Muslim and truly “American” at the same time but does not attempt a simplistic answer. 
Khadra’s final realization that the U.S. context shaped her religious development is countered 
with her lingering feelings of exclusion from the mainstream U.S. and her many encounters with 
prejudice, her anger at the government’s neo-imperialist policies abroad and racism at home, her 
limited knowledge and unexamined stereotypes of U.S. subcultures outside of Islam, and her 
reactive rejection of American identity at various points in the narrative. The juxtaposition of 
Khadra’s ambivalence about American identity and the marginalization of African American 
Muslims in her own community speaks to the privileging of immigrant Muslim identity as 
authentic.18 During a childhood argument, Khadra’s friend Hakim says, “Then how many Dawah  
                                                          
18 In her book American Muslim Women: Negotiating Race, Class, and Gender within the Ummah, Jamillah Karim 
notes that “America’s legacy of racial inequality frames not only race relations in the American ummah but also its 
ethnic makeup,” and that to “be Muslim in America, therefore, means to claim a faith tradition marked by both 
African American and immigrant struggles” (4).  South Asian and Arabic immigrant families, like the kind 
represented by Khadra’s family, are often held up as “model minorities” for their achievements in higher education 
and professional employment, in contrast to struggling or “problem minority” African American communities. 
Karim argues that immigrant identity is privileged over American identity in two related ways.  First, “American 
Muslim identity translates into a convert Muslim identity, whereas immigrant identity translates into a 
multigenerational Muslim identity” (41).  Second, “American Muslim identity translates into ‘American Islam,’ a 
version of Islam that, in the view of many immigrants, can never be as authentic as the Islam practiced in the 
countries from which they came” (41).  Both of these privileged identities are linked to the notion that Islam and 
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Center officers are black? How many immigrants do you know who’ve married African  
Americans?” (137). Khadra tried to counter but fails: “This was the Dawah Center line. No 
racism in Islam. Meaning, none is allowed; a commendable ideal. But it was also a smokescreen 
of denial that retarded any real attempt to deal with the prejudices that existed among  
Muslims” (137). Ideals of authenticity structure allowable practice and behavior within the 
community. Which is why Tayiba’s Anglo American father eventually changes his name to  
Yusuf, because “’Joe Thoreau’ just did not seem like a proper Muslim name” (29). The brief but 
benign story of Joe’s acculturation – from the name change, to getting rid of his dog, to growing 
a beard “like decent folk” – foreshadows more sinister cultural pressures, for example, the 
marginalization of Shias by the majority Sunni Dawah Center, Khadra’s linkage of Hanifa’s  
African American heritage to her fall from grace, the Dawah Center’s unspoken racism, and the 
sexism Khadra encounters in Saudi Arabia and in college. Insofar as their own cultural and 
religious practices are threatening to the mainstream U.S., the community has its own sense of 
what threatens order.  
 At the end of the novel, the narrative begins to pile character upon character – a gay  
Latino Muslim, Khadra’s youngest brother Jihad’s Mormon fiancé, Khadra’s childhood friend 
who has come out as a lesbian, secular Muslims, progressive Muslims, conservative Muslims, 
polygamous Muslims, Muslim women in rap groups, Muslim men in mixed religion rock bands,  
Muslim women who race in NASCAR, Muslim poets and renegades and extremists. Muslims of 
every ethnicity, sexual persuasion, race and nationality appear. The effect is comical, as though  
                                                          
Western values are inherently incompatible, and “while many have demonstrated that this false dichotomy emerged 
as part of colonial and anticolonial struggles between Europeans and Muslims, it continues to inform the notion that 
one cannot be truly Muslim and truly American at the same time” (41). 
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Kahf is sitting at her keyboard, trying to imagine every possible Muslim stereotype in the U.S.  
The goal is provocation, of course, to challenge the assumptions made by non-Muslim American 
readers, but also to defy the sensibilities of Muslim American readers who may think, “these 
people are not authentic Muslims.” They are “lost Muslims” in the words of Ebtehaj and Wajdy.  
They do not “practice proper Islam,” and are “lost to America,” just as Ebtehaj always feared for 
her own children. But Khadra experiences a connection to every Muslim; a connection that 
transcends national boundaries, political affiliation, and sectarianism. Her vision of the umma is 
informed by her vision of universal religion and secularism, as she thinks “If all paths lead to  
God, this one also leads to God” (422). She takes seriously its call to social justice and the global 
Islamic community. She believes in the potential of secularism – but only when the  
umma is lived out in reality.  
 Karen Armstrong writes that in Muhammad’s time “the tribe had been the basic unit of 
society; the umma, however, was a community which was based on religion rather than kinship” 
(154).  The “unity of the umma was to reflect the divine unity, which Muslims were also 
commanded to build in their own personal lives.  No tie of blood, no old tribal allegiance, must 
stand in the way or be allowed to split the unity of the umma into warring camps” (Armstrong, 
155).  Of course no human community has ever managed to make its utopian ideals an earthly 
reality.  Interpretations of the umma, like any theological concept, vary throughout history and in 
different cultural contexts.  For instance, Talal Asad distinguishes the classical theological umma 
from its use in Arab nationalist rhetoric: “Of course the word umma does also have the sense of 
‘a people’ – and ‘a community’- in the Qur’an.  But the members of every community imagine it 
to  have a particular character, and relate to one another by virtue of it.  The crucial point 
therefore is not that it is imagined but that what is imagined predicates distinctive modes of being 
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and acting” (197).   Asad adapts Benedict Anderson’s theory of “imagined communities” in 
order to uncouple the umma from its use in Islamist and nationalist political movements, in 
addition to distancing the theological concept from comparisons to the modern nation state.   He 
also highlights the modes of embodied behavior and relating that an imagined community 
engenders, not the indefinable form such a community takes.  For the umma is not an entirely 
malleable concept, and it is certainly not a blank symbolic state onto which just any vision of 
community or rallying cry can be projected.  As Asad writes: “The ummatu-l-muslimīn (the 
Islamic umma) is ideologically not ‘a society’ onto which state, economy, and religion can be 
mapped.  It is neither limited nor sovereign. . . . It can and eventually should embrace all of 
humanity.  It is therefore a mistake to regard it as an ‘archaic’ (because ‘religious’) community 
that predates the modern nation” (197-198). 
Asad’s description of the umma works well with Khadra’s nascent understanding of what 
it means to her.  Since it is not limited, she can imagine it as a transnational community, not one 
bounded to ethnicity, or tied to culture, or even secular time.  It is not sovereign, given that there 
is no governance and no official hierarchy.  It is, however, experiential.  As an imagined 
community its tangibility is manifested through affect, through the expressed feeling and 
experience of association, just as Khadra is inspired by her bonds to community and exhausted 
by its limited imagination.  Khadra’s vision of the transnational Muslim community explicitly 
critiques its tendency to divide and exclude along national, ethnic, cultural, racial, and gendered 
lines.  Her childish expectations of religious authenticity in Saudi Arabia are dashed, and as she 
grows older she becomes more ambivalent about how to self-identify: “Going overseas was what 
enabled her to see that she was irrevocably American, in some way she couldn’t pin down.  Yet 
even now, she never thinks of herself as American, not really.  When she says ‘Americans,’ 
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‘Americans do this or think that,’ she means someone else” (391).  Her ambivalence about her 
own Americanness reveals divisions within the American umma that are linked to issues of 
authenticity, race, and acculturation.    
In her essay about Turkish and French secularism, Nilufur Göle writes that “Muslim 
migrants are called to (re)think about their religion and faith from the vantage point of their 
experiences as European citizens.  Similarly, European secularism is refashioned in 
confrontation with issues raised by Muslims” (253).  I propose that the same is true for American 
secularism and American Muslim communities, and part and parcel of that rethinking and 
refashioning is taking place through the literary.  Göle uses the example of the veil, as women’s 
movement from private to public spaces such as the university and political realm make the veil 
a visible and potent symbol whose meaning “needs to be readjusted, given its meanings in the 
past and its contemporary appropriations by new profiles of Muslim women” (257).  The 
eponymous tangerine scarf of the novel’s title is an apt totem for the refashioning of meaning 
that Khadra’s choices embody.  Khadra’s experience as a member of an immigrant family, a 
growing multi-cultural faith community, and a secular American public, enables her to refashion 
the meaning and context of the disciplinary practices that shape her life and practice, and in 
doing so, refashion their meaning in the public, secular sphere.  
I argue that Khadra’s developing vision of the umma also represents a kind of self-
fashioning.  The narrative proposes that not only can the secular and the umma co-exist, but the 
umma can inform one’s understanding of the secular, and the secular has the potential to foster 
the umma.  Khadra sees this potential in secularist culture as it occurs within the context of the 
American crucible.  Not in a strong-form exceptionalism that excludes Muslims from the public 
conversation or the political sphere, or even the weak-form exceptionalism, which by virtue of its 
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assumptions, favors majority held (and historically “American”) religious values.  Rather, 
Khadra seeks an almost utopian secularism that draws on a multitude of religious and non-
religious voices, that allows persons to practice their faith without judgment (within, of course, 
the limits of her ethical code), and recognizes the injustices perpetrated upon Muslims globally 
by the U.S., often in the name of the values used to suppress, colonize, and discriminate.  It is a 
secularism that recognizes religion as a universal category, and that adapts the idea of private, 
individual faith from secularist narratives, while including the aspect of community, public 
worship, and connection that secularism excludes from the public sphere.  It is here that Khadra 
departs from the secularism(s) she critiques, adapts, and translates: in her celebration of the 
umma.  The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf enters the contemporary literary fray among a host of 
novels and memoirs that feed into Orientalist fantasies about Muslim women, and demands room 
for a novel about a strong, compelling young woman who challenges both patriarchal Islam and 
secular notions of emancipation.  For Khadra the umma, with all of its flaws and inconsistencies, 
represents optimism.  In this way the novel forces us to ask how Khadra’s vision of the umma 
can help us imagine a more inclusive secularism; not a naïve hopefulness based on an uncritical 
essentializing or atomizing notion of humanity, but a rejection of cynicism and separatism. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Secularism and the Apocalypse: Rabih Alameddine’s Koolaids 
I.  The Four Horsemen 
 “Death comes in many shapes and sizes,” begins Rabih Alameddine’s 1998 novel 
Koolaids, “but it always comes.  No one escapes the little tag on the big toe” (1).  What follows 
is a shocking, expletive laden revision of the exchange between the four horsemen of the 
apocalypse in The Book of Revelation chapter 6, verses 1-8: The rider on the red horse says, 
“This good and faithful servant is ready.  He knoweth war.”  The rider on the black horse says, 
“This good and faithful servant is ready.  He knoweth plague.”  The rider on the pale horse says, 
“This good and faithful servant is ready.  He knoweth death” (1). Finally the rider on the white 
horse says, “Fuck this good and faithful servant.  He is a non-Christian homosexual, for God’s 
sake.  You brought me all the way out here for a fucking fag, a heathen.  I didn’t die for this 
dingbat’s sins” (1).  The figure on the white horse is Christ triumphant, and in the first scene all 
of the novel’s major themes – war, disease, and death – coalesce into Christ’s sweeping rejection 
of the Druze artist Mohammed, who lies in his hospital bed, dying of an AIDS related illness. 19  
Riding throughout the entire novel, the four horsemen blaze a trail through a disjointed narrative 
only to loop back towards the beginning, bearing down on Mohammed’s death. 
 Koolaids takes place largely in the imagination of Mohammed, but it is also set in Beirut 
and San Francisco, among other locations.  It is at once temporally static as it captures the last 
thoughts of the dying Mohammed, and chronologically sporadic as it shuffles through the last 
decades of the twentieth century.  The reader cycles through the dreams, hallucinations, 
memories, and pronouncements of Mohammed as he dies.  Form itself is unstable, as we read 
                                                          
19 The Druze are a Shia Muslim ethno religious group. 
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snippets from new reports, emails and letters, first person monologues and short plays.  Sections 
of the novel are rewritten again and again – the four horsemen, for example, appear five times in 
the novel.  Each time the white rider’s final words illuminate the preceding and ensuing 
narrative.  Secular time always progresses forward, but Alameddine disrupts narrative 
conventions by muddying chronology.  He frames the novel through sacramental time – using 
the eschatological figures of the apocalypse to orient time simultaneously towards past 
revelations and future prophecies.  The novel also shifts perspectives, often giving the narrative 
floor to minor characters or characters who only appear once, and who speak from a variety of 
locations and time periods.  Although many episodes give specific dates, even more do not.  
Thus the novel moves back and forth from one Lebanese war or period of civil unrest to the next, 
blurring the historical narrative and giving the reader the unsettling feeling that violence is 
continuous and unresolved.   
Alameddine’s work needs to be read in conjunction with the plethora of English language 
works written by Lebanese American authors in exile emerging post-Civil War, including recent 
works by Patricia Sarrafian Ward and Rawi Hage.20  Scholars and critics of Lebanese diasporic 
literature have addressed how these emergent Anglophone authors have “broadened and 
complicated the notion of Lebanon” (Salem, 771).  I argue that works such as Koolaids, which 
take exile as their starting point, also broaden and complicate the notion of a transnational United 
States.  Laura Doyle writes of transnationalism, “There is much talk of resistance and 
counterproduction but….in the main there is still a dearth of theory about the radical, involuntary 
interconnectedness of subjects who live in history and together shape, suffer, enjoy and resist its 
forces” (3).  Doyle insists that as part of our thinking about transnationalism “it makes sense for 
                                                          
20 See: Ward, Patricia S. The Bullet Collection. Saint Paul, Minn: Graywolf Press, 2003. Print; and Hage, Rawi. De 
Niro's Game. Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2006. Print. 
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us to describe those relations that cripple, sustain, propel, and define bodies as they continually 
reorient toward each other within and across national borders, and so create nations in the 
process” (21).  I read Koolaids with Doyle’s philosophy of regional and inter-corporeal 
transnationalism in mind – as a novel that portrays the push and pull of bodies across borders by 
economic and political forces.  Koolaids generates a transnational literary form that makes 
claims for universal religious and sexual freedom within what I call an inclusive secularism as 
opposed to a prohibitory one.   
What does a decidedly postmodern tale about AIDS and war have to do with secularism?  
Because secularism is itself a narrative, it tells the story of a turn from the cosmological to the 
scientific, bringing with it new forms of agency.  The story of secularism is self-congratulatory, 
ignoring the imbrications of science and religion that make up its core.  It is also, as I have noted 
in the previous chapter, a story whose plot has a forward momentum and whose rising action is 
the universal spread of abstract principles without regard for the bodies and spaces it covers.  
For, as Talal Asad reminds us, “representations of ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’ in modern and 
modernizing states mediate people’s identities, help shape their adequacy, and guarantee their 
experiences” (Formations, 8).  Secularism does not mediate, shape, and guarantee without regard 
to actual bodies; identity, adequacy, and experience are all regulated through an endless prism of 
contingencies, including but not limited to gender, race, class, national origin, sexuality, health, 
ethnicity, and religion.  It is the systematic and exclusionary social processes of mediating, 
shaping, and guaranteeing that come under scrutiny in Koolaids.  Devastatingly critical of both 
institutional religion and secular society, Koolaids demonstrates how literature can both disrupt 
and create secular and religious meanings through literary forms such as mu’arada and the 
postmodern novel.  
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In this chapter  I consider identity, adequacy, and experience as they emerge through the 
character of the refugee, Mohammed, and as embedded in both the form and representation of 
storytelling.  Asad uses the word adequacy to indicate how “backwards” countries and cultures 
measure up to the standards of so-called modernity.  But I also am using adequacy to talk about 
the anxiety of influence in a novel that borrows heavily from Western sources and must counter 
Orientalist expectations of what storytelling should do, and the ultimate inadequacy of writing to 
the task of shaping identity and conveying experience.  I highlight linkages between fractured 
time in the novel and secular understandings of sexuality and identity formation, arguing that the 
disjointed chronology of Koolaids disrupts linear coming out narratives and instead posits a more 
fluid, less structured relationship between time and identity.  A character’s sexuality as it 
represented at one point in time in the novel may overlap with or contradict other moments in the 
novel in ways that complicate ideologies of progressive identity formation (in the sense that we 
understand characters to be developing towards some kind of fixed identity, and that a final 
coming out, so to speak, could ultimately define them).  Instead, the hyper-surreal settings and 
unruly chronology suggests that closets are everywhere and nowhere, at once inexorable and 
dynamic, oppressive and even cathartic.   
In his chapter on Alameddine’s oeuvre, Wail Hassan writes that Alameddine’s “fiction 
queers Orientalism by, first, laying bare the discriminatory and often violent processes by which 
all identities (sexual, social, national, cultural, religious, and so forth) are formed; second, 
staging storytelling as an epistemology that reveals the ideological constructedness of all cultural 
knowledge; and third, demonstrating the limits as well as the potentials of cultural translation as 
both impossible and inevitable” (200).  Although ultimately my reading of Koolaids is less 
cynical than Hassan’s, I agree with his assertion that Alameddine’s novel imagines narrative as 
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epistemological and raises questions about the impossibility of cultural translation.  Hassan 
believes that through these challenges to constructed knowledge and identity Alameddine 
“queers Orientalism,” and I question whether the concept of “queering” can apply to secularism 
as represented in the novel.  In other words, as Thea Gold asks in response to recent scholarship 
asking whether critique is secular, “Is queer secular?” (629).21   
The presumption Gold articulates is that queer people can only truly be free under secular 
conditions.  Gold ultimately concludes, “The very question ‘Is queer secular’ thus assumes a 
binary division into secular and religious that is a false dichotomy” (629).  The question itself 
reinforces the very binaries “queer” is meant to erode, and Koolaids – from the erosion of 
Mohammed’s health, to the erosion of the state of Lebanon – is nothing if not a book about 
disintegrating realities.  What would it mean for a novel to “queer” secularism (when queer is 
usually assumed to be inherently secular) except to point out the failures of secular states to 
protect and enhance the lives of queer people?  Koolaids estranges the established meaning of 
secularism through its parody of secular states, allowing readers to recognize the hidden contours 
of the secular narrative that shape our relationships to concepts such as freedom.   It participates 
in “queering” only insofar as it presents a multitude of queer faithful, atheist, agnostic, and 
searching individuals from across political and cultural spectrums in order to underscore the 
inconsistencies of secular and religious thought.  It does so by mocking the religious pieties of 
secular rhetoric and juxtaposing the secular religiosity of early reactions to the AIDS epidemic 
with sectarian violence in Lebanon.  Interspersed are critiques and revisions of religious 
justifications for violence from the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, the Quran, and the 
Bhagavad Gita.  The irreverent mix of sacred and profane reveals the secular to be just as 
                                                          
21 See Asad, Talal, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood, Is Critique Secular?  Blasphemy, Injury, and 
Free Speech. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.  Print. 
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incongruous and doctrinaire as religion.  At the same time, by drawing parallels between the 
devout in Lebanon of various religious affiliations with gay men dying of AIDS in San Francisco 
with a range of religious and spiritual practices, Koolaids shows that the exclusionary tactics of 
institutionalized religion do not diminish the actions of ethical faithful people or devalue the 
solace that faith can provide.   
Nilufur Göle asserts that, “Western secularity cannot be separated from its claim for a 
higher form of civilization, its impact in shaping and stigmatizing a certain understanding of 
religion (as backward), its role in spreading models of secular governance to different parts of 
the world, and, last, but not least, its permeation of material culture in norms of secularity and 
private-public distinctions” (244).  Göle is writing specifically about secularism in relationship to 
veiling laws in France and Turkey, but her questions are also pertinent to the United States 
context: “How can one go beyond the limits of the local, particular qualifications and religious 
boundaries and address critiques of the ‘common’ knowledge of secularism?  The question is, 
who has access to the ‘universal’ – what kind of agencies are considered to bear a universal 
significance?” (245).   Finally, she asks, “How does a Muslim experience of secularity transform 
and question our understanding of the secular age?” (245). Literature by and about Muslim 
Americans is already doing the work of transformation; rooted in the personal and the local, 
books like Koolaids challenge the universalism at work in the “common” knowledge of 
secularism by portraying alternative (and common in both the sense of shared and prevalent) 
experiences of secularism.  Koolaids critiques promises of universal rights inherent to common 
understandings of secularism, but it does not abandon the appeal of the universal.  Instead, it asks 
its readers to reconsider how the universal can be made inclusive, all the while underscoring the 
impossibility of such a task by undermining the assumed universality of narrated experience. 
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Using the four horsemen as a framing device, I first introduce the main themes of the 
novel and analyze the connections Koolaids makes between the Lebanese Civil War and the 
early AIDS epidemic in the United States.  I then explore form and its relationship to time, 
narrative, and identity in the novel.  Crucial to my argument is Alameddine’s use of the Arabic 
literary convention of mu’arada. Mu’arada is traditionally imitation of poetic form, but can also 
be parody. Early twentieth century neoclassical poets, for example, demonstrated their mastery 
of poetic forms by imitating the language, meter, and style of medieval Arabic poets.  However, 
Koolaids repurposes the form of the mu’arada through active engagement with the themes of the 
original, whether it is the stories of Julio Cortazár or the poetry of Rumi.  Alameddine combines 
his use of the mu’arada with postmodern literary techniques such as fabulism, pastiche, and 
historiographic metafiction in playful homage to the masters of postmodern literature, and also as 
a way of rewriting master narratives and challenging dogmatic certitudes.  I argue that 
Alameddine uses the figure of the refugee in combination with postmodern literary forms and 
mu’arada to critique how both secularism and religion work as structures of affect in order to 
naturalize certain identities and regulate others.  Next I look to the relationship among secular 
discourses, GLBT rights, and gendered and racialized representation of Muslims – both imposed 
and self-asserted – in the United States, to address the question about what kinds of agencies, and 
indeed what kinds of bodies, are considered to bear universal significance.  Finally, I draw 
together my previous arguments about narrative and identity to consider how Koolaids can be 
read as endorsing the potential in both secular and religious moral thought to create more 
inclusive secularism(s).  Koolaids suggest that while a universal epistemology, experience, and 
narration may be impossible, questing for universal inclusivity should not be. 
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II. The Red Horseman: War and the Refugee 
Mohammed’s revision of Revelation that begins the novel is - we find out later - the 
abbreviated beginning of his unfinished novel.  Or, at least, it might be.  It may also be reality, a 
dream, a hallucination, or Mohammed’s final vision before his death.  Whatever it is: it is 
Mohammed’s story.  As the “irascible rider on the white horse leads the other three lemmings 
away,” the story is interrupted by Mohammed’s immediate pain: “The hospital bed hurts my 
back” (1).  In one brief episode Alameddine merges the thematic core of the novel with its form: 
a fragmentary novel, an altered sacred text, and movement in time and place.  The title 
Revelation comes from the very first word of St. John the Divine’s text, apokalypsis.  As an 
ancient prophecy Revelation transports the reader simultaneously back to its first millennium 
origin and forward into an unknowable point in the future.  Revelation recalls St. John’s exile on 
the island of Patmos where, as the story goes, he went to escape persecution.  It also propels the 
reader into the coming apocalypse.  Finally, it evokes the act of writing.   By beginning with the 
end times Koolaids declares itself an apocalyptic text, filled with hallucinatory visions and 
dreams indistinguishable from reality, but always and ultimately concerned with the 
impossibility of narration.  Like Revelation itself the passage evokes many things: Christian 
history, religiously justified homophobia, Mohammed’s death, and the physicality of the hospital 
room. Mohammed is the prophetic voice of the novel, and this, in conjunction with his single 
name, makes him an unlikely allegory for the Prophet Mohammed.  Like the Prophet 
Mohammed, who was exiled to Medina, Mohammed is in exile: in San Francisco, which is 
another unlikely corollary – this time for Medina, the second holiest city in Islam. 
Alameddine was himself a refugee from the Lebanese Civil war, and Koolaids is 
permeated with a sense of dislocation as Mohammed attempts to inscribe the brutalities of war in 
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Lebanon upon his experience of exile in the United States. Salah Hassan calls Lebanon an 
“unstated state” which “refers to a condition of a state that is no longer a state, a state that has 
little or no sovereignty, a state that is bereft of the means to uphold or impose the rule of law in 
its territory or at its borders through the mechanism of force” (1622).  Hassan reminds us that 
one of the many consequences of the unstated state is the stateless subject, including migrants, 
refugees, and exiles.  The novel’s two main characters, Mohammad and the Muslim student 
Samir, are both refugees who struggle with the fracturing of national and familial bonds as they 
flee sectarian violence at home.  The novel repeatedly ties the condition of statelessness to the 
inability to narrate experience.  The Beirut militia Die Rosenkavaliers encapsulates the inability 
to express coherent identity in the chaos of state violence, as they “came into our world 
suddenly, killed tons of people, and disappeared just as suddenly as they appeared.  I still have 
no idea who they were, what party they belonged to, or what they were fighting for” (45).  
Although capable of the permanence of killing “tons of people” Die Rosenkavaliers is incapable 
of the solidity of narration, of an enduring story of their motivation.  If narration creates 
permanence through its very utterance, creates stated-ness so to speak, than Koolaids denies that 
intransience at every turn.        
  It is “particularly through the refugee,” Hassan argues, that one “encounters a significant 
alternative to the nation-state as the model for structuring global political order and defining 
subjectivity in general” (1622).  Hannah Arendt makes the point that stateless people lose their 
human rights when they are deprived of their legal status as national citizens, thus the right to 
have rights is at the core of her argument about polity.22  Not only does the exile lose access to 
rights, but as Hassan points out, nationality itself is intrinsically associated with “defining 
                                                          
22 See Hannah Arendt.  The Origins of Totalitarianism.  1951.  New  York: Harcourt, 1968. Print. 
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subjectivity,” thus the exile also loses something of his or her human condition.  Nationalism is 
not only an institutional phenomenon that affects the construction of political communities, but 
also a defining feature of a subject’s ability to narrate his or her own existence.  This is 
particularly true in the United States, but also true of being a gay man in Lebanon, as 
Mohammed writes, “In America, I fit, but I do not belong.  In Lebanon, I belong, but I do not fit” 
(40).  Lebanon, as an unstated state, renders even the most powerful characters unable to assert 
their identity without fear of reprisal or death from the government, the military, Lebanon’s 
neighbors, enemies, and even allies.  Queerness, as an often-unstated state of being itself in the 
novel, links the unstated-ness of Lebanon to the unstated-ness of queerness.    
Hassan writes that “flights into exile potentially constitute new beginnings liberated from 
the political nightmare of an unstated state,” yet Mohammed and Samir must contend with the 
racial and sexual hierarchies of their new home (1626).  For both Mohammed and Samir the 
flight into exile represented not only freedom from the violence of war torn Lebanon but also the 
autonomy to occupy a sexual identity supposedly abhorred in their home culture.  In the United 
States, the two refugees find their theoretical American self-determination hemmed in by 
different kinds of violence, including homophobia, xenophobia, anti-Muslim sentiment, AIDS 
hysteria, and the appropriation and mass-marketing of AIDS stories through art and film.    
In Koolaids the people of the “unstated state” of Lebanon struggle to narrate their 
experiences.  In the first episode that takes place in Lebanon, Samir’s mother writes a 1976 diary 
entry about the shelling of her apartment building.  “The only thing I remember about those 
seconds was the look in Samir’s eyes,” she writes at one point, and later: “I felt my control 
slipping. . . .I don’t recall much of what happened for the twelve hours before we were able to 
drive her to the hospital” (5-7).  Twenty years later she writes another diary entry about the 
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Israeli bombing of Lebanon: “How long can this go on?  How many more ambulances?” (209).  
In the two hundred pages between the two diary entries Lebanon is bombed repeatedly “by 
foreign invaders – Americans, Israelis, Syrians – or domestic militias – Phalangist, Shiite, 
Palestinian, and others” (Wail Hassan, 207).  In the interim almost all of Mohammed’s friends 
die of AIDS related illnesses.  The text circles back to the diary with its images of “a mother with 
a dead baby on her breast, a child with no face sitting on her father’s lap” broadcast on the 
television for all to see and none to remember, just as Samir’s mother labors to remember and 
narrate her own experiences of bombings.  Meanwhile, Mohammed struggles and fails to state 
his experience of AIDS, saying that “I have never been able to write anything because I don’t 
trust my writing” (18).  His best friend Scott thinks that, “Only Danielle Steel could write a book 
about the ravages of the AIDS epidemic and get away with it” (18).  The inability to narrate 
springs not from the trauma of experience, but from the speaker’s condition of statelessness: 
from the unnamed victims of sectarian violence that cycle through international news, just 
another speechless and distant spectacle for viewers, to the AIDS stories that television 
whitewashes and sanitizes.  The “unstated” victims of war in Lebanon and AIDS in the United 
States seem at a loss to state much of anything for themselves even as their stories are co-opted 
by the media or the sentimental films that Scott and Mohammed come to abhor.  “Do you think 
this gratuitous sentimental scene is enough to clinch a movie deal,” Mohammed asks of his 
parody of The Longtime Companion and Philadelphia called The Waltons Do AIDS. 
Steven Salaita writes that Koolaids is “a text in which the concept of Lebanon is made to 
travel along with the diasporic Lebanese characters, who provide a different type of American 
consciousness, one based on the interaction of memories and contemporary realities” (80).  
Salaita describes the novel as accurately embodying Saree Makdisi’s theory about political 
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upheaval in Lebanon, as Makdisi believes that “the people of Lebanon . . . had to try to carry on 
their daily lives and social interactions while at the same time following each new development 
in that other reality called the war – and, between those two parallel realities, meaning and 
signification got cut off” (277).  For Salaita, the ontological and temporal uncertainties of the 
novel’s form reflect Lebanon’s reality.  I would add that they also reflect the realities of living 
during the AIDS epidemic of the 1970s and 80s, which in turn created its own parallel reality.  
What is vital then is the connection between the incommunicability of the unstated state of being 
in Lebanon and the way that this “concept” creates and interacts with a “different type of 
American consciousness,” one that in turn reflects another unstated state of being: being gay and 
HIV positive in the U.S.  While Salaita finds that the form is rooted in the reality-making of the 
Lebanese war, he also writes that the war “has been inscribed into the American polity because it 
was part of the consciousness of writers who migrated to the United States and expressed that 
consciousness in writing, thus rendering the civil war a participant in American social discourse” 
(84).  In the instance of Koolaids, Alameddine inscribes the Lebanese war onto the discourse 
around AIDS patients – not only through the relationship between death and sex, but through the 
ways in which representation can actually cause the erasure of the victims of war and disease.  
 
III. The Pale Horseman: Death and the Story 
 “Time.  Time is what I need right now,” Mohammed tells us immediately after the first 
appearance of the four horsemen, “I can’t think straight anymore.  I should not have said that.  I  
try never saying the word straight” (1).  Though the passage is written in English, Mohammed 
tells us that “I can’t speak English anymore either.  Really.  I can’t think in English.  It’s back to 
my roots.  I now think and dream only in Arabic” (1).  As we read his stream of consciousness 
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over the next two pages, while Mohammed drifts through memories of his language acquisition 
as a child to his struggles to speak English to his hospital visitor, it dawns upon us that we must 
be reading a translation of his thoughts from Arabic to English.  Wail Hassan writes that one of 
the major themes of the book is that “the failure to communicate is a failure to translate” (209), 
and here is a vivid example of how that equation works in the novel.  Mohammed is telling us a 
story in which he cannot remember the order of events (“James was here the other day.  Or was it 
today?  I can’t think straight.  Time gets confusing”) and during which he recounts his failure to 
communicate (“I tell him, but he doesn’t understand me.  I must have said it in French”) (2).  The 
scene relates his inability to translate to his inability to locate himself in time, connecting 
temporal and lingual slippages as imperfect narrations.  The complexity of the episode – the 
breakdown of communication, repetition of phrases, emergence of childhood memories, and 
temporal uncertainty – confuses a clear understanding of what it means to occupy time and place.  
Straight narration, Mohammed is telling us, is impossible.     
Deliberately calling attention to the artifice of narrative is of course nothing new, and in 
the following scene Alameddine hammers the point by citing Robert Coover’s playful 
postmodern novel Spanking the Maid.  Kurt, the flaky boyfriend of Mohammad’s best friend 
Scott, scoops up one of Scott’s books and asks what it is about.  “Spanking the maid, of course,” 
Scott explains.  Spanking the Maid reiterates its beginning scene over and over: a man wakes 
from an ever-changing dream, his maid arrives in his bedroom and fails to perfect her work, the 
man chastises her, and so on.  Scott was right, it is about spanking the maid, in the same way that 
Koolaids is a novel about AIDS.  But Spanking the Maid is also about the cyclical nature of 
narrative, and its early placement in Koolaids indicates that this too will be a cyclical story, with 
numerous starts and stops and changes that ultimately circle back to the beginning.  It 
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acknowledges and mocks an abstract ideal of storytelling: a perfect narration that never occurs, 
just as the maid forgets her soap and her mop. 
 Scott then proceeds to read a selection from Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a 
traveler: “Long novels written today are perhaps a contradiction: the dimension of time has been 
shattered, we cannot love or think except in fragments of time each of which goes off along its 
own trajectory and immediately disappears.  We can discover the continuity of time only in the 
novels of the period when time no longer stopped and did not yet seem to have exploded, a 
period that lasted no more than a hundred years” (4).  Again, Calvino’s novel has numerous 
beginnings, and its themes – the related acts of reading and writing, the subjectivity of meaning – 
are introduced in this very short scene through citation rather than exposition.  Yet it is not 
merely citation: it is an engaged citation, one that takes on the meaning of the text even as it 
imitates.  For example, the quote sets up the ruptured style of Koolaids, acknowledging that its 
nonlinear timeline and unfinished storylines are features of a post modern literary heritage.  
However, by citing Calvino, the text also directly confronts the question of influence through a 
form that at this point seems decidedly Western: postmodern pastiche.  Koolaids calls attention 
to pastiche by incorporating different genres (emails, letters, journalism, first person narration, 
etc.) and by including authors known for using the form.  Even so, at the end of the passage Scott 
asks Kurt if he is following.  “Not really,” Kurt says, “Are you ready to go to the movie?” (4). 
Two weeks, Mohammed thinks, is how long this relationship can last.  The Calvino quote 
references the nineteenth century novel; its inclusion in Koolaid references the postmodern 
novel, but the couple goes off to see a film.  Attention spans are waning.  The narrative methods 
of Calvino and Coover, even as they are imitated, are going the way of the nineteenth century 
novel and Kurt and Scott’s soon to be defunct relationship.        
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Later in the novel, Mohammed debates Julio Cortázar over a cup of mate, a drink, he 
points out, enjoyed by Argentinians and Lebanese.  He borrows quotes from Cortazár’s Rayuela, 
translated into English, putting them directly into Cortázar’s mouth without reference to the 
novel, rendering them into a debate about war and AIDS.  In Rayuela, the quotes are originally 
spoken by characters who are philosophizing about life and death, all while a baby lies dead 
nearby unbeknownst to its mother.  Understanding the scene in Koolaids necessitates familiarity 
with the source novel, nonetheless it is more than a mere citation.  By writing himself into the 
scene, Mohammed turns the absurd musings by characters too self-involved to inform the mother 
about her child’s death into equally absurd musings that ignore the horror of AIDS deaths.   
Mohammed is at once the interlocutor and the disregarded dead child.  Advocating for the chaos 
created by war and disease, Cortázar says, “And these crises that most people think of as terrible, 
as absurd, I personally think they serve to show us the real absurdity, the absurdity of an ordered 
and calm world” (106-107).  What is a dead child or a mother’s grief when compared to man’s 
potential for philosophical reflection, which would be impossible in a calm and ordered world.     
Alameddine rewrites the scene in the form of the original debates, but this time erases the 
boundary between the author and his characters.  Cortazár debates, with the words of his 
fictional characters, the fictional author Mohammed, who ultimately critiques and defeats him, 
“Poor Julio.  I try not to do this to him, but he’s just too easy” (107).  Like Rayuela, one can 
“hopscotch” through Koolaids; it cites the novel in both theme and form.  It also raises the 
question of influence by citing novels like Rayuela  and If on a winter’s night a traveler that 
explicitly invoke other texts, styles, and genres, all while musing on the impossibility of 
authorial originality.  If straight narration is impossible, so too are attempts to map the channels 
of influence. 
54 
 
 Traditionally, poems written in the form of mu’arada do not riff on the original in the 
way that Koolaids does.  Scholar and memoirist Sasson Somekh writes that as a rule, “the 
intertextuality employed by the writer of mu’arada is of a linear nature: the modern poet does 
not attempt to produce a new meaning through allusion to an older text; rather he reproduces the 
same semantic purport by reshuffling phraseological components of the old poem” (52).  
However, contemporary Arab writers are modifying the form.  In her extensive study of Iraqi 
poet Badr Shakir al-Sayyāb, Terri De Young considers how al-Sayyāb reworks the classical 
genre.  She writes that the form has “no parallel in Western literature” and that in its traditional 
definition it is merely a “poem composed in the same rhyme and meter as a previously written 
poem” (131).  Yet this stringent definition means that the question of intention - “so important 
when dealing with practices that thematize influence, as mu‘ārada does – is (perhaps 
deliberately) left obscure” (131).  It means that “any suggestion of a dialectical exchange 
between the two parties involved in the mu‘ārada is consistently disregarded in favor of 
subsuming and containing the relationship within a model of interpersonal restructuring or 
reordering of the instantiated words” (132).  Alemaddine’s careful citation yet radical revision of 
Cortazár, for example, would fall outside the realm of traditional definitions of mu‘ārada.  
Because Alameddine uses citation to indicate his own influences as well as to parody the 
cacophony of removed academic, artistic, and media voices that drown out actual AIDS patients 
and their narratives, his citation pays homage not only the form and style of Cortazár, but also 
extends the meaning of Cortazár’s text beyond the world of Rayuela. 
Yet De Young contends that not only are contemporary poets reworking the form, but 
also that these dialectical exchanges have always been present within the tradition.  Arguing for 
what she calls a Bloomian reading of the form as used by al-Sayyāb, De Young draws on Harold 
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Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence.  She challenges those who might question the “applicability of 
Bloom’s theories” to classical Arabic literature to look at the literature about the practice of 
mu’arada because it represents it as “being both ubiquitous through the entire history of classical 
Arabic literature and thoroughly grounded in relationships of tension and conflict” (133).  
Conflict and tension are not a modern literary innovation, but a part of the literary history of 
mu‘ārada that is obscured by modern critics who “deny it any relevance to the modern modes of 
literary production” and who deem it “at best the products of a lesser poetic talent, one unable to 
innovate on its own” (136).  She points to  al-Sayyāb’s poetry as an example of how mu‘ārada 
can be challenging rather than simply contrasting a “valorized past with [a] degenerate present,” 
as his work contains “practices that in fact invite subversion, contestation, and even direct 
challenge to their hegemonic power” (131).  The Bloomarian anxiety of influence that she cites 
shapes the historical production of mu’arada from its classical beginnings to the contemporary 
manifestations that more explicitly address anxieties about literary influences.   
De Young gives an insightful literary history of the practice of mu’arada, but I take up 
her study where it intersects with Alameddine’s: contemporary criticism and the question of 
influence.  Mu’arada is a “literary form that flaunts the fact that its author has been influenced,” 
and De Young believes that in modernist and contemporary Arabic criticism “‘influence’ has 
become a very problematic term” (135).  Instead, she writes, the terms “‘innovative’ and 
‘original’ have been situated as central touchstones of quality in the evaluative vocabulary of 
Arabic literary criticism” (135).  Therefore, De Young writes, to “label a literary practice as not 
‘open to innovation’ is implicitly to deny it any relevance to the modern modes of literary 
production” (136).  The difference between al-Sayyāb’s work and his predecessors, De Young 
argues, is his level of engagement with the original text.  Rather than merely imitate style and 
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theme, his work comments and expands upon the meaning of its source.  She sees his use of the 
form as variously resisting “the impositions of a Western literary discursive apparatus” by 
selecting the authors he imitates with no regard for the values imposed by the Western canon, 
and also as inhabiting Homi Bhabba’s “hybrid text” which offers up “new avenues for 
expression (or self-construction) to its practitioners virtually in direct proportion to its ability to 
confound the expectations inherent in the narcissistic gaze of the colonizing other” (149).  
Koolaids addresses hybrid migrant identity as a paradigm of globalized, neo-liberal anxiety 
through the characters of Mohammed and Samir as exiles that alternately do and do not “fit” or 
“belong” in the United States and Lebanon.  While their hybrid identities create anxiety 
wherever they go, they also produce interior anxieties about what they have absorbed from the 
West and how it enhances, alienates, and alters their Lebanese identities.  Through Mohammed’s 
immersions into and modifications of Western sources, Koolaids literalizes this anxiety through 
literary borrowings, making the anxiety of influence a palpable part of Mohammed’s reflections 
on his own creative process and on his own death. 
Mu’arada means opposition or protest but is most often read as homage.  This reading, as 
De Young argues using an anecdote about the poet Imru’ al Quis, elides the fact that “thematic 
engagement was emphatically a possible, it not necessary, element of the rhetorical strategy” 
(134).  Citation can be seen as protest because it foregrounds “the competitive dimension 
inherent in the form” (134).  Alameddine’s uses of citation are not merely jockeying for literary 
position, but protest against Western literary influences, categories, and canons.  Alameddine’s 
version of mu’arada encompasses both its linguistic meaning as protest and its historical legacy 
as homage.  There is a certain amount of fidelity to the original text, and definitely a celebration 
of the authors cited and respect for their literary innovations.  Yet Koolaids protests against many 
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of the forms it imitates even while imitating, and opposes many of the authors it cites in the 
midst of citation.  Like al-Sayyāb’s poetry, it is an “eclectic appropriation” of source material 
(148).  It is the combination of citation of literary precedence, imitation of style, and reworking 
of meaning, that leads me to want to call Koolaids an improvisation on the form of mu’arada.  It 
is not a clear leap to make, one might more easily make a case for postmodern pastiche, mostly 
because very little of the novel is in verse and mu’arada is conceived of as a purely poetic form.   
However, the literary implications for identifying Koolaids as mu’arada are threefold.   
First, I am making a claim that Koolaids is representative of a transnational literary form, 
not merely because it cites and imitates Western and Arabic literary genres, but because it 
addresses the anxiety of influence from various angles.  By drawing upon Western sources, 
commenting and altering them, and juxtaposing them with texts from around the globe, Koolaids 
draws attention to the colonizing influence of Western literary practices and canonical values on 
Arabic letters.  Koolaids also addresses the more insidious cultural influences of Western 
imperialism and consumerism through Mohammed’s writing; at one point he writes: “We all had 
what some would call a European complex.  We wanted so hard to be European . . . There were 
those who mimicked everything European;” at the same time, “Another manifestation was the 
complete opposite.  Many hated Europeans with a passion.  Some tried to revive Arabism. 
Islamic Fundamentalism was on the rise.  They kidnapped Westerners” (29).  When Mohammed 
writes, “In America, I fit but I do not belong.  In Lebanon, I belong, but I do not fit,” he is 
writing about his own identity, but he could also be writing about the novel itself, the one he is 
narrating as well as the one of which he is a part (81).  The novel itself, because it is in English 
and not Arabic and satirizes both Arabic and Western literary forms, does and does not belong or 
fit anywhere.  Rather than sycophantic mimicry or outright rejection, Koolaids is the hybrid text 
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that “confounds expectations  inherent in the narcissistic gaze of the colonizing other” by, as 
Wail Hassan writes, queering Orientalism, as well as underscoring the complicated, often 
conflicted, experience of artistic influence on exile narration. 
Second, Koolaids draws together two literary traditions that are often interpreted as 
having only a unidirectional influence, and demonstrates the preoccupation of both Western and 
Arabic writers with literary heritage.  By doing so, Koolaids expands upon De Young’s reading 
of mu’arada as a genre with the potential to include more than mere mimicry of form.  It also 
indicates that mu’arada can incorporate texts from outside the Arabic literary tradition.  
Additionally, it means that critics should conceive of mu’arada as a form that can be written in 
languages besides Arabic. Mohammed describes his own book: “I wanted to write an endless 
book of time.  It would have no beginning and no end.  It would not flow in order.  The tenses 
would make no sense.  A book whose first page is almost identical to the last, and all the pages in 
between are jumbled with an interminable story.  A book which would make both Kant and Jung 
proud” (118).  He is unable to do it, however, because “I would have been copying the master.  
Borges did it before me” (118).  Mohammed does not finish this book, but Alameddine does.  In 
a meta-textual moment, Mohammed is implicitly declaring all of Koolaids a citation of Borges. 
Its jumbled temporality, its circularity, its hopscotch narration (which cites Cortazár as well as 
Borges), are insistences of mu’arada making up one novel-length mu’arada. 
Third, unlike the postmodern literary forms that Koolaids also cites, associating the novel 
with mu’arada addresses the religious elements of the text.  Postmodernism, as difficult as it is to 
define, seems decidedly secular, as does its literary forms.  This is not to say that the Arabic 
literary tradition does not participate in these modernist and postmodernist forms, but that 
mu’arada has a rich historical association with religious writing.  De Young proposes that the 
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“best evidence for a Bloomian reading of Arabic mu’arada can be found in . . . . those treatises 
that deal with attempts to demonstrate the sacred status of the Koran as a scriptural miracle, one 
containing the verbatim words of God as they were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and thus 
confirming his claims to be a truly inspired prophetic messenger to mankind” (133). 
Furthermore, De Young writes:  
One of the proofs that these treatises repeatedly point to as a demonstration of their 
contention is the fact that the Koran itself challenges ‘both men and jinn’ to compose 
something similar to its words, yet no one who took up that challenge was ever able to 
convince a significant proportion of the available audience that what he had produced 
truly equaled or surpassed the Koran’s characteristic brand of eloquence.  These works on 
the inimitability (i’jāz) of the Koran – and there are many – consistently refer to the 
unsuccessful imitation of the scripture as mu’aradas.  Thus they are led to discuss the 
dynamics of the production of mu’aradas among poets – in order to give a context for 
their discussion of the relationship between the Koran and its mu’aradas (133). 
Mu’arada has a long history of engagement with religious texts, most notably the Qur’an, as De 
Young points out, and also an associated anecdotal history of the inadequacy of written imitation 
– not just (and obviously) of the sacred nature of the text but of its intrinsic beauty.  The Qur’an 
is believed to be the word of God or the representation of the word of God – and is thus believed 
to be as perfect in form as in content.   
Koolaids’ engagement with sacred texts works towards a different end: it reveals the 
violence inherent in various sacred texts by either revising or appropriating their language.  At 
points in the novel Mohammed offers commentary on his retellings of Scripture, for example 
after paraphrasing the story of Sodom and Gomorrah he writes, “Let’s get this straight, and I do 
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mean straight.  God tells us men fucking men is a terrible thing, but a father offering his two 
daughters, vestal virgins no less, to a horde of horny buggers is heroic. Now that’s straight” (64).  
He concludes, “God destroys the faggots with fire and brimstone,” before turning his attention to 
the dying, suffering Scott, who simply says, “The catheter hurts” (64-65).  Traditionally, poets 
use the mu’arada not to attempt to replicate the perfect content of the Qur’an, which while open 
to interpretation is unassailable, but its form.  Here and elsewhere, Mohammed not only 
repurposes the language of the Qur’an, he challenges its flawless substance.  Earlier I note that 
straight narration in the novel is associated with the violence of binary and civilizational 
narratives.  Koolaids does not equivocate with Scriptural interpretation, as many feminist and 
queer theologians and religious activists and scholars do, but with Scripture itself.  Mohammed’s 
writing evokes the mu’arada because of his relationship to a distinct literary heritage that 
intersects with Islamic cultural production, while, in the tradition of the postmodern authors he 
cites such as Borges and Calvino, he transforms the form (as, of course, does Alameddine).    
At the same time Koolaids critiques religious institutions, it also invokes the sacred in 
order to convey precisely what mu’arada traditionally works to express: the poverty of language 
when it comes to communicating what is beautiful, sacred, and meaningful in the world.  That 
what is sacred in Koolaids is often contrary to the Scriptures and religious edicts it cites is 
embodied in the juxtaposition between God “destroying the faggots” and Scott’s painful words.  
In one simple statement, “the catheter hurts,” Scott exposes how the violence of the story of 
Sodom bears upon contemporary, suffering humans.  It at once enrages and elicits empathy from 
the reader.  Here, Scott is sacred and so is his pain.  Parallel moments occur to victims of 
violence in Lebanon; they too are sacred victims of supposedly religious warfare.  The framing 
device of the constantly shifting horsemen scenes are one way in which Koolaids addresses the 
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paradox of religiously inspired brutality and moments of such fragile humanity that words cannot 
translate their inviolability. 
Wail Hassan interprets the revisions of the horsemen scene as Mohammed’s unfinished 
novel about AIDS.  Of the scenes, Wail Hassan writes that they are “an ongoing parody of 
religious traditions that justify prejudice and violence” and that “the theme of the failure of 
writing gestures toward the impossibility to communicate fully – to translate – the horrific effects 
of war and AIDS, as well as the tragicomic absurdities they reveal” (208).  Salaita interprets 
Koolaids as an “example of pastiche” and as ultimately “articulat(ing) an implied humanism” 
(72).  I agree with Hassan’s interpretation of the four horsemen as parody of religious dogma and 
as representing the failure to ever truly communicate horrible violence and human suffering.  I 
also agree with Salaita’s claim about the novel being an example of pastiche and as perhaps 
endorsing a type of humanism, albeit one that Salaita never defines.  But I think that both critics 
fail to grant the generosity of spirit that motivates the novel, particularly of characters such as 
Scott and Samir but even that of the cynical Mohammed, for flawed humanity.  Koolaids speaks 
to the inadequacy of writing to convey horrific experiences, as Wail Hassan points out, but also 
the difficultly of conveying beauty.  Translation does not just fail to communicate the negative, 
but we are also unable to translate – as Mohammed tells us over and over about his writing and 
his art – what is good and significant about being human.   
Koolaids mocks religious institutions and parodies sacred texts; it takes down religious 
fundamentalists in all their pious guises.  When the Christian town of Damour is devastated, 
Mohammed writes: “In one fell swoop, Damour no longer existed.  They killed the people.  
Bloodied corpses, with open eyes, were left everywhere . . . . Then they burned the town and the 
surrounding citrus groves.  Damour was no more.  Expunged.  Obliterated.  I never thought 
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humans could do that” (119).  It echoes Mohammed’s paraphrasing of Sodom and Gomorrah: 
“So here we have the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. . . He turns a disobedient wife into salt.  
But he asks us to idolize drunks who sleep with their daughters or offer them to a horny, unruly 
mob” (64).  As I have argued, his pared down, reinterpreted version of Lot lays bare the absurd 
moral of the story; but when juxtaposed with the Sodom and Gomorrah-like destruction of 
Damour, the humor is drained: “I never thought a human could do that” (119, italics mine).  The 
lessons of our holy books can be fundamentally destructive.  They can result in unspeakable 
horror.   Yet human goodness, potential, and inexpressible beauty can also be found in sacred 
texts and the actions of the faithful.   
One example is the encounter between the five-year-old Makram and his Grandma Salwa 
in Lebanon.  Makram’s father is Christian and his mother is Muslim.  The scene itself is 
unmoored from time; it arrives in the narrative without context or introduction to the characters.  
Grandma Salwa is troubled by violence committed by Lebanese Christians, and she removes 
Makram’s gold cross and tells him, “You wear this when you are proud of it.  These days, it is 
nothing to be proud of.  We have to keep it safe until you can be proud of it again” (22).  Deeply 
moved, Makram’s Muslim mother reacts, “I saw her walk towards us like a queen, but she was 
crying.  She kissed Grandma Salwa and told her she loved her.  She took off her gold chain, 
which said Allah in Arabic, and took my cross from my grandmother.  My dad gave her his 
cross.  He carried me and said, ‘One day soon we can be proud of wearing them again’” (22).  
Shame blends with optimism as they exchange necklaces.  Moments like these provide 
counterpoints to religious parody, for in Koolaids nothing is ever as simple as religion is all good 
or all bad.  Rather, the potential for spiritual beauty is something “we have to keep safe until we 
can be proud of it again.” 
63 
 
When drawn out and read side by side, many of the chronologically scattered scenes in 
the novel relate to one another through the kinds of eschatological time or spiritual themes that 
Grandma’s cross and Mother’s Allah necklace symbolize.  For example, in the following four 
scenes certain theological concepts only emerge when the episodes are put side by side.  In the 
first scene, Mohammed finds out he is HIV positive and goes to a Roman Catholic priest to ask 
for absolution, which he knows he cannot receive because he is Muslim.  He recounts this story 
in the midst of another scene, while listening to Bete Aber Auch Dabei: “Yet pray, even while/ in 
the midst of keeping watch!/ In thy great guilt/ beg the Judge for patience,/ and He shall free thee 
from sin/ and make thee cleansed” (46).  The Church denies him absolution because he is not 
baptized, but it is purity of the idea that attracts Mohammed: he wants desperately to be freed, 
not of sin, but of death.  As he listens to the music, he thinks: “That voice is heavenly.  I would 
stay alive for that voice….It is divine.  I can’t understand why my mind is disappearing . . . She 
is talking directly to God” (45-46).  Then, towards the end of the novel Mohammed confesses to 
having killed Scott: “He told me to kill him.  He had said if it ever got rough, he didn’t want to 
go on….I killed him” (210).  Finally, the second time the four horsemen appear the white 
horseman says, “This good and faithful servant killed his best friend.  Let him suffer” (53).   
Because of the chaotic temporality of the book, Mohammed vacillates between accepting 
and resisting death in different sections of the book.  When the song ends he says, “I want to die” 
(47).  He wants absolution because he fears death; on the next page he desires the freedom that 
death entails.  He writes his own judgment into the mouths of the white horseman, “let him 
suffer,” but later suggests that he did the right thing.  Taken out of context and read together, the 
four scenes – Mohammed listening to the sung mass in German on his deathbed, telling a story 
about visiting a Roman Catholic priest upon learning his HIV status, confessing Scott’s murder, 
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and the second appearance of the four horsemen – indicate moral and spiritual depth beyond 
merely critiquing religious or secular morality.  Together the scenes broach the theological 
concepts of judgment, sin, forgiveness, and our ethical obligations to others.  In this case, 
Mohammed’s duty to give Scott a merciful death, Mohammed’s residual guilt over Scott’s death, 
feelings of regret and readiness for his own death, and the mystical beauty he still manages to 
find expressed in art. 
It is impossible to parse out exactly what all these episodes mean overall given that each 
one could mean something different when paired with different episodes than the ones I have 
chosen.  This is especially true because interrelated scenes are deliberately separated through 
narrative time and space, and through physical pages.  For example, the Christian trope of 
“cleanliness” appears again in a hateful letter written by a fundamentalist to his stepson who is 
dying of AIDS.  The stepson’s boyfriend sends a return letter “telling him both he and 
Christopher had converted to Islam.  As Mohammadans, God would be waiting for them with 
open arms, but with better presents” (112).  The letter enrages the parents and amuses the reader, 
but it does so by playing up Islam as even more objectionable than AIDS.   
Pointing out moments of spiritual longing, confusion, or generosity is not to say that any 
religion or philosophy emerges unscathed.  As Wail Hassan points out, “the novel also ridicules 
the elaborate justifications for war and fratricidal violence found in the Bhagavad Gita. . . . . the 
philosophical discourse on the meaning of dharma in Hinduism is treated in the same way as the 
‘straight’ Abrahamic religions: reduced to absurdity” (207).  That is to say: nothing is sacred.  
Nonetheless, in the midst of derision is always the genuine human need for connection and 
meaning.  For instance, the Bhagavad Gita shows up when Mohammed rewrites a play four 
times featuring Arjuna, Krsna, Eleanor Roosevelt, Krishnamurti, Tom Cruise and an assortment 
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of rotating characters.  Each time Arjuna asks a variation of the same question: “What is the 
purpose of life….I wish someone could explain the purpose of life to me”; “I just want to 
understand… Why me, O God, why me?”; “You don’t hear me.  In an ordered world, you would 
hear me…I wish someone would just tell me what it’s all about”; and finally, “My head hurts” 
(38-39, 84, 136, 168).  In the midst of critique – usually in scenes that involve the exposure of 
absurd moral rationalizations, revision of sacred texts, or the incorporation of prayer – Koolaids 
makes its most raw appeals to the Divine for guidance, absolution, and peace.   
In this section, I made the connection between the narrative form of Koolaids, its 
occupation with influence, and its literary religious heritage.  In the following section I extend 
the connection to the realm of the secular, asking how secularism narratives shape sexual and 
gender identity with respect to post-colonial theories of subjectivity.  I relate the existential 
questions emerging in scenes preoccupied with religion in the United States and Lebanon to 
secular hierarchies of identity.  Finally, I broaden my search for human potentialities beyond the 
religious to the vexed and vexing nexus of religion, secularism, and freedom in the novel. 
 
IV. The Black Horseman: Secularism, Sex, and Sickness 
The third time the four horsemen appear, they follow a gruesome description of the 
debilitating AIDS related illness of Mohammad’s friend Juan in addition to a journalistic litany 
of violent exchanges between Hizballah, the South Lebanese Army, and Israel.  While Juan’s 
illness causes him to shake and drool uncontrollably; the militia, Mohammad explains, are 
afflicted with a different virus, called Ya Rabbi Tegi Fi Aino, or “Oh God, I hope this gets him in 
the eye” – a “Egyptian virus first discovered in June of 1967….those infected with the virus are 
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known to close their eyes, and fire, hoping to hit something” (97).23  The four horsemen 
approach and the first three chant from Surah 81 of the Quran:  
When the sun shall be darkened, When the stars shall be thrown down, When the 
mountains shall be set moving, When the pregnant camels shall be neglected, When the 
savage beasts shall be mustered, When the seas shall be set boiling, When the souls shall 
be coupled, When the buried infant shall be asked for what sin she was slain, When the 
scrolls shall be unrolled, When the heaven shall be stripped off, When Hell shall be set 
blazing, When Paradise shall be brought nigh, Then shall a soul know what it has 
produced (98).   
The Surah in its entirety prophesizes the end of the world, and verse 14 (then shall a soul know 
what it has produced) emphasizes the responsibility of each soul for collapse of the world. The 
white horseman responds, “You guys are reading from the wrong fucking book, you idiots.  
You’re not allowed to read from that book when you are with me…..We’re in America now.  
Who cares about stupid camels anyway?” (99).  
These three scenes are a hodgepodge of styles and perspectives.  The first is a satirical 
account of Juan’s condition, the second a commentary on historical justifications for the 
escalating violence in Lebanon, the third a revision of a sacred text.  All contain an element of 
prophecy – the first gestures to the reader’s fear of AIDS, the second prophesizes the 
inevitability of ongoing war in Lebanon, the third shows both the overlap and divide between 
Christian and Muslim eschatologies.  All merge the trauma of disease and war with the violence 
of public storytelling.  Finally, these scenes position Mohammed’s prophetic voice against the 
United States in several ways.  First, the lack of response to AIDS in the United States leaves 
                                                          
23 References the Six Day War when Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. 
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characters like Juan vulnerable and stigmatized.  Don’t worry, Mohammed reassures the reader 
after describing Juan’s degeneration, it won’t happen to you.  Mohammed’s reassurance 
underscores how the act of storytelling determines the course of an outbreak – that the public 
story of AIDS as a disease of homosexuals and degenerates anointed AIDS first victims as 
unworthy and charted its course to global epidemic.  Second, within the critique of sectarian 
violence in Lebanon is a critique of the failure of the United State to respond.  Here, and 
repeatedly through the novel, the United States is blasted for its biased media coverage, 
endorsement of violent leaders, and shifting allegiances.  Through storytelling, Alameddine 
underscores the power that stories have: how they shape the path of an epidemic and a nation, 
and determine who is saved and who is sacrificed to both war and disease.  The storytellers 
themselves control whose voices and perspectives are represented. 
The rejection of Qur’anic prophecy as the wrong book - because we are in America - by 
the white horseman, locates the rift between Christianity and Islam firmly on United States soil.  
The geography is ironic because Lebanon is the region of the Middle East with the largest 
Christian population, and the novel narrates its war involving acts of religiously motivated 
violence.  Yet instead of Lebanon, the horseman represents the United States as the nexus of the 
clash of civilizations; its democratic freedoms are set up against the backward traditionalism of 
Islam.  In the United States, this schema is complicated by racialized politics that paint the 
Middle East and Arabs as violent and anti-modern and repressive to women and gays, yet fails to 
deliver on the promise of equality.  Alameddine therefore positions his critique of institutional 
religion alongside a critique of the secular values that supposedly ensure religious and sexual 
freedom.  United States’ beliefs about religion, morality, and the public sphere are attached to 
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sexuality and its regulation – and the regulation of sexuality is tied to both the maintenance of 
Christian authority and the power of the secular state.   
Repeatedly in the novel, characters are categorized in the United States according to 
intersecting sexual, racial, gendered, and religious hierarchies.  As the two major characters are 
Lebanese refugees in the United States, their experiences cast the intersecting hierarchies 
experienced by Arab Americans in stark relief.  The historical and legal trajectory of Arab 
American immigration and citizenship is complicated, made even more so by the geopolitics of 
suspicion, the Gulf Wars, and the post 9/11 war on terror – all of which contribute to the 
racializing of Islam and the politicizing of Muslims and Arabs.  No matter their religious 
affiliation, and Koolaids is packed with Middle Eastern characters of every religious persuasion 
and national origin, all are uniformly coded as Muslim in the United States.  During the civil war 
in Lebanon, the answer you give during interrogation at a checkpoint can determine whether you 
live or die – and the novel recounts a multitude of episodes revolving around the trauma of 
checkpoints and interrogation.  Yet to be gay, Arab, and Muslim in United States, is to court just 
as much danger.  United States religious pluralism, Alameddine suggests, is selectively tolerant, 
as is United States liberalism.  
Religion, race, gender and sexuality are inextricably linked for Samir and Mohammed in 
the United States and in Lebanon.  Both are exoticized for their “Arabness” within the San 
Francisco gay cultural scene, and their so-called Arabness paradoxically feminizes them within 
the United States context and also marks their masculinity as threatening.  They do not escape 
racial positioning amongst the Lebanese either, as Mohammed is recognized by a fellow 
Lebanese who describes him, “He was dark, looked like an Arab.  In Lebanon, that’s a curse” 
(101).  After the Oklahoma bombing Mohammed remarks that televisions are strewn with 
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images of Middle Eastern men.  The first suspects in the United States media and public are 
nebulous specters of Arab terrorism, although the culprit was ultimately a right wing white 
American man.  Finally, both Samir and Mohammed are exclusively labeled as gay although 
both identify in a variety of ways at different points in the novel.  Mohammed is asked by a 
museum trustee, “You’re a gay artist, aren’t you?” (54). Disgusted, he doesn’t respond.  Yet as 
with the Lebanese checkpoint, questions like this can mean life or death, as one’s answer 
determines, among other things, whether one has access to work, health care, and freedom of 
movement.   
In Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation and the Limits of Religious Tolerance, Janet Jakobsen 
and Ann Pelligrini tackle the issue of “how it has come to pass that Christian theological 
pronouncements have become so institutionalized in the official life of the nation that they can 
be taken for just good old American values” (3).  Jakobsen and Pelligrini write about the “yoked 
assumptions” that “American public life requires absolute values and these values are based on 
religion” (4).  Yet as they point out, while religion is seen as the “natural and appropriate basis 
for public policies concerning sex” it is not necessarily considered to be so for other ethical 
questions” (5). Secularization, they argue, “has not so much meant the retreat of religion from 
the public sphere as its reinvention” and “this reinvention is accomplished through a conflation 
of religion and morality, in which morality is assumed to be the essence of religion and, 
conversely, moral proclamation can be a means of invoking religion without directly naming it” 
(21).  Literalist religious interpretations of morality, seen repeatedly in Koolaids as potentially 
destructive forces, survive the shift from the religious to the secular, becoming the foundation of 
secular values in the United States.  But they are no longer “religious” values despite their 
Protestant origins; they are secular values that have supposedly shaken off their religious genesis 
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and now represent “American” values.  American secular values – with their Protestant 
inheritance - underwrite all of the laws and policies that maintain United States cultural, social, 
political, legal, and economic norms; but in the case of sexual regulation religion is more often 
called upon to justify policy than in cases involving social and economic justice, the death 
penalty, immigration reform, etc.     
“Sexual regulations are not just about sex,” Pelligrini and Jakobsen point out, “By 
regulating sex, the state attempts to regulate family life and American social relations more 
broadly.  Through myriad regulations the state actually defines what counts as family” (7).  
Family, then, “solves the sex problem” because it “is supposed to domesticate sexuality without 
its participants having entirely to give up on the American discourse of freedom” (7).  Yet 
“promises of ‘freedom’ and ‘privacy’ – promises supposedly made to every American by virtue 
of being a citizen – are actually held out as rewards, not rights, and only to those who belong to 
the right kind of family” (9).  Indeed the characters of Koolaids – including Mohammed, Scott, 
Kurt, Joe, Christopher, Samir, and many others – encounter obstacles to their own family-
making and their abilities to decide their own fates when AIDS related illnesses result in 
dementia, disability, and death.  
Secular values, however, do not only reflect one interpretation of Western sexual 
morality, particularly when applied to cultures beyond hegemonic United States cultures, both 
internal and external to United States national borders.  Joseph Massad argues that while the 
premodern West attacked the world of Islam’s alleged sexual licentiousness, the modern West 
attacks its alleged repression of sexual freedoms.  He critiques the “internationalization of 
Western sexual ontology” by human rights activists purporting to be working on behalf of gays 
and lesbians globally.  “The universalist moment here,” Massad writes, “is the assimilationalist 
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moment which guarantees that the sexual subjectivity of the Western purveyors of international 
lesbian and gay politics itself is universal while its racial/national/class constitution is carried out 
through a repudiation of the subjectivities of those unfit to defend themselves by the fittest 
subjectivity of them all” (40).  Western gay and lesbian identities thus are viewed as culturally 
universal, thus different sexual subjectivities must not only assimilate to Western norms, but 
must also assimilate to its racial, gendered, national, and economic hierarchies. 
The categories of gay and lesbian, Massad argues, are not universal.  His work examines how 
Western ideas that “functioned for much of the century on the Arab intellectual scene and 
international human rights activism [came] to define in the 1980s not only Arab nationalist 
responses, but also and especially Islamacist ones, and what implications these would have for 
the sexual desire and practices of contemporary Arabs” (48).  Fundamentalist Islamacists impose 
and then reject Western understandings of homosexuality upon people who may or may not 
identify as such, re-categorizing long standing Muslim cultural practices as anti-Islamic.24  
Moreover, the history of secularist discourse in the United States around issues of sex and 
morality produces normative sexual subjectivities and casts other forms of sexual subjectivity 
that emerge in diasporic or immigrant communities as non-normative. Varying forms of sexual 
subjectivity are seen as entirely definable within the hetero/homo binary – it is just that those 
                                                          
24 Massad argues that, “Instead of emulating the West, as the Gay International insists, the Islamists insist that Arabs 
emulate their Muslim ancestors.  The fact that much of Islamist discourse on sex and sexuality is an emulation of 
Western Christian fundamentalisms and Orientalist contructions of the Arab and Islamic past escapes the notice of 
both the Islamists and the Gay Internationals.  Thus, the Gay International and the Islamists both agree that 
deviance/gayness has much to do with civilization.  For the Gay International, transforming sexual practices into 
identities through the universalizing of gayness and gaining ‘rights’ for those who identify (or more precisely, are 
identified by the Gay International) with it becomes the mark of an ascending civilization, just as repressing those 
rights and restricting the circulation of gayness is a mark of backwardness and barbarism.  For the Islamists, in turn, 
it is the spread and tolerance of sexual deviance that mark the decline of civilization, just as repressing, if not 
eliminating, it will ensure civilization’s ascendance” (194-195).  I further argue that Massad’s “Gay International” 
and the contemporary human rights regimes his concept draws upon are intimately connected with secular narratives 
of progress and modernity that posit “queer” as a wholly secular subjectivity. 
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others do not realize it yet because they are behind on the secular clock.  Molly McGarry argues 
that:  
In U.S. queer politics, claims for secularism are typically framed in liberal humanist 
terms of tolerance and social progressivism, which appear as naturalized nodes of 
opposition to right-wing religious rhetoric.  The political spectrum that positions 
“religion” as always already at odds with queer subjects not only construes the idea of 
religious homosexuals (for example) as either oxymoronic or just moronic but also erases 
significant structures of belief that, at least in moments, sustain progressive politics.  A 
certain understanding of American politics that produces the queer as the quintessentially 
secular subject shares a curiously similar conclusion with the history of sexuality as 
deployed in the American academy, one wrought from the thesis of a French thinker who 
traced a shift from European Roman Catholicism to scientific discourses of subjectivity 
(248). 
Just as Gold concludes that to ask, “is queer secular” reifies binaries, McGarry notes that 
positioning secularism as the progressive and natural opposite to right-wing rhetoric excludes 
and belittles faithful queer people.  This schema elides difference within religious communities 
and collapses all Christian religion into the United States conservative movement.  Earlier I cited 
Jakobsen and Pelligrini’s assertion that sexual regulation draws more readily on religious 
reasoning than other policy debates in the United States.  Here, McGarry points out that aligning 
“queer” solely with liberal, secular politics and religion with conservatism blocks progressive 
theological arguments for social and economic justice.25  Secularism and secular understandings 
                                                          
25 I am not writing about fringe movements within or external to mainstream denominations, but about long standing 
theological teachings and practices.  For example, the Catholic Church’s anti death penalty, pro immigration reform, 
liberation theology, worker’s movement, and green theology teachings; Islam’s emphasis on social and economic 
justice; Quaker teachings on pacifism; and the Episcopalian Church’s history of queer theological writings and 
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of queer subjectivity are seen as developing evolutionarily.  Secular time marches forward, 
progressing always towards more perfect manifestations of modern civilization and the values it 
produces, namely freedom and equality.  Such values are problematically couched in terms of 
liberal tolerance. 
Here is the double bind of several characters in Almeddine’s novel: the queer is the 
quintessentially modern secular subject, which does not allow for the complicated 
interrelationship of religion, desire, and embodiment.  And secularism itself controls the 
definition of what it means to be religious and practice religion appropriately within U.S. society.  
Thus one can never be a religious queer or queerly religious.  For example, when Samir’s father 
comes to America and cheats on his wife, adultery is seen as a function of his “different culture,” 
one that is seen as inherently more patriarchal than United States culture and thus his adultery is 
culturally acceptable, even expected (123).  Conversely, Samir’s friend Karim’s frequenting of 
gay bars but refusal to come out is seen as a feature of religious and cultural self-hatred.  If 
Karim does not identify openly as gay within the confines of Western understandings of what 
that entails, then he must be imbued with self-loathing stemming from the same Muslim, 
patriarchal norms that liberate Samir’s father.  Samir’s great-uncle, a 93 year old, happily 
married man who writes about his fantasies about sex with men is a subject for pity for a life 
supposedly left unfulfilled – his happiness notwithstanding.  Characters such as Mohammed’s 
father have imbibed homophobic Islamicist rhetoric to the extent that he rejects Mohammed after 
an art review calls Mohammed a “gay artist” (39).  Conversely, Samir’s mother, the model of 
faithfulness in the novel, is devastated over Samir’s AIDS diagnosis.  The suggestion is that the 
                                                          
practices.  These are only a handful of examples of theologies, teachings, histories, and practices that do not get play 
on major media outlets, are not cited as rationale in political debates, and are virtually invisible in the public sphere.   
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father’s refusal to abide his gay son is rooted in secular, not Muslim, understandings of sexuality, 
where the mother’s Muslim spirit of compassion prevents her from rejecting her son. 
Museum directors and trustees who profit from “gay artists” particularly after their AIDS 
diagnoses, and who attempt to market Mohammed as a producer of Lebanese or ethnic art, 
embody intersecting racial, national, sexual, and class hierarchies and economies. “I do not want 
to be considered a Lebanese,” Mohammed writes, “But that is not up to me.  Would people think 
of me as a painter or a Lebanese painter?  That is not up to me” (244).  Market, not aesthetic, 
values fuel Mohammed’s categorization; his managers capitalize on trends for multi-cultural or 
ethnic art.  Additionally, when a museum trustee asks Mohammed what made Keith Haring into 
a “superstar artist,” Mohammed replies, “The AIDS diagnosis” (55).   After a one-night stand 
accuses Mohammed of concealing his HIV positive status, he has HIV+ tattooed onto his chest.  
ArtNews asks Mohammed to “pose for a close up photo of my chest with the tattoo.  They 
thought it was an artistic statement.  I did.  The picture made the cover” (177).  Gallery owners, 
art media, buyers, and curators fetishize artists according to the hip ethnicity of the pop moment, 
but also, devastatingly, according to their HIV positive status, the latest trendy, “radical” art 
accessory.  The AIDS diagnosis becomes a mass-market signifier of resistance, even exclusivity, 
and thus is commodifiable.     
Mohammed lambasts the way the United States profits from bodies infected by AIDS, the 
money made by “doctors, pharmacists, and various medical personnel…psychotherapists and 
alternative healing practitioners… books published, the stories in the media.  War profiteers” 
(167 ).  After cataloguing ways to make money from AIDS, Mohammed goes on in the next 
paragraph to calculate the cost of war: “Has anybody ever tried to figure what the daily profit 
was?  They did in Beirut. . . .In one night alone, an estimated ten thousand shells had poured 
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down on the city.  The cost estimate was about fifteen million dollars for one night.  That is for 
one night of a war which started in 1975” (167).  The Lebanese Civil War, he says, is a 
“registered trademark of Martin Marietta,” while AIDS “should be a trademark of Burroughs 
Wellcome” (167).26  Koolaids explicitly draws parallels between pharmaceutical companies and 
the military industrial complex that profit from people’s sickness, suffering, and death.  Yet it 
also makes explicit the more subtle relationship between cultural consumerism and AIDS.  
Additionally, while art world elites bandy about talk of the libratory thrust of the United States 
art scene, they blithely ignore the United States’ participation in global racial, religious, and 
economic oppression.  Economic justice is not part of the universalizing gesture, because it 
implicates America’s self-narration as liberator.   
Scenes of non-identification – refusal to comply with the categories of either Lebanon or 
the United States– are always paired with scenes of bombings in Beirut and disease in San 
Francisco.  It is at these moments of conflation, where the violence of war meets the violence of 
identity, that Alameddine both critiques U.S. secularism and finds within it the potential for 
solidarity among marginalized communities.  Through the characters of Samir, Mohammed, 
Karim and others, Alameddine subverts the notion that modern sexual identities such as 
homosexuality are unique to the secularization process and the belief that such identities can only 
flourish within a secular state.  And because U.S. secularism is produced through narrative –it is 
                                                          
26 Martin Marietta is an American chemicals, aerospace, and electronics company that later merged with Lockheed 
Corporation to form Lockheed Martin, a defense, advanced technology, and security company.  The company 
“receives more than 80 percent of its revenue from the U.S. government, mostly the Pentagon . . . it is the largest 
federal contractor and the largest weapons producer in the world” (Mattawa, Philip.  “Lockheed Martin: Corporate 
Rap Sheet.”  Corporate Research Project.  18 Sept. 2010.  Web.  21 May 2013.  www.corp-research.org/lockheed-
martin)  Also see: Hartung, William D. Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial 
Complex.  New York: Nation Books, 2010.  Print.  Burroughs Wellcome is the pharmaceutical company that created 
the AIDS drug AZT and garnered controversy by charging astronomical sums for a course of the drug (See: 
O’Reilly. “The Inside Story of the AIDS Drug.” CNNMoney.com. 5 Nov. 1990. Web. 21 May 2013. 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1990/11/05/74308/) 
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the story we tell ourselves about our own journey to modernity and the story we tell to urge 
others to catch up with us – Alameddine uses storytelling, full of citations and disjunctions, to 
suggest a different ending.  
 
IV. The White Horseman: Art and Redemption 
Near the end of the novel, the character Mohammad takes up the ultimate project of 
mu’arada: he rewrites the entire book in one scene.  Instead of the Prophet Mohammed, the 
protagonist becomes an allegory for Jesus.  He is an HIV positive violinist named Ali who leaves 
the United States for Beirut in order to make peace with his father.  Instead, his father has him 
kidnapped, telling him that maybe if he dies, people will forget about his homosexuality.  In a 
moment of high melodrama underscored by Mohammed, the father has his son tied naked to a 
bed and stabs him to death.  Carrying his bloodied corpse into the streets, the father creates a 
messiah – the crowd idolizes him “as the progenitor of a genius.”  Ali’s mother, echoing the 
pieta, cradles the body.  The bloodiness of the scene suggests the Koolaid of the title: the red 
drink of Jonestown that represents the religious and cultural indoctrination Mohammed 
constantly rejects.  And with the sacrifice of Ali, the blood symbolizes the Christian sacrament of 
communion.  But instead of the sacramental wine, here we have AIDS infected blood, and we 
have the blood of the exile, the refugee who attempts to make peace with home through return, 
and is rejected.  This scene echoes Mohammed’s continual rejection by the rider of the white 
horse.  The passage makes a link between Muslim and Christian allegory as the historical Ali 
was also a martyr – assassinated by the people he trusted.  Indeed, Mohammed inserts himself 
into the revision of the novel, saying, “As the protagonist, I would be able to say, Father, why 
have you forsaken me?”  Father takes on a multitude of meanings: God the father, the nation as 
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father – both Lebanon and the United States, and Mohammed’s own father, with whom he never 
reconciles.   
By calling himself the protagonist, Mohammed reveals self-consciousness about his own 
role as storyteller within the narrative of Koolaids.  And by rewriting the novel as a Christian 
allegory with a Muslim protagonist, Mohammed subverts the mythological clash of civilizations 
– the division between Islam and Christianity touted on all sides.  Ali’s father sacrifices his son 
in order to cover his own shame and to bring about his own glory – just as a multitude of 
characters are sacrificed to the political machinery of Lebanon, Syria and Israel throughout the 
course of the novel; just as Mohammed and his friends are sacrificed to the machinations of the 
Regan administration. 
Through Ali’s murder in Beirut, Mohammed attempts to give meaning to his own death 
from AIDS in San Francisco.  Koolaids illuminates the relationship between religion, morality, 
and sex as they come together in the context of U.S. public life, and demonstrates how sexuality 
is often seen, as Pelligrini and Jakobsen point out, as the indicator of an “individual’s – and even 
a nation’s – overall morality” (5).  Earlier I cited Göle’s question about “what kind of agencies 
are considered to bear a universal significance?” (245).   Through his narration, Mohammed 
demands that his own diseased and stateless body bears universal significance for the discourses 
that produce and limit freedom; through his literary meanderings he asserts that his very 
condition troubles assumptions about U.S. secularism and its promise of rights - religion and its 
promise of deliverance.  
Eventually, Mohammed merges John chapter 1, verse 1 with the Qur’an, saying, “In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was Mohammed, peace be 
upon him.”  Koolaids inhabits the long tradition of mu’arada by imitating sacred and literary 
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forms, but reworks traditional literary and historical accounts through the figure of the refugee.  
Technologies of assimilation, in Mohammed’s case these include the San Francisco gay scene 
and the United States art market, pressure the refugee to conform.  Compatriots and family from 
the homeland can question the refugee’s ability to remain culturally authentic.  Yet Mohammed 
is a figure who personifies the form of mu’arada; he never merely imitates or conforms to the 
cultural forms he uses to express himself, rather, he transforms them, confounding discourses of 
assimilation and authenticity.  Mu’arada thus becomes the formal enactment of exile within the 
narrative structure of the novel.   
It cannot be without significance that Mohammed is an artist.  As such, he is caught in 
the representational binds that Western secularism wants to encode.  That is: the contemporary 
artist can only critique Islam from the perspective of the secular, outside of devotion.  
Mohammed challenges prohibitory secularism, as does the novel project of Koolaids, which 
shows both the complicities of form with secular aims, and also the means by which such 
secularism can be revealed – their veils rent, as it were.  Koolaids signals the link between the 
politics of display and storytelling by using the trope of art as a descriptor of how narratives of 
inclusion and exclusion are framed.  As Koolaids emphasizes again and again, interpretive 
frameworks condition the reception and consumption of art.  For Mohammed, this includes the 
racialized Western framework of gender and sexuality that undermine his masculinity as Arab 
and as gay, while at the same time aligning him with the contentious masculinity of terrorists.  
Koolaids points to the preoccupation of exhibition and publishing with creating or distinguishing 
religiosity and religious subjects – part of determining what is private and public means deciding 
what is religious and sacred.  And those supposedly abstract spheres are constrained by gender 
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norms and racial categories: subversive sexualities, degenerating bodies dying of AIDS, even 
suicide bombers – these are not bodies that bear universal significance and they are not sacred.   
Pelligrini and Jakobsen “wonder what new possibilities for thinking about, and achieving, 
sexual freedom might be gained by connecting sexual freedom to religious freedom” (16). 
Ultimately, they argue that sex “can be a site for the production of values” and they “turn to the 
rich varieties of gay and lesbian community formation and consider how sex, precisely because it 
is embedded in interpersonal relations, can help constitute new forms of social life and 
belonging” (17).  Koolaids, intensely focused on gay men to the exclusion of any real 
consideration of women or LBT sexualities, narrates one version of post-colonial, Muslim, male 
immigrant sexuality that can add to the rich variety of community formation that Pelligrini and 
Jakobsen write about.  The novel is a critique of the broad global reach of American secularism 
and the dissolution of the nation of Lebanon through international and sectarian violence; but it 
is also a localized plea for recognition for the people being sacrificed to war and indifference in 
Beirut and San Francisco.  The novel demonstrates how Muslim and Arab American experiences 
of secularity can transform and challenge our understanding of the American secularism, both in 
terms of its limitations and its possibilities.  Koolaids calls for a reexamination of the canonical 
works of secularism, including the works it cites and reveres, in order to deconstruct the 
naturalization of Protestant values and practices as American.  Furthermore, through the use of 
an Arabic literary form and Muslim allegory in a decidedly American novel, Koolaids expands 
and deepens our conception of what kinds of forms and voices constitute American literature.   
Mohammed is the wandering prophet of Koolaids: he is Salah Hassan’s unstated refugee 
who “stands in opposition to the citizen of the nation-state and represents the figure of an 
unstated future, or a future without territorialized nation-states” (1622).  From the position of 
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exile the character Mohammed is able to offer a critique of the way the presumed natural binary 
of religion/secular affects the lives of the Lebanese, whether at home, or, like the Phoenicians, 
off at sea.  When his suitability as storyteller is questioned, because he is a refugee, because he 
has “AIDS dementia,” Mohammed tells his critics, “Live with this suckers, for I am the Word” 
(77).  The final scene of the novel suggests redemption through narrative, as the four horsemen 
arrive once more.  “This good and faithful servant is ready,” they agree, for he knows war, 
plague, and death.  And the rider on the white horse says, “I love you, Mohammed.”  Finally, 
Mohammed is led away. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Curating Religion: Art, Performance, and Stewardship 
I. Defining Religious Art 
In 2009, the Yale Institute of Sacred Music and the Arts offered an exhibit entitled 
Breaking the Veils: Women Artists from the Islamic World.  The ArtReach Foundation produced 
the exhibition in order to “break the stereotyping attached to women from the Islamic world” 
(“Breaking the Veils”). The audience envisioned by the exhibit is decidedly Western, because 
who else is doing the stereotyping that needs breaking?  While the works of the 52 artists deal 
with subjects ranging from the occupation of Palestine to environmentalism, and most are 
abstract pieces, the emphasis of the title is on a particular kind of gendered representational 
Islam.  It works under the assumption that veils need breaking, and the Western audience should 
bear witness to unveiling.  In the introduction to the exhibit catalog, Wijdan Ali, the president of 
the Royal Society of Fine Arts in Amman writes, “The term Islamic [here] refers to a civilization 
that construes one of the richest and most prolific phases in the cultural history of humanity; and 
is used in its cultural and not religious sense” (“Breaking the Veils”).  The “rich and prolific 
phase” is temporally ambiguous – the wording implies that perhaps this phase has ended. The 
emphasis on cultural as opposed to religious Islam only serves to make a monolithic cultural 
Islam the primary framework for interpretation.  Artists from 21 different nations can hardly 
represent one cultural Islam, and even if they could, the tricky veiling metaphor brings religion 
to the forefront and positions Islam in conflict with the values of secular and Christian 
feminisms. These types of exhibits serve to mystify artists and their works, while regulating art’s 
meaning within the public sphere and in regard to the marketplace.  The distinctions drawn 
between religious and secular art are embedded in a broader framework of meaning underscored 
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by secular understandings of what religion is and where it belongs, and the relationship between 
religious content and the forms it can take. 
While celebrating these artists and their works is laudable, I question the implication that 
the staging of their work liberates Muslim women.  Implicit in the title and the exhibition notes is 
that it is supposedly the exhibition itself and not the creation of the art that is liberatory.  The 
image of the breaking veil implies a hard and rigid Islam; the veil here hardly connotes the fluid 
complexities of Kahf’s tangerine scarf.  The framing of the exhibition is by no means unique in 
the United States.  Even ArteEast’s carefully curated 2009 Tarjama /Translation exhibition at the 
Queens Museum of Art was accompanied by a disclaimer by Iftikhar Dadi: “Readings 
engendered by Tarjama/Translation are not to be confused by the usual orientalist tropes in 
which much Western representation of the region remains mired, and which have unfortunately 
characterized even otherwise excellent recent exhibitions of contemporary art from the region . . 
.[the exhibit] strives as much as possible to avoid the tropes of veiling, harem, violence, 
terrorism, and the equation of an essentialized Islam with the region” (1).  In telling us how not 
to interpret, the exhibition manages to loop back to the very interpretive framework it seeks to 
avoid.  When exhibited in the United States, art and texts produced by non-Muslims from the 
Middle East, and Muslims from across the globe, no matter their content or form, are raced and 
politicized. 
I begin with the Breaking the Veils exhibit to provide an example of the kinds of secular, 
interpretive frameworks that are upended by the works I consider in this chapter.  I look at two 
artists –Ninar Esber and Mounir Fatmi- who structure their work as part of a critique of 
prohibitory secularism’s will to power.  Like Kahf and Alameddine, they too call attention to 
form as each transforms literary genres such as the novel and erotic literature into visual and 
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sound pieces that underscore the Orientalizing modality of narrative and critique secular 
understandings of the role of art.  The artists I analyze in this chapter have four things in 
common: their art demonstrates cultural shifts at work in the practice and perception of Islam 
globally post 9/11; they experiment with religious and secular identity-construction; they draw 
from multiple and divergent literary and cultural sources; and they attempt to sidestep the 
process of institutionalization.   
In my first section, I explore the ways in which secular institutions, including museum 
cultures and academic systems, define religious art and artists. I ask how these definitions 
perpetuate models of stewardship and how they intersect with modern interpretive practices. I 
describe how secular institutions in the United States not only secularize art, but also link 
particular artists and works with religion in ways that reproduce colonial epistemologies. Notions 
of authenticity are built into institutional stewardship models, as these institutions essentialize 
their subject matter as well as the publics they address.  The homogenizing framework in which 
Islamic or Middle Eastern art is exhibited conflates geography and gendered cultural practices 
with religion, while racializaing religion.  Ultimately, it ties religion to the United States 
secularism narrative while entangling it with the politics of gender and sexuality that this 
narrative generates in the United States. 
Authenticity or subjectivity may not be the most useful conceptual frameworks for 
interpreting cultural narratives.  Rather than reducing religion to a political metonymy, I 
advocate more community-oriented approaches that still draw heavily on individual participation 
or self-definition, and are not concerned with discerning who can represent religion or secularism 
with authenticity or purity.  In my second section, I ask how one might turn from the ambiguous 
notion of the secular or religious subject and instead think about the publics addressed and 
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produced by texts, art, and performance.  Doing so enables us to think through how these 
discourses are mediated, organized, and articulated by the very publics they create.  How does art 
address its publics and whom do they include?  What is the relationship between the form a work 
takes and the public it creates and addresses?   
My final section looks at the work of Ninar Esber and Mounir Fatmi, both of whom use 
religious symbolism in their work to challenge authoritative narratives that dominate the Western 
secular, public sphere.  Both use religious symbolism in their art not to transform the secularity 
of the public sphere into religiosity, but to critique the presumed neutrality of an imagined 
secular, public sphere, and to comment upon received ideas about what art is and what art should 
do, particularly art that contains religious imagery.  Esber’s work subverts patriarchal 
interpellations of Muslim women, criticizing both Western and fundamentalist Islamist 
paradigms.   Esber merges sacred and profane literary traditions, inverting regulated gendered 
representations by associating women’s bodies with the sacred tradition of naming God.  Her 
public performances and digital archive focus on acts of translation and evocation; through 
narration she relinquishes stringent religious narratives that alienate women from their bodies 
and defies Orientalizing strategies of interpretation that limit Muslim women to the role of 
oppressed minority. Mounir Fatmi’s work, in contrast, manipulates traditional forms of media 
such as the video cassette and the novel in order to comment on violent forms of public address 
such as suicide bombing and 9/11.  I argue that Esber and Fatmi use literary and media forms to 
question how hegemonic narratives are sustained, whether they can be altered through aesthetic 
realms, and how publics experience them.  
Much of the work on secularism has confined itself to the realm of the political and the 
legal; turning to the visual imaginary expands our understanding of how secularism shapes the 
85 
 
visual register and how artists challenge that visual regimentation.  Furthermore, because the 
secularization narrative embeds opposition into the very foundation of religious studies, the field 
has difficulty accounting for the simultaneity and mutual constitution of religion and secularism.  
The artists and writers I examine in this chapter refuse this foundational opposition.  Their sense 
of the secular is not opposed to, separate from, or outside of religious devotion, but rather seeks 
to engage it while producing the conditions of freedom. 
 
II. Exhibiting the Sacred in Secular Spaces 
An inquiry or claim, once submitted by a religious leader or group deemed to 
have standing by the museum, should provide the framework for a dialogue 
between the museum and representatives of the religion regarding special 
treatment of the work of art. . . Decisions may be reached regarding the 
adoption of special stewardship responsibilities for sacred objects. 
-Report of the Association of Art Museum Directors Task Force on the 
Acquisition and Stewardship of Sacred Objects (emphasis mine) 
How museums canonize and define art is an old debate, but it still resonates.  As recently 
as 2006, the Association of Art Museum Directors (henceforth the AAMD) established a set of 
guidelines for dealing with sacred objects, particularly but not exclusively with regard to 
American Indian tribes.  The “Report on the Stewardship and Acquisition of Sacred Objects” 
draws a distinction between works that merely “express religious ideas, values, and feelings” and 
“sacred works of art” which are “venerated objects created for use in ritual or ceremonial 
practice of a traditional religion” (AAMD Report).  The report reminds directors that they must 
comply with the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and encourages them 
to “consider cases where it may be important to go beyond the law and adopt special stewardship 
or interpretive responsibilities for sacred objects that are not covered by NAGPRA [Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act] and are not subject to specific national or 
international laws or treaties” (AAMD Report).   
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There are a multitude of problems with the guidelines.  First, they assume universal 
understandings of the sacred and religion among all people, and in particular, all American 
Indian tribes.27  They also assume an ontological division between sacred and profane objects 
within this universally designated American Indian culture, and by extension, all cultures.  The 
guidelines imply that the members of each AAMD designated religion (“deemed to have 
standing by the museum”) understands itself as a religion in a universally defined sense.  Thus 
each religion must also have a corresponding understanding of the AAMD defined distinction 
between profane and sacred.   
Talal Asad writes a brief genealogy of the concept of the sacred, and argues that “the 
sacred, constituted first by anthropologists and then taken over by theologians, became a 
universal quality hidden in things and an objective limit to mundane action” (33).  The sacred 
“was at once a transcendent force that imposed itself on the subject and a space that must never, 
under threat of dire consequence, be violated – that is, profaned. . . . ‘the sacred’ came to be 
constituted as a mysterious, mythic thing, the focus of moral and administrative disciplines” (33).  
The AAMD appeal for respect and the guidelines for the acquisition, preservation, and 
interpretation of sacred objects point to the moral and administrative disciplines that define and 
govern the sacred.  Asad believes that the idea of a transcendent, universal sacred developed 
within the discipline of comparative religion: “new theorizations of the sacred were connected 
with European encounters with the non-European world, in the enlightened space and time that 
witnessed the construction of ‘religion’ and ‘nature’ as universal categories” (35).  Religion and 
nature were not only understood as universal categories, but as separate ones without overlap.  
Comparative religious scholars relegate religion, especially in its non-European, “exotic” 
                                                          
27 But only federally recognized tribes, given the references to NAGPRA which only applies to “legal” tribes.   
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manifestations, to the realm of superstition in contrast to rational philosophy and science. As a 
universally definable system, religion and its subcategory, sacredness, can therefore be studied, 
indexed, and even safeguarded by objective scholars. The guidelines still operate under this 
Enlightenment understanding of the sacred, which justifies a model of stewardship, a concept to 
which I will return.   
The taxonomy of sacredness remains slippery even within the guidelines, and the 
implication is that its definition should not be left up to the religious leaders or groups submitting 
claims.  The report defines a difference between sacred objects, which can be both used in 
practice and exhibited as art, and religious art, whose mere exhibition is sufficient to 
communicate “ideas, values, and feelings.” Religious art is thus art that has religious content but 
does not have a sacred form or use, or is not imbued with sacredness.  Sacredness is vaguely 
related to practical use, but not in an everyday sense; the object must be designated for special, 
spiritual ritual, it cannot merely exist or be used for everyday practice.  It is unclear whether the 
object is only sacred when used in a sacred ritual (and thus can be exhibited in its mundane off-
time) or if it is sacred all the time given its use, or perhaps given its essential sacredness.  Is 
sacredness conferred upon objects by humans, or by divinity, or are objects sacred in and of 
themselves?  If my attempts to parse the assumptions made by the report seem circular and 
imprecise, it is only because the definitions at work in the report are hazy at best, as are the 
genealogies of ‘the sacred’ within the disciplines of comparative religion and anthropology that 
inform the report. 
Finally, the report refers to a model of stewardship that is related to a long-standing 
reading of human stewardship in Genesis, in which humans are given the responsibility of caring 
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for and using God’s creations.28  It also echoes the federal stewardship model imposed upon 
American Indian tribes and other unincorporated territories, in which the federal government 
determines what property is, how it properly “belongs” to American Indians, and how it can hold 
it in trust for tribes.  Stewardship implies the inability of specific religious persons or 
communities to responsibly care for their own sacred objects, or even in this context to define 
what is and is not sacred.  Stewardship is allied with interpretation, as “the Report also 
encourages AAMD members to employ special sensitivity and professional judgment regarding 
the interpretation of sacred objects” (AAMD Report).  After all, “Interpretation should be 
developed, if possible, in consultation with appropriate traditional religious leaders.  In all cases, 
art museums should strive to represent and interpret all religious and sacred objects with respect 
and equity” (AAMD Report).  Stewardship, representation, and interpretation are thus linked, 
and all are dictated by the guidelines of self-declared secular institutions, whose very designation 
as secular governs their interpretive practices.   
 While treating “all religious and sacred objects with respect and equity” is a valuable 
goal, the colonial epistemologies at play, coded in language of respect and equity, are troubling.  
The report replicates stereotypical ideas about how a collective American Indian consciousness 
envisions the world.  It differentiates between traditional religious practice and what are merely 
“religious ideas, values and feelings.”  Thus in the report, interpretive and reading practices are 
pre-determined by secularism narratives.  Inherent to this understanding of secular stewardship 
                                                          
28 “Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion 
over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, 
and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’  So God created humankind in his image, in the image of 
God he created them: male and female he created them.  God blessed them, and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and 
multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and 
over every living thing that moves upon the earth.’” (Genesis 1:26-28). (New Revised Standard Version Catholic 
Edition). 
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over religious and/or sacred art is the idea that secular interpretive practices have an essential, 
indisputable rationale that can determine what art is, what art does, and whether or not it is 
religious and/or sacred. These interpretive practices enable the AAMD to decide which 
American Indian objects, or any religious objects, are sacred.  Thus these kinds of objects can be 
divorced from context and exhibited un-problematically as art objects in public, secular, 
institutional spaces.    
What are the implications of linking certain art objects with religion so indiscriminately?  
How does it speak to a secular understanding of art’s purpose?  The Yale exhibit reflects the 
post- 9/11 interest in creating cross-cultural understanding between Islam, often represented by 
the Middle East, and the West.  Jessica Winegar is critical of these types of exhibitions, writing 
that “when art is used to show Middle Easterners’ humanity or to advance certain views of Islam, 
a very particular and politicized ‘bridge of understanding’ is created that obfuscates and perhaps 
refuses, other understandings which might be less comfortable to America’s secular elites” (653).  
She argues that these exhibits rotate around two assumptions, namely “that art is a uniquely 
valuable and uncompromised agent of cross-cultural understanding; and that art constitutes the 
supreme evidence of a people’s humanity, thereby bringing us all together” (652).  Both 
assumptions speak to an understanding of art objects as having secular value: they help us to 
bridge cultures, reveal our common humanity, and reflect our core beliefs about what it means to 
be human. 29  
                                                          
29 Of course many examples of religious art also have these attributes (even if we are considering “religious” art as 
constituted by the secular) and religious art often explores what it means to be human, particularly in relation to 
concepts of Divinity.  Winegar’s point is that these “universal” secular assumptions about what art means shape 
Western interpretations of art and dictate what art is acceptable for exhibition.  These assumptions also have a 
patronizing tone: a given group/ethnicity/religion/nation/etc. must produce art to these specifications in order to 
demonstrate their own humanity.  The idea of a bridge that facilitates cultural understanding seems innocuous as a 
bridge usually goes in two directions.  But in this schema the “bridge” enables Westerners to approach non-Western 
art and culture, but in return Western discourses only provide their interpretation of the art and the designation of 
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Winegar goes on to observe that “the secularist impulse in the desire to find art that 
shows the historical artistic achievement and modernity of Middle Eastern Muslims, along with 
the encouragement of certain kinds of art-making among them, actually ends up reproducing a 
religious framework such that their work is often interpreted with reference to Islam, whether or 
not there even exists a religious connection” (653).  The Smithsonian, for example, tries to 
sidestep this problem by titling its permanent exhibition Arts of the Islamic World.  Both the 
Yale exhibit and the Smithsonian use the term “Islamic World” which calls to mind not just a 
distant geographic region (omitting Islamic cultures in regions beyond the Middle East and 
North Africa, not to mention the United States), but another planet.  Reminiscent of science 
fiction, the titles dislocate Muslims in time (akin to exhibits such as “The Medieval World”) and, 
literally, space: they do not seem to occupy the same world as the audience.30 
In her article about the exhibit for Muslim Voices, Rosemary Pennington writes: “What’s 
striking about the collection . . . is the lack of overtly religious pieces.  [Chief Curator 
Massumeh] Farhad is careful to state the art exhibited in the collection is from the ‘Islamic 
World’ and represents particular cultures, not the religion of Islam itself. . . ‘We don’t want this 
to be confused, let’s say, with Hindu or Buddhist art because this is not religious art,’ [Farhad] 
says.  ‘There are works that certainly refer to Islam but many of the other pieces don’t’” 
(Pennington).  Geographies, populations, cultures, and histories cannot be so easily parsed.  
Countries widely considered part of the “Islamic World,” such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
include Buddhist and Hindu populations, art, architecture, and tradition.  Regions associated with 
                                                          
said art as art.  It is not a cultural exchange so much as an opportunity to categorize and interpret art, and by 
extension, culture, on behalf of a less sophisticated other.    
30 Envisioning Muslims as inhabiting other worlds is not limited to unfortunate exhibition titles.  Rather, Islam has a 
long history of appropriation in Western science fiction, from the corrupt Calormenes in C.S. Lewis’ The Chronicles 
of Narnia to the Fremen in Frank Herbert’s Dune series. 
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Hinduism, such as India, have long histories of Islamic art, architecture and tradition as well.  
Even in trying to avoid a correlation, the curator is forced to explain the naming process, thus 
circling back once again to the problems Winegar elaborates.   
Winegar connects the kinds of art selected by private and public institutions with the 
political agenda of the United States government: “The so-called bridge of understanding that is 
to be built through what is termed ‘exchange’ will, it is hoped, encourage Muslims – especially 
the young – to have a positive view of the United States, and hence to take up new creative 
projects rather than arms . . . art is linked to the discourse of freedom in an incredibly 
unliberating moment” (656).  The freedoms that these exhibits promote include the freedom to 
consume and the freedom to critique Islam, particularly its attitudes towards gender and 
sexuality. Politics affects not only the kinds of art chosen for these events but the selection and 
evaluation of the artists, and decisions about who can be representative of a constituency.  These 
decisions reveal who Americans consider representative of a constituency and why.  Thus 
Winegar compares the current interest in Middle Eastern art with the Latin American art boom,  
which ignored U.S. –born Latinos because they were seen as ‘minorities’ and thus not 
representative of exotic Latin American ‘difference’ . . . The contrasting preference for 
artists born in the Middle East but working in the U.S. might reflect an insistence on 
ultimate otherness, a refusal to incorporate Middle Easterners as ‘minorities’ in the 
American nation, or to valorize them as ‘exotics’ living elsewhere (despite the problems 
of these two terms) (654).   
Whereas Latinos were considered too “American” to be included in Latin American art 
exhibitions, Middle-Eastern Americans or other Muslim Americans will never be American 
enough. 
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What makes some visual texts more readily open to non-religious interpretation or 
designation, while others are tied inextricably to religion?  Why, for example, was the 
construction of new minarets banned in Switzerland in 2009, bolstered by the rhetoric of secular 
feminism in the media and propaganda posters?  Because the architecture itself is seen as imbued 
with meaning (namely, Islamic) that apparently must be ousted from not only public discourse, 
but its skyline; yet overtly Christian architecture is absorbed into the history of the cultural-
national public sphere.  This example demonstrates that not all religions are private and public in 
the same way.  Talal Asad asks how and why we can read the Christian Bible as literature and/or 
as religious simultaneously: “Is this text essentially ‘religious’ because it deals with the 
supernatural in which the Christian believes – either a text divinely revealed or a true record of 
divine inspiration?  Or is it really ‘literature’ because it can be read by the atheist as a human 
work of art?  Or is the text neither in itself, but simply a reading that is either religious or literary 
– or possibly, as for the modern Christian, both together?” (9). The religious quality of the book, 
Asad suggests, is located in the act of interpretation.  But it is only through the development of 
certain “disciplines and sensibilities” that it has “become possible to bring a newly emerging 
concept of literature to the aid of religious sensibilities” (9).  The modern religious sensibilities 
that permit us to read the Bible as literature, and to see its sacredness as embedded in reading 
practices and not emanating from its material property, are the same ones that can codify the 
sacredness of American Indian ritual objects and Tibetan Buddhist altars, while at the same time 
appropriating them as art objects worthy of study and display.   
But the relationship between reading practices and religious meaning, Asad points out, is 
dependent upon the apparent modernity of the interpreter as well as the nature of the text.  Some 
meanings, in other words, are more fixed than others.  While the Bible’s meaning relies on the 
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act of interpretation, Asad states that many Westerners view the Qur’anic text as having a static 
meaning, thus “the Qur’anic text will force Muslims to be guided by it” while “Christians and 
Jews are free to interpret the Bible as they please” (10-11).  These assumptions “take up 
contradictory positions between text and reader,” so in the case of the Qur’an the “religious text 
is held to be determinate, fixed in its sense, and having the power to bring about particular 
beliefs (that in turn give rise to particular behavior) among those exposed to it – rendering 
readers passive” (Asad 11).  On the other hand, where the Bible is concerned the “religious 
reader is taken to be actively engaged in constructing the meaning of texts in accordance with 
changing social circumstances – so the texts are passive” (Asad 11).  Asad ascribes the current 
discussion of the roots of “Islamic terrorism” in this distinction between text and reader, in which 
“a magical quality is attributed to Islamic religious texts, for they are said to be both essentially 
univocal (their meanings cannot be subject to dispute, just as ‘fundamentalists’ insist) and 
infectious (except in relation to the orientalist, who is, fortunately for him, immune to their 
dangerous power)” (11).  Therefore it is not just that the text itself is univocal and infectious, but 
these qualities depend upon the capacity of the reader to actively engage the text or be passively 
influenced by it.  Within this system, Muslim readers do not have this capacity, while secularized 
Western readers, no matter whether they pick up the Bible or the Qur’an, do.  This schema 
ignores Western Christian fundamentalism because secularism narratives ignore them; they, like 
Muslims, are seen as not partaking in modern interpretive practices. 
Due to the fact that in this schema correct interpretive practices are informed by secular 
categorizations, other kinds of reading practices can be incorrect.  In her recent essay addressing 
the debate over the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, Saba Mahmood observes 
that the debate centers on an “impasse between the liberal value of freedom of speech and a 
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religious taboo” (838).  Yet she questions the “normative conceptions enfolded within this 
assessment about what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity in the modern 
world.” Mahmood contends that to “abide by the description that the Danish cartoons exemplify 
a clash between the principles of blasphemy and freedom of speech is to accept a set of prior 
judgments about what kind of injury or offence the cartoons caused and how such an injury 
might be addressed in a liberal democratic society” (838).  Both the notions of blasphemy and 
freedom of speech are “grounded in juridical notions of rights and state sanction” and 
“presuppose a semiotic ideology in which signifiers are arbitrarily linked to concepts, their 
meaning open to people’s reading in accord with a particular code they share between them” 
(841).  This in turn “naturalizes a certain concept of a religious subject but also fails to attend to 
the affective and embodied practices through which a subject comes to relate to a particular sign 
– a relation founded not only on representation but also on what I will call attachment and 
cohabitation” (841-842).  The framing of the debate by Western media operates in a paradigm 
that takes for granted not only universal assent to governmental definitions of freedom, but also 
dictates the very terms of the insult suffered.  There is a direct connection between the paradigm 
Mahmood describes and my discussion of secular understandings of art: the cartoon is political 
art that is fundamentally misunderstood by Muslim protesters, thus the act of interpretation must 
be done on behalf of Muslim protesters to preserve religious freedom.  In this case, as with the 
AAMD report or modern reading practices, expertise – whether interpretive or in the sense of 
stewardship – becomes a technology of secularism.        
Mahmood writes that many Westerners were baffled by the angry reactions of some 
Muslims to the cartoons, and she finds that one source of the bafflement “emanates from the 
semiotic ideology that underpins [the Western] sense that religious symbols and icons are one 
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thing, and sacred figures, with all the devotional respect they might evoke, another.  To confuse 
one with the other is to commit a category mistake and to fail to realize that signs and symbols 
are only arbitrarily linked to the abstractions that humans have come to revere and regard as 
sacred” (844).  Muslim agitation over the cartoons is therefore the result of improper reading 
practices and “a product of a fundamental confusion about the materiality of a particular semiotic 
form that is only arbitrarily, not necessarily, linked to the abstract character of their religious 
beliefs” (844).   What Mahmood is describing is a secular reading practice, but one that, in the 
U.S. at least, co-exists alongside a theology of religious phenomenology evocative of Paul 
Tillich’s influential Dynamics of Faith.  This is to say that signs have the simple semiotic 
relationship Mahmood outlines: they point to the abstraction they represent.  But as Tillich points 
out, sacred symbols participate in the nature of the divinity towards which they gesture, 
materially engendering an encounter with the infinite.  This concept has more in common with 
sacramental theology than secular rationalism, but both are very much alive within the U.S. 
cultural sphere.31   
The connections I am making between the AAMD’s stewardship of American Indian art 
and the U.S. media and political fray over Islam and Muslim Americans post 9/11 are rooted in 
this secularized distinction between abstract concepts and material reality.  The secularization 
narrative creates and substantiates modern interpretive practices.  As Mahmood writes, “the 
                                                          
31 Just subject the object in question to a burn test: does burning the Christian Bible do more than enact disrespect?  
If so, is it because people are unable to understand the difference between a religious book (“ideas, values, and 
feelings”) and a sacred object?  What would the reaction to such an action be in the United States?  How does 
sacramental religious phenomenology, in which objects like the Bible can participate in the divinity to which they 
gesture, intersect with secular reading practices in which they can merely point to abstract theological principles?  
How do interpretive practices that distinguish between malleable and fixed texts, as well as secular freedoms of 
religious practice, all resolve in U.S. public political and cultural life?  The most straightforward answer is that they 
do not.  Rather, there is an uneasy co-existence that results in multiple contradictions within politics, media, and 
cultural traditions that resist simple analysis. 
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dismay that Protestant Christian missionaries felt at the moral consequences that followed from 
native epistemological assumptions . . . has many resonances with the bafflement many liberals 
and progressives express at the scope and depth of Muslim reaction over the cartoons today” 
(844).  Religion is seen as a “matter of choice” and once the “truth of such a conception of 
religion, and concomitant subjectivity, is conceded then it follows that wrongheaded natives and 
Muslims can perhaps be persuaded to adopt a different reading practice, one in which images, 
icons, and signs do not have any spiritual consequences in and of themselves but are only 
ascribed such a status through a set of human conventions” (845).  The AAMD’s gesture towards 
respect and dialogue, as well as moves by U.S. cultural institutions to “bridge cultures,” only 
enact a culture of tolerance and multiculturalism, both of which are entrenched in the narrative of 
secularism, and which function as muted versions of neocolonialism.   
If the politics and realities of exhibition are shaped by our expectations of modern 
interpretative practices; so too is the critical theory that scholars and art critics use to talk about 
exhibition and art, particularly art with religious connotations or themes.  “Insomuch as the 
tradition of critical theory is infused with a suspicion, if not dismissal, of religion’s metaphysical 
and epistemological commitments,” Mahmood writes, “it would behoove us to think ‘critically’ 
about this dismissal: how are epistemology and critique related within this tradition?” (861-
2).She goes on to ask the following: “Do distinct traditions of critique require a particular 
epistemology and ontological presupposition of the subject?” (862). Modern traditions of critique 
compel a particular epistemology and understanding of subjectivity at the expense of others, yet 
it is difficult to circumnavigate these discourses when discussing art in a Western context.   
Religious subjectivity in particular is loaded with the “ontological presuppositions” 
Mahmood critiques.  In the following section, I explore alternatives for framing questions of 
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religious subjectivity, epistemology, and ontology found in theories of publics and 
counterpublics.  I want avoid creating a schematic wherein religion is to private as secular is to 
public while acknowledging that these kinds of correlations are key to the way the U.S. imagines 
the secular.  The politics of exhibition, for example, point to a preoccupation with creating or 
distinguishing religiosity and religious subjects, even if curators aim to promote respect or to 
bridge cultures.  Where public display is concerned certain cultures are indelibly tied to 
religion.32  I also want to avoid labeling publics as secular or religious in nature.  My aim is to 
emphasize that it is difficult to pinpoint what makes someone a religious or secular subject, and 
that the distinction is in and of itself a feature of secularism.  There is no religious subject or 
buffered self without the backdrop of secularism.  The very definition of religion is dependent 
upon and constitutive of secularism and vice-versa.  This relationship dictates not only our 
participation in the secular public sphere, but our conception of what the public sphere entails 
and what it means to be a member of the public.   
 
III.  Going Public 
Public and private are spatial concepts, and thus religious freedoms and privacy come to have 
spatial, in addition to legal and abstracted, values.  Public address moves us from thinking about 
a singular spatialized or politicized public sphere that organizes secular or religious subjects, to 
the publics that participate in it.  In his work on publics and counterpublics, Michael Warner 
states, “the way the public functions in the public sphere (as the people) is only possible because 
it is really a public of discourse.  The peculiar character of a public is that it is a space of 
                                                          
32 For example, the argument is often made that secular displays of the Ten Commandments in state courthouses can 
potentially represent the secular values of the public and supposedly be stripped of their religious affiliation if not 
their religious heritage.  Yet same case could not be (or is not) made for other types of public religious display in the 
U.S.   
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discourse organized by discourse.  It is self-creating and self-organized; and herein lies its power, 
as well as its elusive strangeness” (68-69).  Public discourse, Warner insists, is “poetic world-
making”:  “By this I mean not just that it is self-organizing, a kind of entity creation by its own 
discourse, or even that this space of circulation is taken to be a social entity, but that in order for 
this to happen all discourse of performance addressed to a public must characterize the world in 
which it attempts to circulate and it must attempt to realize that world through address” (113-
114).  The exhibition organized by Yale is only one example of the discourses that shape the 
public address of art.  It is clear how the Yale exhibit characterizes the world and how it attempts 
to realize it.  But what does it mean to be part of the public that views the Yale exhibit?  In this 
section I establish connections between the public address of art, interpretive practices, and 
Warner’s concept of the/a public and its dependence upon theories of a modern, secular 
imaginary. 
Publics and the public are very different animals.  Warner reminds us that the public is 
perceived as a disinterested universal public and participation involves a certain amount of self-
abstraction.  Warner states: “As the subjects of publicity – its hearers, speakers, viewers, and 
doers – we have a different relation to ourselves, a different affect, from that which we have in 
other contexts.  No matter what particularities of culture, race, gender or class we bring to bear 
on public discourse, the moment of apprehending something as public is one in which we 
imagine, if imperfectly, indifference to those particularities, to ourselves” (160).  Of course, this 
indifference to particularities only works insofar as the member of the public is already in line 
with the imagined constituency of the public itself: the modern Western subject.  The assumption 
is that through self-abstraction we become mass subjects: “No matter what its character for the 
individual subjects who come to public discourse, however, the rhetorical contexts of publicity in 
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the modern Western nations must always mediate a self-relation different from that of personal 
life” (160).  Self-abstraction, however, is not for everyone: “The bourgeois sphere has been 
structured from the outset by a logic of abstraction that provides privilege for unmarked 
identities: the male, the white, the middle class, the normal” (167).  And thus individual 
character, identity, or status is either assumed to be in harmony with the character of the public 
(modern, Western, white, male) or negated (Muslim protesters of the Mohammad cartoon, for 
example, are not just misinterpreting, they are not properly self-abstracting).   
Self-abstraction is directly related to the modern reading practices Mahmood and Asad 
delineate: in order to properly interpret art within this paradigm – secular, religious, sacred – one 
must abstract oneself from one’s own world view and take on that of the secular public sphere.  
Yet this sphere, as I have consistently noted, despite its performance of abstract objectivity, is 
not free of religious influence or assumed notions of what constitutes a modern subject.  The 
public Warner describes takes for granted self-abstraction, however “indifference” does not 
characterize racialized, gendered, or religious subjects’ apprehension of themselves in public.  In 
order to participate (as a public consumer of media, and in freedom of speech, for example, as it 
is understood in the U.S.) one must self-abstract, but through self-abstraction difference is keenly 
felt. 
The “Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Stewardship and Acquisition of Sacred 
Objects” concludes that “a broad definition of ‘sacred object,’ if combined with the expectation 
that museums provide special treatment or consideration for such works, would create 
immensely difficult problems for art museums as secular institutions.  Their mission is defined in 
terms of acquisition, preservation and interpretation of works of art for the benefit of the general 
public” (AAMD Task Force, emphasis mine).  Who is the general public for these works?  
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Warner writes that “as the bourgeois public sphere paraded the spectacle of its disincorporation, 
it brought into being this minoritizing logic of domination” (167).  Therefore publicness is 
“always able to encode itself through the themes of universality, openness, meritocracy, and 
access, all of which dehistoricize its self-understanding, guaranteeing at every step that 
difference will be enunciated as mere positivity, an ineluctable limit imposed by the 
particularities of the body, a positivity that cannot translate or neutralize itself prosthetically 
without ceasing to exist” (167).  Just as one might assume that Breaking the Veils is not breaking 
any veils for Muslim women viewers, the AAMD Task Force would assume that the general 
public is made up of people who do not believe that (let alone experience) the objects on display 
are sacred.  Which does not mean that members of the American Indian tribes to whom those 
objects originally belonged could not be among the audience members.  What it does mean is 
that they must undergo a self-abstraction to shed their marked particularities in order to consider 
themselves members of this public.   
One of my larger questions is how this definition of publics emerges from a secular 
context, and how alternate understandings of publics might be hijacked by the secular narrative.  
Warner thinks of the idea of publics as a global cultural phenomenon produced by the modern 
social imaginary, whose manifestations must be historically and culturally situated.33  This 
conception of publics and the relations among strangers relies heavily on secular constructions of 
public life, discourse, and the modern social imaginary.  Warner gestures to this reliance without 
spelling it out directly. 
                                                          
33 For Warner, the “self-creating” public “can only produce a sense of belonging and activity if it is self-organized 
through discourse rather than through an external framework” and yet publics “have to be understood as mediated 
by cultural forms, even though some of those forms, such as polling, work by denying their own constitutive role as 
cultural forms.  Publics do not address apart from the discourse that addresses them” (72).  A public is a “relation 
among strangers” that “unites strangers through participation alone, at least in theory,” and “in the context of a 
public . . . strangers can be treated as already belonging to our world.  More: they must be.  We are routinely 
oriented to them in common life.  They are a normal feature of the social” (75).   
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The features of a public that Warner outlines all rely to a certain extent upon what 
Benedict Anderson called imagined communities: the way in which humans imagine themselves 
as part of nation-states and the rise of national consciousness.  Anderson writes that the rise of 
vernacularization, the creation of print languages, and print-capitalism “made in possible for 
rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves and to relate themselves to others, 
in profoundly new ways” (36).  The creation of print languages laid the basis for a national 
consciousness by creating “unified fields of exchange,” gave a “new fixity of language” which 
helped to build myths of antiquity, and created dominant “ languages-of-power” (Anderson, 44-
45).  People began to think of themselves as a unified “public” being addressed in and speaking a 
unifying language with a shared history, temporality, and national consciousness.  Charles 
Taylor picks up on these ideas when he writes about modern social imaginaries, the social 
imaginary being “the way people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with 
others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, 
and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Modern Social 
Imaginaries, 23).  The modern social imaginary, much like the imagined community, Warner’s 
publics, and perhaps even the spirit of capitalism itself, takes on the sense of inevitability: “once 
we are installed in the modern social imaginary, it seems the only one possible, the only one that 
makes sense.  After all, are we not all individuals?  Do we not associate in society for our mutual 
benefit?  How else to measure social life” (Taylor 17).  The common understanding makes 
possible certain common practices, in much the same way Anderson might say common 
language makes possible common discourse and a sense of oneself as belonging to a “public,” 
and a shared sense of legitimacy.  Warner’s theory of publics, then, relies on a secular legacy.   
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 The public sphere and the publics that inhabit it are both material (as in, definite spaces 
occupied by actual people) and imagined.  Becoming a member of a secular, Western public as 
Warner describes it requires more than self-abstraction; it demands espousal of modern 
interpretive practices that shape the world views of members of the public, the meaning of public 
address, and the potential shapes that publics can take.  In the next section I analyze works by 
Ninar Esber and Mounir Fatmi that are forms of public address.  Both use versions of public 
prayer in their work that invoke the Muslim tradition of the 99 names of God; Esber does so 
through vocal performance and Fatmi through installation art.  Furthermore, both address the 
position of the contemporary Muslim subject in the public sphere as perceived by a Western 
audience.  Esber startles her audience by confounding their expectations of Muslim women and 
propriety; she challenges perceptions of Muslim women and their sexuality by making the 
private, public.  Fatmi uses imagery of suicide bombers and the Twin Towers in order to explore 
the public address of and response to terrorism.  Both offer a critique of the Western notion of 
the public sphere as a space of, in Warner’s words, “universality, openness, meritocracy, and 
access” (167).  By using imagery that is at once intimate – women’s bodies, prayer, suicide 
bombers before the explosion – and the focus of passionate public debate, these artists confront 
the assumed accessibility and impartiality of the global public sphere for Muslim people 
globally, and the interpretive practices that inform the reception of art by or about Muslims. 
IV. The 99 Names of God: Reforming the Secular 
Ninar Esber is a Lebanese visual and performance artist whose work is often about 
revelation.  She uses what is considered private to uncover the nature of public-ness.  Esber 
performs much of her work live, but part of the performance is the digital recording of her pieces 
in real time, which are in turn posted on the Internet.  The live performance aspect of her work 
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gives her digital videos and video diary a particular context, but their presence on the Internet 
transforms context through the spatial and temporal dislocations made possible by their repeated 
play on the Web.  Esber’s pieces depend both on the performance in the moment and the 
Internet’s extension of the moment.  First performed in 2006 at the British Museum in London, 
her piece The 99 Names of Delicious, is posted on her webpage with very little interpretive 
framing in place (Esber, “Biographie”).  We experience only her disembodied voice reciting 
words.  She recites names for the vagina taken from 16th and 17th century Arabic erotic literature 
(Esber, “Les 99 noms du Délicieux”).34  She recites each word first in Arabic and then in English; 
there is no background noise or music, only her sharp enunciation of each word.   
Some names are animals, like the wasp and the hedgehog, suggesting both the vagina’s 
nature (it can sting and it can be prickly and unapproachable) and its physicality.  Others give a 
sense of action, like the confronter, the surrenderer, the biter, the swallower, and the crusher.  
Others describe character, as in the greedy, the lustful, the generous, and the ambiguous.  And, as 
the last word indicates, many of the words are contradictory, and all are ambiguous.  The duelist, 
for example, could signify the dual nature of the vagina and gesture toward actual battle.  The 
stretched could refer to the act or aftermath of childbirth or sex, or the ways we stretch the 
meanings of the female sex to accommodate cultural notions of women’s bodies.  Various names 
denote stereotypes of women: the vagina is the primitive, pointing to notions of women’s non-
modernity; it is the killjoy, the dry, the untamable, the seducer, and ultimately, the scapegoat.  
Names reveal cultural ideas of the proper place of the vagina: the secretive, the shy one, the 
hidden, and the silent.  But the vagina is at once the armored one and also the helper; it is the 
                                                          
34 To a U.S. listener, the piece immediately conjurers Eve Ensler’s The Vagina Monologues, first performed in 1996 
in the U.S. and now performed across U.S. college campuses and globally as part of the V-day global activist 
initiative to stop violence against women and girls (“About V-day”).  Yet there is no indication that Esber is familiar 
with the Monologues or that it influenced her work.  
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disturbing one and the hearth; it is the liberator as well as the free.  It is the labyrinth and the 
temple.    
The 99 names of Allah are described in the Qur’an and the Sunnah (as well as assorted 
hadith) and are known as Asmaa al-Husna (The Most Beautiful Names).35  Much like 
Alameddine’s use of the mu’arada, which implicitly evokes the sacred by using a form 
associated with religious poetry and the Qur’an, Esber explicitly invokes both traditional and 
mystical forms of prayer.  By associating the tradition of naming God with female eroticism, 
Esber challenges the ways in which sexuality is seen as a property of individual subjectivity 
rather than part of publicly accessible religious culture, and thus asks how religion and the 
privatization of sexuality are related.  Esber’s piece also poses the question of how to read art 
that makes deliberate reference to religion without making claims about its or its creator’s 
religiosity.  She uses literature that Westerners might read as secular (erotic literature), thus 
subverting the West’s concern with gender and Islam.  Delicious juxtaposes the religious and the 
erotic and blurs the distinction between the sacred and the profane.  The names of God are sacred 
in a way that transcends either the material manifestations of the sacred (an object or text) or 
normative understandings of semiotics (they do more than point to the abstraction they 
symbolize).  The names of God can be taken in vain.   
                                                          
35 For examples from the Qur’an, see the following surah: Al-A'raf 7:180, Al-Isra 17:110, Ta-Ha 20:8, and Al-Hashr 
59:24.  The published lists of names are not consistent from source to source, therefore there is disagreement over 
which names should be included on the complete list of 99 names.  The names are often invoked in prayer and ritual.  
For instance, prayer beads called Misbaha (or Tasbeeh or Sibha), are used to perform dhikr (“remembrance of 
God”), including the 99 names of God (they often contain 99 or 33 beads, corresponding to the 99 Names of God).  
It is widely used in mystical Sufi practice.  William C. Chittick states: “All the words of the Quran are God’s words, 
but the most fundamental are His names.  Islamic theology, both scholastic and mystical, is a great commentary 
upon the names of God, which reveal His nature to mankind” (122).  He goes on: “There is another act of 
remembrance, taught explicitly by the Prophet to some of his companions and mentioned in numerous Quranic 
verses, and that is the ‘remembrance’ or ‘invocation’ (dhikr) of God’s names….The remembrance of many different 
divine names is practiced by the Sufi orders” (127-128). 
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The public sphere, no matter which forms it takes, is a gendered sphere.  Warner’s notion 
of the bourgeois public sphere demands a logic of abstraction that, as I have noted, is not 
universally applied, particularly with regard to gender.  What connotations does Esber’s 
performance have in a digital context, particularly given its subject?  What is the difference 
between the public Esber addresses and the publics her website potentially creates – she is, after 
all, in the moment of recorded performance, addressing a self-selected audience of art enthusiasts 
who made a deliberate choice to attend her performance, which is different than either 
consciously spending a few moments with her performance on the web or stumbling across it 
inadvertently.  Do the kinds of gendered self-abstractions required by being part of a public, 
whether in the moment of performance as a member of the audience or sitting in front of a 
computer, unravel the intentionality of the performance itself and its exhibition online?  I argue 
that Esber’s piece transforms constructions of gender through the address and imagination of 
publics both in the moment of performance and the extension of that moment digitally.  
Furthermore, her use of a virtual exhibition space in addition to more traditional performances 
circumvents, or at least complicates, standard narratives of display.   
Moreover, Esber’s piece intersects with contemporary debates about the representation 
and circulation of imagery of Muslim women, as well as the role of the Internet globally in the 
lives of Muslim women who have access to it.  Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone believes that the 
Internet is making it easier for Muslim women across the globe to dismantle gendered 
ideologies.  In her introduction to On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era, she 
writes that “Internet technology affords writer and reader the freedom and safety of anonymity” 
which in turn “removes from online interactions any predetermined notions based on physical, 
gendered presence.  It also liberates women to freely articulate repressed identity or forbidden 
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subjects” (xviii).  She also claims that “the diffusion of diverse images of women in public – on 
the streets, on the television, on the stage – as well as of the voices of women – singing songs, 
writing on the Web, making their thoughts and feelings known – has profound cultural 
implications” (xviii).  Those images, much like Esber’s performance, upend stereotypes of 
Muslim women as solely oppressed subjects without agency.  These phenomenon apply to both 
the women “who are seen and heard but also the women who see and hear them.  The public act 
transfers to the private sphere, imprinting a new image or voice in the minds of those watching or 
listening, and breaking ground for others to follow” (xviii).36  Warner writes that self- abstraction 
“from male bodies confirms masculinity” while self-abstraction “from female bodies denies 
femininity” (166).  White hetero masculinity is the tacit, impartial subject position, much like the 
obscured Protestant ethos underlying Western secularism; the two paradigms work in tandem to 
create a gendered, secular public sphere.  Esber’s performance in the moment refuses self-
abstraction and confirms feminine embodiment not through anonymity but through public 
display.  However, because her performance is available online, it also speaks to the anonymity 
Nouraie-Simone values; in this case the anonymity of art consumption rather than production.   
Undoubtedly, the Western concept of what art is and what it does is intrinsically linked 
with the reading practices I discussed earlier. I hear Esber’s piece, for example, as art and not 
                                                          
36 Of course, one should not over-emphasize the internet as a liberating agent.  In his article on the Arab Spring, 
Brian T. Edwards writes that “putting the Internet in this privileged position, it seems to me, effaces or downplays 
the bravery and the spontaneous organization of Egyptian demonstrators by implicitly giving credit to the West for 
inventing technologies that created the wave of demonstrations in early 2011, from Casablanca to Damascus” 
(Edwards).  At the same time he remarks, “Not to account for the role of the digital age, and of social media, 
however, would be wrong too” (Edwards).  Analogously, the Internet is only a tool (and only one of many) that 
Muslim women use as a means of expression, revolution, and transformation.  It is used to make public globally 
what is commonplace knowledge locally (for example, women participating in the public sphere as writers, singers, 
politicians, etc.).  It is also used as a vehicle for public expressions and actions that are circumscribed locally.  
Conversely, it provides opportunities for content producers such as journalists, media outlets, and bloggers to 
reproduce stereotypes, and opens up the possibility of audiences re-inscribing stereotypes on what they consume and 
interpret online. 
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prayer.  In U.S. public discourse, art is often spoken of as having universal, transcendental 
meaning that represents the values of civilization, progress, and ultimately, humanity.  And of 
course, the art world and the Internet are mediated forums and part of the system of global 
capitalism.  With this in mind, however, I am curious how Esber’s piece might transcend the 
moment of performance and encounter the developing interpretive practices of the virtual – a 
world that is at once local and transnational.  In her essay in On Shifting Ground, Meena Sharify-
Funk writes that for contemporary Muslim women activists “the transnational has become a form 
of ‘public space’ that enables women to transcend their isolation and derive inspiration for 
actions from their own local realities.  It is beyond the boundaries of the nation (not to mention 
the family and the tribe) and yet it is bounded in the same sense as the Internet: It is an open 
network constituted by those who actively participate in it and engage in dialogue” (251).  For 
Sharify-Funk, the transnational and the Internet give women the opportunity to enter the public 
sphere from within a restricted private sphere, albeit inspired by that private sphere and their 
“local realities.”  She sees circulation as a dialogue from which many women were previously 
excluded.   
Sharify-Funk and Esber are inserting women’s voices into circulation without demanding 
self-abstraction.  Sharify-Funk goes on to write that “in other words, it transcends the more 
limited statist national identity in order to explore, live, illustrate, and act on such an identity.  
Inherent in transnational identity is the wish for new frontiers and the desire to dwell in the 
‘space in between’ – an interstitial space where one’s identity may be local and at the same time 
beyond any specific locality” (251).  Esber’s disembodied voice, for example, becomes a 
circulated text, but is very much rooted in her body (given its cadence and timbre) and her 
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subject.  The public she addresses, the world-making she envisions, does not demand that I 
abstract myself from my bodily particularities to include myself in her public.   
While I am interested in the implications of the piece itself, I also wonder how the 
proliferation of performance through the form of digital art opens up the possibility of multiple 
interpretive frameworks.  What kind of translations from live to digital must take place for 
Esber’s piece to be intelligible?  Which or what kinds of publics does it address in the moment of 
performance, and how does that public change when time and space are in the hands of the 
viewer?  Esber’s work, for example, is not divorced from the social landscape that produced it, 
including but not limited to contemporary anti-Muslim French policies and media representation 
that rely heavily on notions that Islam inherently represses women.  A live performance in Paris, 
where she currently resides, challenges the idea that Islam oppresses women by publicly drawing 
upon a tradition of erotic literature in which the role of women is not uncomplicated.  Such a 
performance points out cultural stereotypes of the female body that are both restrictive and 
celebratory by juxtaposing the female body with the Divine, using the tradition of the 99 names, 
and naming the vagina the temple.  Yet the piece could also be interpreted as feeding into 
precisely those Western and fundamentalist Muslim stereotypes of women’s sexuality that it 
intends to defy through the very act of naming; calling attention to stereotypes can paradoxically 
reify and disavow them simultaneously. 
However, Esber uses English and Arabic, not English and French, which suggests that 
she is unmooring her work from the geography of France and from the longstanding colonial 
relationship between France and Lebanon.  At the same time, using English underscores the 
global reach of the English language, gesturing towards another long history of colonialism and 
neo-colonialism.  But I did not experience a live performance in Paris or London.  The public at 
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the real time performance in an exhibition space is very different than the public I am a part of 
when I listen to it in my home.  You may never see Esber perform her piece live, but after you 
put down this chapter you can go to her website and listen to her piece.  You can even contact 
her through her website, as I did, to ask her about the availability of the piece online, and you 
might receive an enthusiastic reply as I did.  I did not experience the piece at its moment of 
performance; my encounter with the piece through virtual and digital documentation demands 
translation.  Digital media is a tool that enables the amplification of the artist’s gesture and the 
multiplication of her presence.  It interrogates the memory of the performance and endeavors to 
meet up with a particular moment in time through digital mediation.   
Where Esber transforms erotic literature by merging it with devotional practice, Mourni 
Fatmi uses actual, physical texts to reflect upon the power of media.  Fatmi is a Moroccan-born 
artist whose work is exhibited widely.  Much of his work features elaborate calligraphy and often 
alludes to sacred texts and objects associated with Islam.  One piece features circular saw blades 
bearing Qur’anic verses, while another, entitled Brainteaser for a Moderate Muslim, is a series 
of rubix cubes painted black and white to resemble the Kaaba in Mecca.  Like Esber, Fatmi also 
references the 99 names in his piece Face: 99 Names of God.  In the piece, each name is written 
on an individual card, inserted into a conference-style plastic badge, and hung evenly in rows on 
the wall.   
In the Abrahamic tradition, as we have seen in Alameddine’s appropriation of the 
Christian Bible and the Qur’an, the word is performative.  Words have the power to create, 
transform, and incarnate.  In the Qur’an, Allah’s word comes to the Prophet Mohammed as a 
voice, instructing him to iqra’ or “recite” – iqra is the root of the word Qur’an or the “reciting.”  
There is an immediate connection between creation, language, and writing, as Jean Sulzberger 
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points out: “God says through His prophets, ‘Be!’ (kun), and this command and all that issues 
from it as first written in the Quran in jazm, the earliest Arabic script, and the progenitor of the 
famous Kufic script” (80).  The aesthetic and devotional tradition of rendering the Qur’an in 
calligraphy is long-standing, and calligraphy is used to adorn architecture, manuscripts, 
sculpture, and paintings.37  Calligraphy does not have a simple relationship between sign and 
signifier, but becomes a sacred art through its representation of revelation, for “after the Quranic 
revelation, Arabic script become the carrier of the revelation to the Muslim world” (Sulzberger, 
80).  Thus, as Titus Burckhardt writes, calligraphy “represents the visible body of the Divine 
Word” (116).  Religious calligraphy, as a written expression of faith, is closely linked to the 
aesthetics of spiritual iteration that Esber’s piece evokes.  The very patterns of calligraphy speak 
to Esber’s iteration as the “distended, arched, or rounded letters endlessly reproducing 
themselves in a harmonious order that is somehow felt, are symbolic of the order of nature which 
in always changing is always repeating itself” (Sulzberger, 80).  Repetition, as with Esber’s 
words, is part of the mystical effect of reading calligraphy. Esber’s piece draws on the devotional 
practice of recitation, calling to mind both public, communal prayer and private invocation.  
Whereas Fatmi’s piece conjures a history of public displays of elaborate, highly wrought 
calligraphic arts that he transforms through his stark, minimalist representation of God’s names, 
insulated from one another by plastic, their connective meaning contracted.  Stylized religious 
calligraphy in art and architecture is meant to inspire its viewers with piety and awe.  In Fatmi’s 
piece, the power generated by words in the Qur’an, in prayerful recitation, and in calligraphic 
expression, is diminished by their commercial packaging, ready for consumption. 
                                                          
37 For a comprehensive history of Arabic calligraphy, see: Blair, Sheila. Islamic Calligraphy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2006. Print. 
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Face: 99 Names of God reveals a disjunction between real-world practices and their 
sacred inception: words are powerful in the moment of utterance, but what do they mean when 
they are enclosed and displayed?  The names of God clearly have a religious origin, but here they 
are, in plastic cases, ready to be picked up and worn.  The names are at once isolated in their 
plastic cases and in community with each other on the wall.  They symbolize membership in a 
particular community and religious discourse – many people “wear” these names after all – but 
the size and casing represent the nametag as an authoritarian symbol of identity.  Because the 
cards are identical, one also senses regimentation and assimilation, suggesting criticism of a 
homogenized, global interpretation of Islam without respect for the diversity of its practitioners.   
Nonetheless, the names are by no means completely severed from their sacred origins: 
gazing upon all the names at once can be a mystical, transcendent experience.  It is 
overwhelming to see them side by side. Instead of reading each one, the viewer can reverently 
absorb the entire display.  Winegar writes that “in the dominant framing of Middle Eastern arts 
in the U.S., Islam is seen as a stricture, something from which artists should undoubtedly want to 
free themselves, or at least find moderation within it.  Art becomes a wholly secular tool of 
freedom from religious expression – not, for example, from foreign domination” (667).  Esber 
and Fatmi do not frame their use of religious citation as an uncomplicated critique of religion; 
they are not breaking free from submission, and they are not lifting veils.  Rather, by 
appropriating and transforming the 99 names of God, they question the interpretive practices of 
both mainstream Islam and Western secularism.  They take a familiar religious symbol and make 
it unfamiliar, subverting its meaning and challenging our cultural reflexes.  Fatmi’s piece asks 
how homogenization renders the numinous tradition of calligraphy banal, while at the same time 
retaining something awe-inspiring in its effect.   By associating women’s genitals with the 
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Divine, Esber does not slur the tradition of the 99 names, rather, she elevates women to deific 
heights.  Thus both pieces – the sonorous voice of Esber and the mesmerizing patterns of Fatmi’s 
piece – reflect respect for the mystical and aesthetic traditions of Islam.   
Fatmi’s work teases out the layers of meaning embedded in our cultural symbols and 
questions the function of narrative in bestowing sacredness and profanity upon them.  Two series 
in particular address the theme of terrorism, spectacle, and representation, the photograph series 
Evolution or Death and the installation project Save Manhattan.  Evolution or Death is a series 
of photographs of people with books strapped to their midsections with duct tape, including the 
Qur’an.  They open their shirts or jackets to reveal the books, which are connected to each other 
with wires, suggesting bombs.  The people appear to be Caucasian and include women opening 
their coats and shirts to reveal their bras underneath, thus subverting the stereotype of the 
distinctly un-modern Muslim man as suicide bomber, and disassociating violence from racialized 
masculinity.  The representation of suicide bombs as texts, or of texts as suicide bombs, raises 
questions about violence, circulation, and the archive.   
Asad writes about the widespread assumption that the Qur’an’s meaning is fixed and thus 
inevitably creates Islamic terrorism (as though terrorism can have a religious quality).  Reading 
practices make this viewpoint possible: Muslims object to the Danish cartoons because they have 
faulty, non-modern reading practices, yet the Qur’an is dangerous because modern reading 
practices cannot apply unless modern people apply them. Both the readers and the text are read 
as resistant to modernity.  In Evolution or Death, having the models open up their clothes to 
expose the Qur’an performs Western stereotypes of the Qur’an: its ideology is lurking 
underneath Muslim exteriors, no matter how enlightened they seem, and its resistance to modern 
interpretive practices renders the Qur’an an explosive text.  At the same time, the work plays 
113 
 
with a paradox: danger does not seem to lie in reading the Qur’an alone, but in connecting it with 
other books.  Additionally, most of the books are not religious texts but political or literary, or 
about cultural movements such as surrealism.  Political and artistic movements, Fatmi suggests, 
can be just as earth-shattering as a bomb or the Qur’an.  The title of the photographic series 
insinuates that evolution can be found in texts or art, but by representing texts as bombs, the 
artist attempts to circumnavigate the linkage of art and humanity.  The wires linking the texts to 
each other evoke the transmission of ideas and intertextuality, and suggest the possibilities 
inherent in connecting and interpreting texts, giving all readers agency.  Neither texts nor their 
readers are passive.   
Save Manhattan is a series of installations depicting the Twin Towers.  The first piece 
uses books, all written post 9/11 except for two copies of the Qur’an, which are used to cast a 
shadow that mimics the pre 9/11 skyline.  The second piece uses VHS tapes, suggesting at once 
the media frenzy following 9/11, the famous Osama bin Laden tape, the capturing of images for 
posterity, and the restriction of memory in recorded time.  Finally, the third piece consists of 
speakers which play loops of recorded city sounds, such as car horns and subways, along with 
sounds of violence such as cars crashing and explosions.  The speakers are arranged so that they 
too cast a shadow that mimics the New York skyline complete with Twin Towers.  The Twin 
Towers – much like a religious symbol – can evoke a passionate response in many viewers.  
They have become a symbol for American fortitude for some, a symbol of its reckless militarism 
for others.  The World Trade Center is in many ways a sacred symbol.  It is at once a temple of 
capitalism, which is often cited as the reason it was chosen for destruction, and also the site of 
the inexpressible loss of thousands of individuals whose lives and death resist this kind of critical 
allegory.  The ground upon which it stood has become a pilgrimage site, involved in a 
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controversy over whether the building of a nearby Muslim community center and mosque would 
profane its memory.38  Save Manhattan links the towers to the narratives that created and 
aggrandized its sacredness in the American collective imagination, and to the narratives used to 
justify U.S. military force and global empire.  The books, tapes, and speakers all cast shadows of 
the towers, and these shadows suggest the lingering specter of 9/11 on global politics and 
individual lives.  They reflect the disjunction between the reality of the event and its narration, 
calling to mind of course Plato’s cave, the perfect American form whose shadowy presence 
obscures the fallout from the event.  The tapes invoke the spectacle of media, the images of 
destruction played in a continuous loop until they became sacred visions, and the rhetorical 
process of framing and displaying the narrative of 9/11. 
By having the two copies of the Qur’an create the silhouette of the Twin Towers in Save 
Manhattan 01, Fatmi establishes connections between the sacred book and the towers.  The 
silhouette draws attention to the sacred status ascribed to both book and building; the towers as a 
financial Mecca, so to speak, and a site of rupture, and the Qur’an as the supposed inspiration for 
the terrorist act.  Both the book and towers are at once menacing and sacrosanct.  However, in 
Save Manhattan 01, connecting the towers does not demonstrate a one way bridge, for example, 
the simplistic notion that Islam leads to terrorism. Rather it imagines 9/11 as inaugurating an 
eternal connection between the two, one that suggests the potential of exchange while being 
fraught with the possibility of its own undoing through continued acts of violence by both the 
U.S. and terrorists.   
                                                          
38 For information about the controversy, see: Rohrer, Finlo.  “Is ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ Debate fanning the 
flames?”  BBC News. 25 August 2010.  Web. 3 June 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11076846.  
For information about the Cordoba House itself (often referred to in the press as the “Ground Zero Mosque”) see: 
“Cordoba House.”  The Cordoba Initiative. 2012. Web. 3 June 2013. 
http://www.cordobainitiative.org/cordobahouse/ 
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Using books and VHS tapes to represent the skyline also suggests the continuity of grand 
narratives in shaping our response to events like 9/11, and the ways in which people use 
narrative to make sense of loss and to justify aggression.  Whose story is 9/11 to tell?  By 
representing the towers with Qur’ans and making Islam a part of the narrative process, Elahi 
challenges perceptions of authenticity. At the same time, the VHS tapes in Save Manhattan 02 
and coaxical cables in Evolution or Death hint at regression; these are, after all, technological 
remnants that have been replaced by digital technology.  These archaic materials point to the 
rapid pace of consumer culture and mass media, in which one form of communication is quickly 
replaced by another, and by doing so asks what is being rendered obsolete and whether these 
rapid changes in form also somehow alter our relationship to the information they transmit.  The 
VHS tapes also mark how forms of media contribute to the commercialization of tragedy.  The 
piece forces the audience member to ask, what does it mean to be a member of a public that 
receives its information through mercantile forms?   The VHS tapes and novels in Elahi’s work 
symbolize the process of editing information for dispersal and consumption; they underscore 
technologies of stewardship and expertise in story-telling. 
     Winegar notes, “Generally event organizers do not seek out artistic uses of religion to 
advocate for freedom from things like military occupation.  Thus, cultural production shaped by 
mainstream Islam is denied inclusion in the category of art.  The important goal remains to 
highlight, through art, artistic approaches to Islam that make for an acceptable bridge of cultural 
understanding” (667).  The aim of Western curators of Middle Eastern or Muslim art is to choose 
works that reflect Westerners’ beliefs about Islam and the Middle East back to themselves.  This 
does not include expressly religious art or explicit critiques of capitalism, neocolonialism, or 
Western military, economic, or military influence; it does include critiques of Islamic 
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fundamentalism.  These kinds of exhibits create acceptable bridges of cultural understanding that 
Western audiences feel comfortable crossing.  Secularism works here as a cultural attribute that 
serves to showcase the best that humanity has to offer.  Save Manhattan and Evolution or Death 
work outside of the parameters of accepted frameworks for post 9/11 art: namely, unambiguous 
critiques of Muslim identified violence, fanaticism, and terrorism.  Fatmi portrays suicide 
bombers and depicts the Twin Towers in way that do not explicitly critique the motives of those 
involved in terrorist acts, but rather juxtaposes fanaticism with symbols of the media and cultural 
artifacts, including texts, VHS tapes, and city soundscapes.  His work is not an unproblematized 
critique of fundamentalism nor is it a celebration of destruction.  It finds complicity in Western 
modes of cultural production and representation with the violence of terrorism.   
 Breaking the Veils reflects the post 9/11 interest in creating cross-cultural understandings 
between Islam, often represented uncritically as the Middle East, and the secular West.  Such 
exhibitions attempt to mobilize the questionable values of multiculturalism for managing and 
translating immigrant and diasporic populations.  The works I discuss in this chapter use both 
form itself and, in the case of Esber, digital exhibition to transform and challenge our 
understanding of secularism, both in terms of its limitations and its possibilities.  Fatmi’s work 
on media and textual terror comments on the interrelationship of mainstream and ethnicized 
economies through the lens of Orientalist media fantasies, the War on Terror, and the 
commodification of cultural and aesthetic products.  Through his VHS towers, the realm of 
aesthetic production becomes a proxy for politics and vice versa.  He questions the ways in 
which narratives of violence become vehicles for participation in the aesthetic economy, 
opportunities for identity construction and political expression through the marketing of cultural 
difference.  All of these works evoke texts and the circulation of ideas, from Esber’s borrowings 
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from erotic literature to Fatmi’s use of physical books and tapes.  All use exposure as statement, 
whether through the exposure of female eroticism or the exposure of open coats.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
Hijacking Secularism 
 
Nearly 30 years ago, the federal courts had to place limits on New York City police 
surveillance to protect law-abiding citizens who happened to be politically engaged on 
civil rights and other issues.  A motion filed in federal court last week by the lawyers in 
the Handschu case makes a strong case that the city has simply ignored these guidelines 
in its antiterrorism fight and is targeting Muslim groups because of their religious 
affiliation, not because they present any risk….According to court documents, the New 
York City police routinely selected Muslim groups for surveillance and infiltration, even 
when they did not sponsor unlawful or terrorist acts and were not accused of contributing 
to them….The motion charges the city with violating the Handschu agreement by 
systematically retaining records of conversations in public places that do not pertain to 
potential unlawful activity (“Spying on Law-Abiding Muslims”). 
 
In a few months, the U.S. Air Force will deploy to Afghanistan what is essentially an all-
seeing eye. Named after the ever-alert snake-haired monsters of Greek mythology, the 
“Gorgon Stare” system is a drone-based sensor with a vastly increased coverage area. 
Compared to current airborne video systems that provide warfighters with a view of 
perhaps several hundred square feet of ground, Gorgon Stare will allow operators to 
watch everything in a two-and-a-half-mile area (Kenyon).39 
 
I begin with these two instances of enhanced surveillance techniques on Muslim 
populations to draw attention to surveillance technologies as socio-political disciplines inflected 
by secular values of appropriate modern religious practice.  In this conclusion, I ask how these 
kinds of techniques are being critiqued and co-opted as tools of performance in social and artistic 
frameworks, and how one artist in particular – Hasan Elahi – is using digital information 
networks to comment upon the post 9/11 climate.  I examine Hasan Elahi’s web based piece 
                                                          
39 The Gorgon Stare was developed by MAV 6.  Its founder, Jay Harrison, describes the company, saying that Mav 
6 “combines the innovation and agility of the commercial technology industry with the full -service 
capabilities and reliability of the large systems integrators. Edges are the new front lines of war. And all 
the people who fight on these fronts are edgefighters. General Blount and I committed to positioning Mav6 
as a focal point for connecting edgefighters, national security people, technology people, and policy 
people, to design, source, fund, and deliver the very best innovations that America and the world have to 
offer to our edgefighters. Our goal was and continues to be to create the premier defense design company 
by harnessing the power of multi-disciplinary design thinking to rapidly deliver systems of capabilities – 
and not just new widgets – to edgefighters when and where they are needed most” (Harrison).  
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Tracking Transience and ask what is generated and circulated by art in the digital realm.  I 
contend that Elahi’s work articulates meaning through the form of public address itself: through 
the circulation of digital images.  It addresses the public in a way that continually risks its own 
circulation as art and calls into question the conditions of artistic production.  By using GPS in 
conjunction with Google maps, the piece becomes complicit with certain aspects of surveillance 
economies.  At the same time, Elahi structures his work as part of a critique of prohibitory 
secularism’s infiltration of its own self-declared private domain.  He transforms literary genres 
such as the diary and surveillance technologies such as satellite photography in order to critique 
human rights violations as well as expand upon secular understandings of the role of art.  The 
role of the internet and social media in revolutionary movements, for example in the Arab Spring 
and the Taksim square protests in Turkey, has in many ways been overstated.  Yet social media 
cannot be ignored as both a regulatory tool and an organizational (and potentially revolutionary) 
tool.  Elahi’s piece requires the audience to ask whether the digital be transformative, and if so, 
in what ways?       
Hasan Elahi is a Bangladeshi-born, American artist.  He began the project Tracking 
Transience: The Orwell Project in response to his experience of being wrongly named in a 
terrorist watch list, being subjected to interrogations and polygraphs, and having to account for 
all of his movements before and after 9/11.  After his innocence was determined, he decided to 
voluntarily track his movements online.  His site includes tens of thousands of images stretching 
back for seven years. Elahi has documented nearly every waking hour of his life during that time. 
He posts copies of every debit card transaction, so you can see what he bought, where, and when. 
A GPS device in his pocket reports his real-time physical location on a map.  In his editorial for 
The New York Times on the project, Elahi says: 
120 
 
These images seem empty, and could be anywhere, but they’re not; they are extremely 
specific records of my exact travels to particular places. There are 46,000 images on my 
site. I trust that the F.B.I. has seen all of them. Agents know where I’ve bought my duck-
flavored paste, or kimchi, laundry detergent and chitlins; because I told them everything.  
I also provided screenshots of my financial data, communications records and 
transportation logs. Visitors to my site can cross-reference these records with my images 
in a way that’s similar to how the F.B.I. cross-references the very same databases. I 
provided information from third parties (including my bank, phone company, etc.) who 
can verify that I was at the locations indicated, on the dates and times specified on my 
Web site (Elahi, “You Want to Track Me? Here You Go, F.B.I”). 
Obviously a commentary on surveillance, the project is ostensibly addressed to the U.S. 
government.  His server logs show hits from the “Department of Homeland Security, the C.I.A., 
the National Reconnaissance Office and the Executive Office of the President” (Elahi). The 
project is also a comment on information as a commodity; in an interview with Wired Magazine, 
Elahi says, "It's economics," he says. "I flood the market” (Thompson).  The market he is 
flooding is intelligence collection, and he floods it with information about himself. 
  Tracking Transience points to the difficultly of tracking time, even as the project 
records itself into perpetuity on the Internet.  In the opening scene of 1984 the protagonist 
Winston begins writing a diary.  It is fitting then that Elahi’s piece should evoke the 
totalitarianism of 1984 and also be in the form of a diary, recording for Big Brother his every 
movement in time and space.  Written ostensibly for the self the diary also addresses an 
unknown future audience. Online photographic diaries are of course quite different than a 
narrative written about oneself to oneself, or to a self that one imagines as different than oneself 
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in the moment, perhaps a self that is better suited to explicate the complexities of the narrative at 
hand.  The online diary is written not for a future self but a potential and unknowable present 
audience; the audience is identifiable through user logs only after the diary has been accessed. A 
broad transformation of the diary genre, the online diary is penned for public consumption, 
depending, of course, upon its privacy settings, and even these can be less secure than the 
physical lock of a diary or a particularly shrewd hiding place. Yet the same rhetorical shaping 
takes place in the choice of framing and subject for both physical and digital diaries.   
Surveillance as a thematic concern conditions the structure of the piece: the audience’s 
position as spectator is identical to that of a surveillance operator; yet one who, without a serious 
commitment of time, will ultimately learn very little about Elahi, which is the point of flooding 
the viewer with information. As Elahi says of his website, “the interface I use is deliberately 
user-unfriendly.  A lot of work is required to thread together the thousands of available points of 
information.  By putting everything about me out there, I am simultaneously telling everything 
and nothing about my life” (Elahi). The piece is certainly humorous; it underscores the absurdity 
of Elahi’s situation, and the thought of F.B.I. agents looking through images of the urinals Elahi 
uses is comical.  Yet its comedy is related to ideology: the rhetorical clarity and self-evidence of 
the piece depends upon the viewer being in on the joke.  The piece also critiques the reflexive 
humanizing drama of the media and its impulse to depict human rights actors as victims or 
perpetrators.  Elahi uses the tools of documentary immediacy – the constant influx of “real” 
pictures - without the stock images of vulnerability familiar to purveyors of human rights 
narratives: women, children, elderly; the maimed, vulnerable, and dispossessed. The subject of 
the human rights violation – namely, Elahi – is not even shown.  Instead, the spectator’s desire 
for narrative is satisfied by a camera logic that explicitly mimics surveillance.  Thus the piece 
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transforms the form of the human rights narrative; instead of a sympathetic member of the 
public, the viewer becomes a part of the GPS of human rights, locating and recognizing Elahi’s 
position as victim, citizen, and activist, all while regulating his movements. 
Tracking Transience does not show or capture action.  Action is only implied by the bills 
showing that goods have been bought, or the train before it is boarded, or the urinal before (one 
fervently hopes) it is used.  After viewing photograph after photograph, locations themselves 
began to seem as transient and shifting as time, and thumbnail after thumbnail of meals don’t 
translate into the artist’s experience in eating them.  The posterity brought into being by the act 
of photographing and uploading is a questionable one: what is Elahi recording?  I cannot draw 
out one photograph as I might one sentence of a diary, because you may never be able to find it.   
But Elahi’s maps remind the user that the artist is an actual person and not a disembodied voice 
on the Internet.  It mattered very much where he was located on 9/11, where he was going and 
where he had been; it mattered where he was from, and what the map of his life looked like.   
Charles Taylor uses the metaphor of a map to explain his theory of the modern social 
imaginary: “The understanding implicit in practice stands to social theory in the same relation 
that my ability to get around a familiar environment stands to a (literal) map of this area.  I am 
very well able to orient myself without ever having to adopt the standpoint of overview the map 
offers me.  Similarly, for most of human history and for most of social life, we function through 
the grasp we have on the common repertory, without benefit of theoretical overview” (Modern 
Social Imaginaries, 26).  He offers a theoretical overview with his metaphorical map, but does 
not indicate how the land we are actually standing upon and our relationship to it determines 
what the map looks like.  Spatial narratives play a role in the development of the social 
imaginary, and it follows that spatial narratives play a role in our understanding of publics. 
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Moving back to Taylor’s theoretical map, how do I orient myself given the ideological 
and physical maps Elahi provides?  Do I relate to Elahi the persecuted artist, wrongly accused, 
who thumbs his nose at the authorities by mapping his every move for them?  I cannot honestly 
put myself in league with the authorities, as I am somewhat indifferent to the particularities of 
what I am being shown (what airport, view, or café) and much more interested in the fact that I 
am being shown something at all.  Elahi tracks his movements without punctual rhythms, and his 
maps are continuously shifting.  But the flashing red arrow that indicates his location at any 
given moment roots him with reference to my position, and I read his times and dates with 
reference to my own experience of the simultaneous time we are experiencing.  I can imagine 
myself as one among many, anywhere in the world, relating myself in time and space to Elahi’s 
map.  Do I only participate in the public address of Elahi’s piece in the exact moment of access?  
Do I continue to be a part of this public when I no longer feel in sync with him in time? Elahi’s 
project constructs his own meanings for private and public.  He voluntarily and publicly deprives 
himself of the privacy the United State government violated (in private, no less) and questions 
the very concept of privacy in which many of our notions of human rights are enshrined.   
In a culture that adores social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, in which many 
people record their every movement, upload photos of their vacations, homes, and families, and 
tell readers their likes, dislikes, and favorite breakfast cereals, Elahi’s piece seems less 
subversive than aligned with our voluntary disintegration of the spheres of public and private.  
The scene Elahi envisions through his piece – oriented as it were to a “horizon of difference” - is 
a scene in which persons and citizens of the Muslim faith are not routinely harassed and deprived 
of their right to privacy.  But the scene he encounters is one in which monitoring and 
surveillance, whether through the ubiquitous cameras on city streets and lights, or new facial 
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recognition software which enables people to search for photographs online without relying on 
tags, or the global project of Google Maps, are accepted as normal features of social life.   
In previous chapters, I argued that Kahf explored the ways in which Muslim practice in 
the United States defied secular understandings of public and private, and that Alameddine’s 
novel demanded public recognition for people – namely HIV positive gay men and the victims of 
sectarian violence in Lebanon- who are excluded from democratic promises of private religious 
and sexual freedom.  I looked at the ways in which Esber merges female eroticism with public 
forms of prayer, and how Fatmi challenges public, dominant Western narratives of Islam and of 
9/11.  Elahi’s piece demonstrates not a shift in the realms of secular private and public life – for, 
as we have seen with Alameddine, those excluded from the mainstream have always been 
regulated – but an exposure of those regulatory workings.   
While interviewing Elahi on his satirical news program, comedian Stephen Colbert says: 
“So if somebody really wants to guard their privacy they should make it something no one wants 
by not having it anymore” (“Episode 62”). In response, Elahi points out that if 300 million U.S. 
citizens give up this kind of information, it will require 300 million employees to keep track of 
the “data flood” (“Episode 62”).  With the revelation of PRISM we realize that government does 
not need 300 intelligence agents, it just needs algorithms to monitor our levels of “foreignness” 
or “threats.”40  During a keynote at the IFA in Berlin, Google CEO Eric Schmidt said of Google, 
“We can suggest what you should do next, what you care about.  Imagine: We know where you 
are, we know what you like” (Schmidt). Surveillance here is linked to consumerism, and in fact 
                                                          
40 “PRISM is a system the NSA uses to gain access to the private communications of users of nine popular Internet 
services. We know that access is governed by Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was 
enacted in 2008. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper tacitly admitted PRISM’s existence in a blog post 
last Thursday. A classified PowerPoint presentation leaked by Edward Snowden states that PRISM enables 
‘collection directly from the servers’ of Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook and other online companies” (Lee). 
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to information that we already, like Elahi encouraged us to do, give up through our use of sites 
like Google and Facebook.  In Tracking Transcience, humanity is not portrayed as a universal, 
shared condition, or even an ethical category encompassing all humans.  It is not, as in Esber, 
embodied by the evocation of both physicality and transcendence.  It is not, as in Fatmi, revealed 
in new ways through the decontextualization of dominant media narratives and sacred images.  
Rather, humanity is shown in habits of consumption, as much of what Elahi records are these 
habits, from the food he eats to the goods he purchases.  It makes sense that if corporations like 
Google know what we do and what we want by scrutinizing our every move online, Elahi’s 
digital performance piece on publicity and privacy should circle around his consumerism.  
Elahi uses the online diary form because unlike a published book or serial, it allows for 
continuous, uninterrupted access to his life, unbound by the passage of years and unmoored from 
place despite his constant mapping.  The Internet may be seemingly formless, or its form may be 
the screen its users manipulate.  It can also however be read as a vehicle for national or secular 
values.  The balance between the value of free expression and the right to privacy on the Internet 
is another ongoing debate playing out through Google, which is transforming our very notions of 
public and private. The very surveillance techniques Elahi is protesting through his project are 
perhaps pointing to the relationship between neo-liberalism, globalization, national security, and 
the dissolution of privacy.  After all, Schmidt says the following about privacy concerns: "If you 
have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first 
place. If you really need that kind of privacy, the reality is that search engines - including Google 
- do retain this information for some time and it's important, for example, that we are all subject 
in the United States to the Patriot Act and it is possible that all that information could be made 
available to the authorities” (Metz).  Of course, we recently found out, it has been.   
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 Schmidt’s words demonstrate that the very notion of the spheres of private and public as 
constituted through secularism narratives are disintegrating: every action outside the actual 
physical space of the home is open for public consumption.  And the home itself –in marked 
contrast to the divisions between domestic and public that distinguish secularism – is open as 
well, be it on Google Street View, or the Internet searches one makes from the living room that 
are archived by Google and other search engines, and are available to the government upon 
request.  The public indicated by Tracking Transience cannot operate unequivocally within the 
terms of secular/religious categorizations of public and private because it represents and critiques 
both the artificial division between public and private promised by the United States government 
and implicated by Elahi’s own experience as a target of surveillance.  Elahi’s project, through 
publicness, aims to transform our understanding of the public sphere, but ends up underscoring 
the frightening changes the Internet is enabling through his very use of monitoring tools.  The 
space of circulation for this project is a social entity that is simultaneously intimate and public, 
which reflects these changes.  As Elahi says, “I’ve discovered the best way to protect your 
privacy is to give it away” (Thompson). 
It is that willingness to give away our privacy that concerns Jill Lepore, as she writes 
about the dissolution of the rhetorical public self in the United States.  She argues that “Secret 
government programs that pry into people’s private affairs are bound up with ideas about secrecy 
and privacy that arose during the process by which the mysterious became secular” (33).  She 
goes on to say that “something creepy happened when mystery became secular, secrecy became 
a technology, and privacy became a right.  The inviolability of the self replaced the inscrutability 
of God” (35).  When mystery becomes the province of governments and not religion, it becomes, 
as evidenced by the work of the authors and artists discussed in this dissertation, entangled in 
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secular technologies of assimilation, exclusion, and surveillance. Thus Elahi’s piece turns on the 
notion of display.  It asks happens what happens when citizens are deprived of both privacy and 
public-ness through secret detentions. 
Tracking Transience: The Orwell Project uses a technological framework to comment on 
the changing conditions of privacy and publicity post-9/11.  Elahi’s diary of digital images and 
maps is a self-generated virtual surveillance system that mimics, parodies, and produces the 
commonality of public scrutiny for Muslim Americans.  While Elahi’s piece records his 
movements in specific moments in time, creating a map of his time, his digital archive also 
critiques what digital media, and theories of media, are capable of in this age of vast personal 
exposure and government surveillance. Similarly, by converting the written diary into 
photographic surveillance, Elahi injects the aesthetics of everyday reality into hyper-politicized 
discourses on Muslims.  Each of the works included in my dissertation engage with the 
restrictions of prohibitory secularism – which promises religious freedom but is undermined by 
its foundational ideologies.  All in some way also engage with exposure: when Khadra removes 
her veil in a secluded, private space in a public garden in Syria, her veil becomes a metaphor for 
the spiritual exposure of a believer’s ravaged and precious self to the Divine.  When she drapes it 
over her head upon her return to the United States it becomes a metaphor for her political 
awakening.  Mohammed, through his art and storytelling, exposes the violent biases of 
institutional religion and the secular state, as well as the political machinations that led to the 
slaughter and displacement of thousands in Lebanon, and the death of thousands from AIDS.   
And each responds by using form – from Alameddine’s subversion of the mu’arada, to Esber’s 
co-mingling of ritual devotion with erotica, to Elahi’s online diary – to dismantle the division 
between public and private, and set a new course for the secularization narrative.   
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